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From the Editor

Dail Fields

Regent University

This issue of the International Journal of Leadership Studies continues our diverse international offerings. First, Greer and Jehn, scholars from The Netherlands, investigated the strategies used by team members who emerged as leaders in organizations communicating primarily via email. More organizations than ever seem to fit this description, so this study is both timely and relevant. In a cross-cultural application of a widely used leadership assessment, Rudd and colleagues assessed the equivalence of the Leadership Behavior Inventory across U.S. and German cultures and investigated differences between leader behaviors across the two cultures. Addressing another cross-cultural challenge, Osula and Irvin explored the influence of cultural dimensions on intercultural mentoring, drawing on the findings of the GLOBE Project. In an innovative look at leadership, Houghton and Lipscomb presented a historical analysis of leaders from the Civil War producing the somewhat provocative result that a leader’s pessimistic explanatory style could be related to leadership effectiveness in some situations by reducing excessive aggression and risk taking. In a shift to the “dark side” of leadership, Chandler provided an integrated framework for considering how unethical leadership develops and perseveres in organizations. Finally, Choi examined emergent leadership, focusing on the extent to which public employees’ perceptions on shared leadership are partially explainable by organizational structure, culture, and context factors.

The diversity of the research presented by our authors offers all of us an opportunity to develop global perspectives on the role of leaders and followers in organizations. Our authors continue to bless us with excellent material, and we continue to work hand-in-hand with authors to present interesting, educational, and professional research. Prospective authors should take note that the IJLS now has more than 2,500 subscribers, receiving our issues free of charge via the Internet. We continue to seek new manuscripts, so bring them on!

This issue marks the departure of Dr. Myra Dingman as managing editor of IJLS. Needless to say, I will miss her help significantly. Myra has tirelessly worked to make IJLS a solid and respected online journal. We wish her well with her new endeavors at Deloitte Consulting LLP.
Follow Me: Strategies Used by Emergent Leaders in Virtual Organizations

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*University of Amsterdam, Netherlands*

Karen A. Jehn  
*Leiden University, Netherlands*

In this multi-method study, we investigated the strategies used by members who emerged as leaders in organizations communicating primarily via e-mail communication. We hypothesized and found that members who emerged as leaders tended to rely on soft influence tactics, were consistent in their usage of a certain influence tactic, and participated in e-mail exchanges more than other members. Additionally, we found that e-mail style moderated the relationship between soft tactic usage and emergent leadership, such that members who used weak e-mail style when using soft tactics were more likely to emerge as leaders. The use of weak e-mail style, such as typos or unclear wording, may have increased the degree to which soft tactics were perceived to be sincere, and therefore increased their effectiveness.

As social and technological forces change the face of management in the 21st century, insight is needed into how managers can capture the value provided by new and improved communication technology. This is especially relevant for managers called to work in virtual teams. As virtual teams become more prominent, research is needed into how computer-mediated communication will affect traditional leadership processes (c.f. Barry & Fulmer, 2004). For example, virtual organizations, such as large online interest groups, that are created without an existing hierarchy in place have created a need for studies of leadership in such unstructured organizations in which emergent leaders (members who gain their position from the support of followers; Hollander, 1958, 1974), rather than hierarchical leaders, may play a central role. Therefore, this multi-method study aims to better understand the leadership processes in such environments by investigating the strategies members can take to emerge as leaders in virtual organizations.

Computer-mediated communication entails forms of indirect interaction mediated by a machine, such as e-mail or instant-messaging (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998). The particular form of computer-mediated communication used by the organizations examined in this study is electronic mail, which has become a fundamental communication tool for millions of people.
worldwide (Friedman & Currall, 2003). Electronic mail, or e-mail, is a type of interpersonal message service that allows the transmission of written messages from one point to another electronically, rather than by physical delivery (Loperfido, 1993). E-mail is asynchronous, rapid, and text-based (Friedman & Currall, 2003). These characteristics make this form of communication very useful for leaders but also make it different from traditional forms of communication. This may have large consequences for how leaders communicate within their organizations, as they have to adapt to an environment which may constrain their ability to express non-verbal behaviors (Daft & Lengel, 1984, 1986).

Leadership at its most basic level is the ability to influence others (Kochan, Schmidt, & De Cotiis, 1975). Influence tactics can thus be viewed as a vital tool of leaders. Past research on influence tactics has examined the spectrum of influence tactics (e.g., Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinsin, 1980), the consequences of tactic usage (e.g., Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988), and the situational determinants of tactical choice (e.g., Schilit & Locke, 1982). However, research has yet to investigate the relationship between influence tactic usage and leader emergence in an organization, and in the setting of virtual organizations in particular. Rather, past leadership and influence tactic research has focused mostly on existing leaders in hierarchical settings (c.f. Buzzanell et al., 1997). However, the rise of virtual teams and other such groups which communicate primarily over virtual mediums and are created without an existing hierarchy in place has created a need for studies of emergent leadership in virtual, unstructured organizations. Hollander (1958, 1974) was one of the first to differentiate between two different categories of leadership: hierarchical and emergent. The first category of leadership that Hollander proposed consisted of members who achieve their role using their formal positions within the organizational hierarchy. The second category consisted of emergent leaders who gain their position from the support of followers. As of yet, research has yet to specifically address the strategies members aspiring to be emergent leaders can take to ensure themselves a position of high status in their virtual organization.

Additionally, scant research has examined the usage of influence tactics in the online environment (c.f. Barry & Fulmer, 2004). For virtual teams who communicate primarily over computer-mediated communication, the nature of interaction may greatly differ from traditional face-to-face interaction (Driskell, Radtke, & Salas, 2003). Traditional organizational process, such as the communication of influence tactics, could be very different when occurring over e-mail, which could greatly affect how aspiring leaders should communicate with other organizational members. Media richness theory provides a framework for comparing computer-mediated communication to face-to-face communication (Daft & Lengel, 1984, 1986). Media richness theory posits that media differ in their ability to translate non-verbal cues. Face-to-face mediums, which are able to fully capture non-verbal cues, are classified as “rich” while textual mediums, which are less able to capture non-verbal cues, are classified as “lean.” Because of the textual nature of e-mail, it has been described as a lean medium (Daft & Lengel, 1984, 1986).

The leanness of e-mail could have important implications for aspiring leaders. First of all, in rich face-to-face communication, non-verbal cues can be used to exert influence. However, in lean mediums, such as written text and computer-mediated communication, traditional non-verbal communication may not be as easily, immediately communicable (Daft & Lengel, 1984; Driskell et al., 2003; Friedman & Currall, 2003; Tanis & Postmes, 2003). This could have two effects on influence tactic usage in computer-mediated communication. The first is that influence strategies that work in face-to-face channels may not work the same in e-mail. The second effect of lean mediums is on how influence tactics are articulated. Because
nonverbal cues are eliminated, the presentation of the verbal cues, or the e-mail style, is very important. E-mail style is similar to the concept of verbal style in oral communication. Verbal style has been defined as “the specific pattern of word choices exhibited within a particular context that has an impact on how the interactants assign meaning to the content of the interaction” (Baker, 1990, p. 13). Similarly, we define e-mail style as the choice and presentation of words in an e-mail which impacts how others assign meaning to the e-mail. While communication style has always been a key tool of leaders (Bass, 1985; Pfeffer, 1981), the confines of groups bond to e-mail communication may make it even more essential. Our research thus addresses the implications for aspiring leaders of using different influence tactics in e-mail communication.

Our study draws on e-mail and interview data collected over a period of three years from unstructured political-organizing organizations in the United States. Political-organizing organizations offer an excellent opportunity to study leadership strategies via e-mail as members tend to be high users of e-mail, given the suitability of e-mail for the complex organizational activities of such organizations and the rapid communication required for their collective actions (Garton & Wellman, 1995). Our study will thus investigate how a member’s usage of various influence tactics may affect the likelihood of the member becoming an emergent leader in the organization and how the e-mail style with which the influence tactics are communicated may affect their usefulness in helping the member to become an emergent leader in the organization. Our study will provide aspiring leaders with advice on how best to gain power when communicating over virtual mediums.

**Theoretical Background**

Leadership and influence have been studied from a number of perspectives including social psychology, interpersonal communication, and management. In this paper, we utilize the three category grouping of leadership influence behaviors of hard, soft, and rational influence tactics (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985), a commonly used framework in past empirical studies of influence tactics. Hard tactics are comprised of direct asserted requests for compliance (Miller, 1983). Hard tactics typically involve aggressive behaviors (Barry & Shapiro, 1992; Farmer, Maslyn, Fedor, & Goodman, 1997; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985), such as the use of demands, threats, or persistent reminders (Somech & Drach-Zahavy, 2002; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Soft tactics are generally thought to consist of friendliness or ingratiation (Barr & Shapiro, 1992; Farmer, Maslyn, Fedor, & Goodman, 1997; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). Ingratiation in the context of influence tactics is used to convince a target to think favorably of the agent before the agent asks the target to do something (Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984). Rational tactics involve information sharing and the application of logic (Kipnis et al., 1980; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985; Somech & Drach-Zahavy, 2002; Yukl & Tracey, 1992).

Past research on influence tactics has found that soft and rational tactics are the most commonly used tactics by all types of members within an organization (e.g., Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, & Ochana-Levin, 2004). However, findings for the relative effectiveness of each tactic are mixed, as seen in Higgins, Judge, and Ferris’s (2003) meta-analysis of influence tactics and work outcomes. Higgins and his co-authors found that soft and rational tactics tended to correlate the most strongly with performance assessments, but hard tactics tended to correlate more strongly with extrinsic success, such as salary or promotions. This could be explained by the fact that soft and rational tactics incite less of a negative reaction in the influence target than
hard tactics whose verbal aggressiveness may invoke feelings of anger and resentment (c.f. Schwarzwald et al., 2004). Our study will examine if these findings on the effects of influence tactics on performance outcomes can also be translated into increases in informal status within organizations that communicate primarily online.

Soft Influence Tactic Usage in E-mail

Soft tactics, or ingratiation as they are often simply called, involve the use of friendliness or flattery to gain compliance with a request. Ingratiation is a process whereby a person tries to improve his or her attractiveness in the eyes of others (Jones, 1964; Wortman & Linsenmeier, 1977). Research has found that the use of ingratiation increases influence (Barry & Shapiro, 1992; Gordon, 1996; McFarland, Ryan, & Kriska, 2002; Watt, 1993; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Kelman’s (1961) theory of identification provides an explanation for this: through reinforcement of the target’s role relationship with the agent (Miller, 1983), the agent is able to develop influence over the target. The leanness of e-mail could prove useful for soft tactics, as ulterior motives are less apparent (c.f. Barry & Fulmer, 2004). For example, a compliment given before a request may not seem as suspicious in e-mail because the ‘wink’ given in such a situation is not seen in the e-mail (i.e. “Oh you look nice today! Will you do X for me?”). Past research on ingratiation has supported this prediction, finding ingratiation more successful in lean mediums such as computer-mediated communication and audio than it was in rich mediums such as face-to-face communication (Gordon, 1996). Our first hypothesis, therefore, is as follows:

\[ H_1: \] Soft tactic usage in e-mail is positively related to leadership emergence.

Rational Influence Tactic Usage in E-mail

Rational tactics involve the use of logical reasoning to convince influence targets why they should comply. Although past research on the relative effectiveness of rational tactics has revealed contradictory findings (e.g., Yukl & Tracey, 1992), rational tactics are accepted as the most commonly used influence tactic (e.g., Somech & Drach-Zahavy, 2002) because they are unlikely to incite negative emotional reactions in others. Rational tactics are also likely to be effective in e-mail. E-mail is very amenable to the transmission and aggregation of factual information. E-mail’s text-based nature, speed, ability to send messages to multiple users, and ability to store and retrieve information make it very useful in information sharing (Romm & Pliskin, 1997). As rational tactics often involve the use of information to support a request, rational tactics should be well-suited to usage in e-mail. Therefore, our second hypothesis is as follows:

\[ H_2: \] Rational tactic usage in e-mail is positively related to leadership emergence.

Hard Influence Tactic Usage in E-mail

Using hard tactics in e-mail, which are often viewed as being unfriendly (van Knippenberg & Steensma, 2003), may in contrast inhibit a member from emerging as a leader. For example, a very directive statement such as “you must do this now” from someone who is not yet a clear leader might not be accepted and could be seen as being too presumptive. The repercussions of
this could be that other members would not like this person enough for the person to emerge as a leader in this team. Along this line, hard tactics could also be perceived as conveying close control and lack of freedom of choice (Schwarzwald et al., 2004), which again, when coming from someone who is not yet a leader, might be poorly taken by other members. We therefore propose hypothesis three:

\[ H_3: \text{Hard tactic usage in e-mail is negatively related to leadership emergence.} \]

**Leadership and Influence Tactic Consistency**

Past leadership research has found that leaders tend to be consistent in their behavior (e.g., Albright & Forziati, 1995; Richardsen & Piper, 1986). This is perhaps because consistency is effective. Richardsen and Piper (1986) found that consistent leader behavior was associated with greater learning by group members in their study. They defined consistency as uniformity in the predominant style of the leader. In this study, we propose that uniformity in style—specifically, consistency in influence tactic usage—is associated with a member’s emergence as a leader within an organization. Using influence tactics in a consistent manner can also be important to leaders from the standpoint of procedural fairness. Consistency, as a procedural rule, implies that members in higher positions use procedures consistently across both people and time (Leventhal, 1980). Past research has found that this procedural rule is very important within organizations (e.g., Van den Bos, Vermunt & Wilke, 1996). De Cramer (2003) found that leadership inconsistency was regarded as unfair, decreasing the self-esteem of members who were low in social self-esteem and increasing their willingness to replace the leader. This implies that members who are not consistent run the risk of losing, rather than gaining, power in the organization. Consistency is also important in e-mail communications. Because members in virtual teams communicate primarily by e-mail, members have to base their impressions of other members on limited information (e.g., Lea & Spears, 1992). It is therefore essential that the limited information available be consistent. Without consistent information, members would be unable to form accurate perceptions of each other, and leaders would not be recognized as such. Additionally, without consistency in behavior, other members may misinterpret member communications, further inhibiting the likelihood of the member to emerge as a leader in the organization. We therefore propose hypothesis four:

\[ H_4: \text{Consistency in influence tactic usage in e-mail is positively related to leadership emergence.} \]

**Leadership and E-mail Participation**

Members who are more engaged in the group (i.e. participate more) may also be more likely to become leaders. Early theories and research suggested that participation is a critical behavior of emergent leaders (e.g., Bass, 1949; Geier, 1967; Morris & Hackman, 1969). Indeed, a meta-analysis by Mullen, Salas, and Driskell (1989) found that members with high levels of verbal participation were the most likely to be chosen as leaders. Relatedly, past research has found that leaders are extroverts (Bales, 1950; Lashbrook, 1975; Lord, DeVader, & Alliger, 1986; Riggio, 2003) and tend to interact more with the group than others in order to achieve their desired results (Riggio, 2003). The relation of participation and emergent leadership may be
explained by several factors. First of all, a member who puts forth more effort to participate may be seen as more motivated to work for the group than other members, and therefore, may be seen as a good potential leader (Sorrentino & Boutilier, 1975; Sorrentino & Field, 1986). Secondly, participation may also signal that the member possesses certain characteristics, such as task expertise, which may also imply to other members that the member should be a good leader in the situation (e.g., Stein & Heller, 1979). In groups characterized by their usage of lean mediums, frequent communication is predicted to be even more important as members aspiring to be leaders try to exert their presence over a medium that does not allow for easy identification of the social cues usually associated with leaders (Zigurs, 2002). This prediction has been supported by past research on the relative participation of hierarchical leaders in e-mail communication, which has found that high-status members communicated more than low-status members (e.g., Weisband, Schneider, & Connolly, 1995). We therefore propose hypothesis five:

\[ H_5: \text{E-mail participation will be positively related to leadership emergence.} \]

The Moderating Effect of E-mail Style

In computer-mediated communication, the style in which the e-mail is written may be especially important for members aspiring to be leaders. E-mail style is wording used in an email that affects the way readers assign meaning to the message. This is similar to the concept of verbal style, as introduced by Baker (1990). Strong e-mail style includes correct grammar, the absence of misspellings, and the use of clear language. In e-mail, strong e-mail style may be especially important as past research has found that impressions formed via computer-mediated communication are stronger than those formed from face-to-face interactions (Hancock & Durham, 2001; Lea & Spears, 1992; Walther, 1996). This has been explained by the fact that in lean mediums, users often engage in an “overattribution” process. Users build impressions of others over e-mail without qualifying the strength of the impressions by the scant information they are built upon—for example, spelling errors or e-mail “signatures.” This overreliance on minimal cues means that weak e-mail style or strong style will have a greater effect on group perceptions of the member in computer-mediated communication than in other mediums, such as face-to-face communication. Therefore, e-mail style has the potential to greatly moderate the effectiveness of e-mail influence attempts by members aspiring to be leaders (c.f. Higgins et al., 2003). We propose that e-mail style moderates the effectiveness of influence, such that rational tactics will be enhanced by strong e-mail style and the effectiveness of rational tactics will be diminished by poor e-mail style. We therefore propose hypothesis six:

\[ H_6: \text{E-mail style moderates influence tactic usage in e-mail for emergent leaders; specifically, influence tactic usage will be more strongly related to leader emergence when strong e-mail style is used in the e-mail than when weak e-mail style is used in the e-mail.} \]
Methods

Data and Sample

We conducted a three-year multi-method field study on political-organizing organizations located in the United States that used e-mail extensively for their communications. These organizations included, for instance, an international women’s organization, a university peace organization, an environmental organization, and a community improvement organization. We collected e-mail data from these organizations over a period of 36 months by becoming a member of the general list serves for the organizations, conducting interviews with members, taking field notes at meetings, and collecting hard copies of handouts from organizational meetings and other ideological materials, similar to the methods employed by Philips and Eisenberg (1993). Given the complexity of influence attempts, qualitative research methods in conjunction with traditional quantitative methods is an especially useful way to study the complex topic of influence (Barry & Fulmer, 2004; c.f. Lee, 1999). Our total e-mail sample consisted of 7,617 e-mails, sent from a total of 631 members representing 10 different organizations. The average organization had 63 members and had exchanged a total of 646 e-mails over the period of the study. Fifty-four percent of the members were female, and the average member age was 33.

Measures

To measure influence tactic usage and e-mail tactics in e-mail, we utilized both quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data included text analyses and coder ratings. The qualitative data included interviews and ethnographic observation. In the following sections, we will describe the exact measures used to assess each construct.

Because it was not feasible to code 7,617 e-mails, we reduced the sample size for coding based on the procedure used by Finholt, Sproull, and Kiesler (2002). Members who sent more than 1% of a group’s e-mails were first chosen, presuming that members who sent less than 1% of the e-mails were not active participants of the group. For the text analyses, we ran all emails sent by these ‘active’ members (165 members) through a text analysis engine; specifically, 4592 emails were text-analyzed. Next, for the coder ratings, for each ‘active’ member, one e-mail per month for each month of the study was randomly selected for coding, similar to the selection process of archived reply files done by Finholt et al. (2002). This strategy allowed 13.7% of the e-mails to be sampled (1031 emails) for coder ratings, as is common with this method.

Influence tactic usage and e-mail style. To obtain a quantitative measure of influence tactic usage and e-mail style, we used the results of word counts from a text analysis as well as the results of coder ratings of the emails. For the text analysis, we analyzed all e-mails through a text-analysis engine based on procedures set forth in previous research (Baker, 1990; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2004; Weisband 2002). To measure the usage of each influence tactic, we developed a keyword list for each of the variables based on past research and the language actually used by group members (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). To measure e-mail style, we utilized a keyword list developed by Baker (1990). The complete list of keywords used can be found in the Appendix. We then sorted the data into individual files for each member. These files were subsequently searched for the keywords using the text-analysis engine MonoConc Pro 2.0.
Because the keywords could also occur with a negation term, such as “not,” we used a Boolean search in Monoconc to identify the number of times a keyword occurred in conjunction with a negation term. This total was then subtracted from the total times the keyword was used. From this, we were able to obtain the frequencies of keywords for each construct. The keywords used for influence tactics were based on past research (e.g., Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985) and the language actually used by group members (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). To measure e-mail style, we employed the keyword list of Baker (1990).

The second method of measurement was the use of independent raters. For the coding, we utilized two coders who were both blind to the hypotheses. The coders were presented with the exact same packet of e-mails, with each e-mail containing the e-mail heading (including information such as date sent, importance, and subject) and e-mail message. Coders received verbal instructions, including a discussion of the theoretical constructs for which they were to be coding. Following this, the coders then answered a set of questions, based on a Likert scale of 1-7 (with 7 being high), for each of the e-mails. The two raters had an inter-rater agreement of 96%, demonstrating very high reliability.

The exact questions the coders used to rate the influence tactic usage and e-mail style of the sender of the e-mail are shown in the Appendix. The operationalization of these measures was based on existing influence tactic (e.g., Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985) and verbal style literature (Baker, 1990) and an initial pretest of the coder questions. In the pre-tests, we initially utilized items more similar to traditional influence tactic scales which capture more overt influence attempts (e.g., Kipnis, et al., 1980). However, in our pre-test, we found that these questions were too strong for the e-mail context, as the subtleness underlying influence tactic usage is not as visible in e-mail (Barsness & Bhappu, 2004). We therefore adapted our questions for the coders to fit the more subtle e-mail context. The Appendix contains our final items. Because our questions had to be modified to fit the e-mail context, we made a point of discussing in depth the underlying definitions of influence tactics and e-mail styles with the coders so that the coders were aware of the construct they were rating in the e-mail context.

The two methods of measurement—text analyses and independent coders—exhibited high agreement, with Cohen’s kappa for rational tactics equaling .77, for soft tactics .80, for hard tactics .81, and for e-mail style .80. The final measure for each influence tactic and e-mail style variable was the standardized average of the scores from the text analysis and coder ratings.

Influence tactic consistency and participation measures. For our measure of the consistency of a member’s use of a certain influence tactic, we used the coefficient of variation, and then reverse-coded it. The coefficient of variation has traditionally been used in diversity research to capture the range of diversity on a continuous variable such as age (Bedeian & Mossholder, 2000). The range was from .30 to .99. A score of .99 means a member was highly consistent.

To measure the participation level of members, we used a straight count of the e-mails sent per member.

Emergent leadership measures. For our dependent variable, emergent leadership, measures came from coding of e-mails done by independent raters blind to the hypotheses (see Appendix for questions), and from coding done by an expert rater, blind to the hypotheses, who had ethnographic experience with all the groups in our sample over time. The independent raters
rated the e-mails in the sample as described above. The expert rater rated each of the members in the organizations on the degree to which they became leaders or not, based on the expert rater’s personal, first-hand knowledge of each of these groups. These two measures—independent coding of e-mails and ratings from an expert who participated in the groups—were highly related, with an inter-rater agreement ($r_{wg}$) of .86, and were thus averaged together. Additionally, for five of the groups, we had supplemental qualitative interview data with four members active in one or more of the unstructured groups that gave members’ own opinions on who the leaders were in their group. As Buzzanell et al. (1997) noted, “Members’ leadership frequently is legitimated through meetings” (p. 291). These interviews served as qualitative confirmations to our quantitative assessments of who the leaders were within the groups.

**Control variables.** We initially controlled for the gender and race of members. In preliminary analyses, we found that neither gender nor age significantly affected our model, so demographics were left out of ensuing analyses.

**Analysis.** To test our hypotheses, we used hierarchical regression analysis. To create the interaction terms, we centered our independent variable in line with the procedure of Aiken and West (1991). Because our dependent variable is the degree to which a member emerges as a leader, we analyzed our data at the individual level of analysis. Specifically, we aggregated the email level-ratings to a mean member level score (e.g., for soft tactics, a member’s score would represent the average level of soft tactics used by the member across emails the member sent to the organization).

Additionally, we also investigated whether there was significant variance between the different organizations included in our sample that would call for a multi-level analysis of our data. Inter-class correlations (ICC[1]s) and corresponding F-tests indicated that there was not significant variance between organizations nor significant correlations within the organizations (all F-tests for our independent and dependent variables were non-significant, and ICC[1]s ranged from .01-.05) (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). However, to provide a conservative test of our hypotheses, we still do control for any possible differences between organizations through the use of dummy variables representing the different organizations.

Lastly, to analyze our data, which we had collected over a period of three years, we split our data in half, looking at the effects of our independent variables during the first 1.5 years of the study on our dependent variable, leadership emergence, as coded during the last 1.5 years of the study. Emails sent during the first 1.5 years were text analyzed and coded separately from emails sent during the last 1.5 years of the study.

**Results**

Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables are shown in Table 1. The results of our hypothesis testing are presented in Table 2. In step 1, we entered the independent variables of our model. In step 2, we entered the interactions of e-mail style with the different types of influence tactics.
Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (N = 168)

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<td>.28**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Participation</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>48.39</td>
<td>.35*</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. E-mail style</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td></td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.78**</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Emergent leadership</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.22*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.

In general, influence tactic usage and participation explained between 15% and 32% of the variance in emergent leadership. Our first hypothesis proposed that soft tactic usage would be positively related to leadership emergence. As seen in Table 2, this was supported, as there was a relation between soft tactic usage and leadership emergence ($\beta = .34, p < .05$). Our second hypothesis stated that rational tactic usage would be positively related to leadership emergence. We did not find significant support for this hypothesis. Our third hypothesis predicted that hard tactic usage would be negatively related to leadership emergence. This was not supported, as there was not a significant difference between rational and hard tactic usage. We further hypothesized that members who would emerge as leaders would be consistent in their use of an influence tactic. Hypothesis 4 was marginally supported as there was a positive, marginally significant relationship between tactic consistency and emergent leadership ($\beta = .17, p < .10$). In Hypothesis 5, we proposed that e-mail participation would be positively related to leadership emergence. This was fully supported ($\beta = .21, p < .05$). In our sixth hypothesis, we proposed that e-mail style would improve the effectiveness of the different types of influence tactics. The moderation of influence tactic usage by e-mail style was only significant for soft tactics ($\beta = -.22, p < .05$). As seen in Figure 1, we found the opposite of what we predicted: soft tactics were the most effective for leadership emergence when members had weak e-mail style. For members using soft or hard tactics, there was no moderation by e-mail style.
Table 2: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Participation, Influence Tactics, and E-mail Style Predicting Emergent Leadership Time 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1 (F = .41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Dummy 1</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Dummy 2</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Dummy 3</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization Dummy 4</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Dummy 5</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Dummy 6</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization Dummy 7</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
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<td>Organization Dummy 8</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Dummy 9</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2 (F = 1.55*)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Tactics</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft Tactics</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Tactics</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>E-mail Style</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.31*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence Tactic Usage Consistency</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3 (F = 1.70*)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Tactics X E-mail Style</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft Tactics X E-mail Style</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Tactics X E-mail Style</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. $R^2 = .03$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .14$ for Step 2, $\Delta R^2 = .18$ for Step 3. Standardized regression coefficients are shown.

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. 


Discussion

Given the growing occurrence of e-mail usage and virtual teams within organizations, managers must learn how to effectively manage and lead when interacting over lean mediums such as e-mail. The unique properties of computer-mediated communication technologies imply that traditional leadership behaviors have to be adapted to fit a new set of conditions, including both lean communication tools as well as unstructured environments that are often common to virtual teams. Our study’s main contributions involve clarifying how members who emerge as leaders utilize influence tactics in e-mail communication, as well as examining a new conceptualization of influence tactic usage—consistency—and a moderator of influence tactic usage—e-mail style.

Soft tactics were the most positively related influence tactic to emergent leadership. In line with what we proposed, when members used soft tactics, or ingratiation, in their e-mails, they were able to increase their influence over others and attain leadership positions in their organization. Soft tactics have been shown to also increase influence in face-to-face interactions (e.g., Yukl & Tracey, 1992), but if ulterior motives underlying the tactics are exposed, they could potentially hurt the member’s role in the organization. The e-mail environment may provide an ideal location for the use of soft tactics as ulterior motives are easier to conceal in lean environments, such as e-mail (c.f. Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Gordon, 1996). For example, flattery in one e-mail followed by a request in a subsequent e-mail may not be as obviously seen as ingratiating as in real life when the tone of voice someone uses to give a compliment can sometimes give away the fact that the compliment is not sincere and is only a ruse to gain compliance with a request. We do not find either hard tactics or rational tactics to be significantly related to emergent leadership. Because hard tactics are often viewed as unfriendly
(van Knippenberg & Steensma, 2003), it is not surprising the soft tactics were more effective for leadership emergence. However, the lack of an effect of rational tactics on emergent leadership is more surprising. This may have to do with the nature of the e-mail environment. Because of their lean nature, virtual environments may require a strong emphasis on relationships, and therefore, rational tactics are not as effective as soft tactics.

In terms of influence tactic consistency, we did find this to have a marginally significant effect on who became leaders in these organizations. This is in line with theory and research which has suggested that consistency may be especially important in virtual settings, where miscommunication is likely (e.g., Lea & Spears, 1992). Consistency in influence strategies may help reduce the likelihood of such miscommunication. Relatedly, consistent behavior has been shown to increase the perception that a member is fair (e.g., De Cramer, 2003) and likely to be a good leader. Therefore, when choosing an influence strategy, our results show the importance of being consistent in that chosen influence strategy.

Lastly, we examined the effect of the e-mail style of the organizational members on their influence tactic usage. We found that soft tactic usage was the most likely to positively relate to leadership emergence when members used weak e-mail style. It could be that when members write a perfectly crafted e-mail that contains a soft tactic, such as ingratiation, the potentially ulterior motives behind the usage of the soft tactic may seem more apparent. In contrast, when an e-mail does not seem to have been given extensive forethought, compliments (soft tactics) may be more believable to others. For example, a spontaneous postscript at the end of the email with a few typos that tells someone how much their idea was appreciated may feel more heartfelt than a seemingly very deliberately given compliment. This finding extends past research on influence tactics (Barry & Shapiro, 1992; Farmer et al., 1997; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985) by helping identify a strategy that members employing soft tactics can use to make soft tactics seem more credible.

**Limitations and Future Research**

While a strength of our study is the specialized political-organizing setting we used to examine leadership in e-mail communication, this can also be considered a limitation. Our research might not hold in other more traditional organizational settings. Future research should examine if these findings can also be generalized to organizations with different organizational goals.

Future research should also find ways to further refine the aspects of ‘good’ e-mail style and the specific strategies leaders employ to enrich lean mediums to make the use of complex influence tactics, such as soft tactics, possible. While past research has examined aspects of strong verbal style (e.g., Baker, 1990), a clear picture of strong verbal style in lean communication mediums is not yet available. In order to truly understand the processes underlying influence attempts in lean mediums, a thorough understanding of what exactly constitutes strong e-mail style needs to be reached.

**Managerial Implications**

The results of this study suggest several important implications for organizational members when communicating over e-mail. In sum, our research suggests that to be a successful leader when using e-mail, members should use soft tactics, such as friendly
comments and polite requests, to influence others; they should be consistent in their influence strategy; and members should participate in e-mail exchanges as often as possible. These findings offer important implications for managers. For example, when working in a virtual team, making your presence known through active participation in e-mail exchanges is critical in gaining a leadership role within the team. Relatedly, consistency in behavior is also critical when engaging in these e-mail exchanges, as misunderstandings are common in virtual settings, and consistent behavior may help others more reliably interpret others’ words and actions. When members know that a member tends to always give feedback in a, for example, rational manner, they may be better able to interpret the meaning of comments than if the member were not always consistent. By being able to reliably predict a member’s style, other members may be less likely to read incorrect meanings into e-mails from the member, and the member is therefore better able to become a leader in the virtual organization.

Additionally, we find that employees should be careful that when they use soft tactics, they do not use strong e-mail style. Perfectly written emails may make compliments seem overly thought out and insincere, whereas more spontaneous soft tactic usage may be taken more to heart by other organizational members. While it may be a step too far to train employees to write e-mails with weak e-mail style, organizational trainings could emphasize the value of heart-felt communication in e-mail that makes clear that employees value the relationships with others. Especially when communicating in virtual environments, making sure employees pay attention to the affective natures of their working relationships is critical.

In the modern age of electronic communication and virtual collaboration, managers must realize that traditional leadership behaviors need to be adapted to the changing conditions. The 21st century is calling for a new sort of manager—a manager that can collaborate with colleagues around the world and make the most out of the lean communication mediums that are necessary for the creation of virtual teams. By understanding the situational effects of communication mediums on influence tactic usage and effectiveness and the effects of working in unstructured teams, managers can use computer-mediated mediums to further enhance their status in their organizations.

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References


Appendix

Scale Summary

Rational Tactics ($\alpha = .77$)

Coder Questions:
1. Does this e-mail seem to be sharing information with the group?
2. Does this e-mail seem to be providing important information for the group?
3. Does this e-mail seem to be providing knowledge for the group?

Interrater reliability = .95

Keywords: event, action, call, forward, www

Hard Tactics ($\alpha = .74$)

Coder Questions:
1. Does this person seem to be giving a direction/instruction/order?
2. Is this person telling others what to do?

Interrater reliability = .93

Keywords: now, must, have to, cc

Soft Tactics ($\alpha = .79$)

Coder Questions:
1. Does this person sound like he/she is trying to please someone?
2. Does this person sound like he/she wants the sender(s) to like him/her?

Interrater reliability = .90

Keywords: please, just, you, thank (you)

E-mail Style ($\alpha = .88$)

Coder Questions:
1. Does this person try to make himself/herself understood by others?
2. This e-mail is very clear.
3. Does this person have good language skills?

Interrater reliability = .95

Keywords: well, like, mean, you know, maybe, perhaps, would, could, might, something, somewhere, interesting (Baker, 1990)

Leadership ($\alpha = .87$)

Coder Questions:
1. Do you think this person is a leader in this group?
2. Does this person seem to have a lot of influence in this group?

Interrater reliability = .98

Ethnographic rating: Based on expert rater’s personal experience with group members
Leader Behavior Inventory: A Test of Measure Equivalence in Germany and the United States

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Tom Kent
Carrie A. Blair
College of Charleston, United States

Ulrich Schuele
Mainz University of Applied Sciences, Mainz, Germany

Multiple research studies have highlighted the importance of understanding differences in leader behaviors across cultures. The Leader Behavior Inventory (LBI) is one measure of leadership behaviors that has been used to examine leadership in the U.S., Costa Rica, Mexico, and Spain. The LBI is based on five behavioral factors: Visualizing Greatness, Empowering the ‘We,’ Communicating for Meaning, Managing One’s Self, and Care and Recognition. The primary purpose of this research was to assess the equivalence of the LBI across U.S. and German cultures. A secondary purpose of this research was to use the LBI to identify differences between leader behaviors across cultures. The results demonstrate measurement equivalence of the LBI across the two cultures. The results also indicate the American managers scored higher than German managers on each of the five behaviors.

Few topics are written about more than leadership. Unfortunately, the topic area is rife with personal theories, disparate definitions, and unwarranted musings. The field is so askew that Rost (1991), in his review of the literature, found 190 different descriptions of leadership. One way to focus the discussion is to look at the specific behaviors in which leaders engage that make them effective leaders. That is the question on which this research is based. In this article, the authors look at this question across two different cultures.

Burns (1978) introduced ideas about leadership that changed the way people think about leadership and how leadership is defined. With his transforming leadership, Burns changed the conceptualization of leadership; the very idea of leadership as a separate and distinct organizational process took on a new level of interest and importance. Since that time, a number of authors have expended serious effort defining the phenomenon of transformational leadership (Bass, 1985; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Conger, 1989; Kent, 2005) while others have attempted to
identify the behaviors that comprise transforming leadership\(^1\) (Bass & Avolio, 1990; Kouzes & Posner, 1995).

Kent (1999) created a model that attempts to differentiate between leading and managing. Based on that model, he gathered statements of proposed leadership behaviors—not managing behaviors, according to the model—from scholarly writings (see Bass, 1985; Bass & Avolio, 1994; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Conger, 1989; Kotter, 1990; Kouzes & Posner, 1995). Using these behavioral statements Kent, Crotts, and Aziz (2001) and Kent (2004) created a measure, the Leader Behavior Inventory (LBI), to assess leaders’ transformational leadership behaviors as described by these various leading authors. The LBI is a 5-factor measure of behaviors purported to reflect transformational leadership. It uses subordinate ratings of leaders’ behaviors. The copyrighted instrument includes 29 items and is included in the Appendix.

Briefly, the five factors are as follows. Visualizing Greatness involves behaviors related to creating and communicating an inspiring vision. Empowering the ‘We’ includes behaviors that create a sense of “oneness” among followers. Communicating for Meaning focuses on getting across the value or relevance of important ideas, decisions, and strategies. Managing One’s ‘Self’ is related to the leader sustaining his or her perseverance, focus, and self-discipline. Care and Recognition behaviors demonstrate a genuine concern and gratitude for peoples’ hard work and effort.

The LBI is useful in that it aggregates the behaviors that comprise what leading authors describe as transformational leadership within the United States culture. But the question remains, are the behaviors that constitute leadership in the United States transferable to other cultures?

Research suggests that the behaviors observed by the LBI in the United States sample should also be observed in other samples. In particular, the GLOBE study (den Hartog, House, Hanges, & Ruiz-Quintanilla, 1999) was a massive attempt to look globally at what leaders around the world view as important leadership behaviors. The study involved 170 researchers, and it attempted to investigate the relationships between societal cultures, organizational cultures, and transformational leadership. While they found many culturally-specific leadership behaviors (behaviors that facilitated effective leadership in one culture but not in others), their primary finding was that behaviors normally associated with transformational leadership are strongly and universally endorsed across cultures.

In the GLOBE study, middle managers from each of the cultures were asked if specific leadership behaviors contributed to or inhibited effective leadership. The researchers’ main hypothesis was that transformational behaviors would be universally endorsed as contributing to effective leadership. This hypothesis was soundly supported by the study, which indicated that transformational leadership behaviors were endorsed in all cultures included in the study.

Further, using the LBI, Quesada, Gonzalez, and Kent (2008) found few differences between United States leaders and leaders in Costa Rica, Mexico, and Spain. In this study, the investigation of leadership across cultures was extended by comparing leadership behaviors in Western Europe—specifically in Germany—to leadership behaviors in the United States. Three of the authors’ university, the College of Charleston, has strong student and faculty exchange programs with a number of European universities and receives a number of German students into

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\(^1\) Bass, 1985, first used the word *transformational* to describe Burns’ transforming leadership; and that has become the accepted language for depicting the leadership processes in question. Transformational leadership will be used throughout the remainder of this paper to refer to Burns’ idea of transforming leadership.
its School of Business. Hence, we decided to study German leaders so that we could relate these findings to our numerous German students.

One might not expect to find differences between German and United States leaders based on the previous assessments of the similarities and differences between the two cultures. Hofstede’s work suggests more similarities than differences between the cultures. Table 1 describes the nature of the two cultures using Hořtste’s four cultural dimensions: power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. The table was excerpted from Adsit, London, Crom, and Jones (1997) and shows sameness between the two cultures, German and United States, on three of the four dimensions. The only difference between the two cultures was in the area of uncertainty avoidance. In Hořtste and Hořtste’s (2005) work, they found the same results except that the uncertainty avoidance dimension had the opposite from Adsit et al.’s results. Hořtste found the German culture to be more avoidant than the United States culture while Adsit et al. found the United States culture to be more avoidant.

Table 1: Differences and Similarities Between German and United States Cultures on Hořtste’s Four Cultural Dimensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Power Distance</th>
<th>Individualism</th>
<th>Masculinity</th>
<th>Uncertainty Avoidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Low 42/44</td>
<td>High 15</td>
<td>High 9/10</td>
<td>Medium 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Low 38</td>
<td>High 1</td>
<td>High 15</td>
<td>Low 43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the question remains: do managers across various cultures behave as leaders in similar or different ways? The first purpose of this study is to see if the 5 factor structure of the LBI observed in a U.S. sample extends to a German sample. The second purpose is to see if there are mean differences between the German sample and the U.S. sample on each of the 5 dimensions. Our hypothesis is that there will be no differences between the UNITED STATES results and the German results in either the factors identified (i.e. the leadership model) or in the scores on those factors.

**Methods**

**Participants**

In general, all participants in both countries were survey respondents who used the LBI to describe their managers’ leadership behaviors. The nature of the managers’ organizational roles varied between the country samples and within the German sample.

**U. S. sample.** The leaders in the U.S. study were deans of schools at a southeastern university and supervisors and managers of employees at a manufacturing plant that produced welding machines and components. Those completing the surveys were 114 faculty members and staff who reported to those deans and 90 factory employees in various functions.

To administer the LBI at the university, deans met with faculty and staff and informed them of the research and its purpose. They also told the faculty and staff that they would be

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2 Excerpted from Adsit et al.
receiving a copy of the questionnaire in inter-campus mail. Faculty and staff were advised both verbally by the deans and in writing that their participation was entirely voluntary and confidential. Further, the researchers sent the questionnaire with a letter reiterating the purpose of the research and the voluntary and confidential nature of participation to each faculty and staff member. Those who completed the questionnaire returned it via inter-campus mail to the researchers with no identifying information on the questionnaires. No demographic information was collected from the deans or their faculty and staff.

To administer the LBI to the manufacturing employees, supervisors and managers asked their employees to go online and complete the survey. The employees were told that no one at the company would see their individual responses to the survey.

German sample. The participants in the German study were working adults studying for their Diplom at the Mainz University of Applied Sciences. All participants were studying management and business administration and were “working adults” who have gone through three years of education in the German dual education system. For example, banking clerks take a “vocational” education program that covers at least 70% of the content of a United States undergraduate program in business. After graduating from this dual system, which does not exist in the United States, the participants continue their education as part-time students while working as lower, sometimes middle level, managers. The study program is a five-year program with the degree of “Diploma,” which is a degree with a level somewhere between the United States undergraduate and master’s level. So the expression “undergraduate” used in an American context would not describe the educational level and the daily experience of these employees in their working environment.

That aside, we surveyed 337 participants within classes. The students were given instructions that were approved with a cover letter signed by institutional. These instructions attempted to provide a process that insured anonymity. Questionnaires were hand carried by the survey team comprised of a student assistant, our German co-author, an American co-author, and German faculty colleagues.

The instructions asked each employee to anonymously describe his or her particular leader or manager and the leader’s specific behaviors. The employees were asked to respond to each of the LBI questionnaire items and to describe that behavior by circling the number on the scale that most accurately reflected how often their leader demonstrated that behavior. The questionnaires were completed during class periods. While completing the questionnaire was voluntary, 100% of the students participated by completing the surveys. They completed the LBI questionnaires in hard copy to describe their leaders. Of those completing the questionnaire, 54.6% were female and 45.4% were male. The leaders who were described by the participants were from mostly large organizations: 13.6% were from organizations of less than 100 people, 16.3% were from organizations of 100-499 people, and 69.8% were from organizations made up of 500 or more people. These leaders were from almost every type of industry. Only two industries were represented by more than 10% of the sample: banking made up 25.6% and other services made up 18.5%. Table 2 lists the various industries represented and the percent of representation for each industry. Virtually all of the leaders’ organizations were wholly domestic German organizations; 98.5% of the organizations were domestic while the remaining were international or global. The leaders being described by the participants were 20.2% female and 79.8% male.
Table 2: Various Industries Represented by the Sample and Percent of Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceutical</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Manufacturing</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail and Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leadership Behavior Inventory (LBI)

The Leadership Behavior Inventory (LBI) was developed (Kent, et. al., 2001, Kent, 2004) to assess individuals’ engagement in transformational leadership behaviors. The inventory measures behaviors in five factors and is completed by “subordinates” of the leader who report on how often a leader employs specific behaviors. The LBI employs an 8-point Likert scale in which 1 (rarely) and 8 (very often). The LBI includes 29 items.

The English version of the LBI was translated into German separately by two German colleagues at the Fachhochschule Ludwigshafen am Rhein. This work was retranslated back into English by an American German language faculty member at a U.S. university. This work was continued until the translators could agree that the intent and meaning of the LBI had been accomplished in the German version. Further, at Mainz University, a German student assistant initially verified that the German translation properly represented the intent of the LBI. When translating the questionnaire to German, problems may occur since there are expressions like “mission” and “vision” in the English language whose meanings may be slightly different in the German cultural environment. It is suspected that “vision,” for example, is seen closer to a religious context than in the American culture. Furthermore, when talking about managing and leading, there is a difficulty related to German history (i.e., “leader” is literally translated as “Führer” which was a synonym for Hitler.) Thus, the words “leader” and “leading” still are difficult to use in a German context. “Leading” has more recently lost a lot of its stigma while “leader” still cannot be used in a questionnaire.

Taking these and other problems of translation into consideration and verifying the translation with both our German co-author and in turn his two colleagues, the questionnaires were distributed to 337 participants. Since the questionnaires were completed within a classroom setting, all of the questionnaires were returned, yielding a response rate of 100%. For the majority of the respondents, all of the LBI and demographic items were completed. However, in some instances, participants either left items blank or used indecipherable handwriting. Three methods were employed to deal with missing data in this study: expectation maximization imputation, list-wise deletion, and pair-wise deletion. In instances in which only one response was missing from the LBI items, expectation maximization imputation was employed as a
method that produces a relatively accurate estimation of the value of the data in comparison to other estimation techniques (Switzer & Roth, 2002). In estimation maximization imputation, the parameter estimates are the focus of the estimation, whereas the missing data points are the focus of other methods. In the current study, estimation maximization imputation was conducted using SPSS 15.0.

In one case, more than one response was missing. The case was deleted list-wise from the dataset; thus, the data from this case was not included in any of the study analyses. Finally, in 49 instances, data were missing for demographic items. Such data was addressed with pair-wise deletion. That is, the cases were deleted from any analyses involving the specific demographic items, but the case was included in all other analyses (Switzer & Roth, 2002).

**Analyses**

Multiple steps are necessary in order to examine the invariance of the LBI across the two samples. The examination of equivalence is conducted based on the general methods recommended by Vandeburg and Lance (2000). That is, two analyses are conducted in order to verify the equivalence of the measure. The first analysis examines congeneric equivalence, or whether the number of underlying factors is equivalent across the two groups (Model 1). If Model 1 is not supported, then it will be concluded that the LBI is not an equivalent measure in the two cultures and no other analyses will be conducted. The second analysis examines tau equivalence, or whether the pattern of factor loadings is equivalent across the two groups (Model 2). The Joreskorg tradition of measurement invariance suggests that a third analysis should be conducted examining the equivalence of the structural parameters across multiple groups. However, Byrne (1998) noted, “The equality of error variances and covariances is probably the least important hypothesis to test (p. 261).” Thus, in this study, it was considered to be important to demonstrate invariance in factor loadings (Model 1) and factor variance/covariance structures (Model 2), but not to demonstrate invariance in the structural relations among the 5 factors.

Similar to the methods used by Woehr, Arciniega, and Lim (2007), equivalence is evaluated using the multi-groups function in LISREL (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). Both Model 1 and Model 2 are evaluated based on the 5-factor structure demonstrated in previous research examining the LBI (Kent, 2005). Model 1 was a measure of congeneric equivalence, or whether the items represented the same basic factor structure across the two samples. More specifically, in order to examine congeneric equivalence, each item is set to load on a specific factor, but the factor loadings are free to vary. If the results indicate that the data do not represent an acceptable fit to the data for Model 1, then additional analyses will be inappropriate given a lack of equivalence of the factor structure.

Model 2 represents a test of tau equivalence, or whether the factor loadings are equivalent for the LBI in the two cultures. In order to examine tau equivalence, the factor loadings are set as equal in the two samples. If the fit for Model 2 is significantly different than the fit for Model 1, then the items will be thought to vary in the degree to which they indicate each dimension. Again, further analyses will not be warranted if Model 2 proves to be substantially different from Model 1.

Model fit and examinations of differences in fit between the two models is based on chi-square analysis. The \( \chi^2 \) provides an estimate of how closely the proposed model matches the structure of the data. Because the goal of this study is to demonstrate that the a priori five-factor model provides an acceptable fit to the data, an insignificant \( \chi^2 \) demonstrates that the structure of
the a priori model is no different than the structure of the actual data. Thus an insignificant $\chi^2$ indicates that the a priori model provides a good fit to the data. Because the $\chi^2$ has a tendency to be significant even when no significant difference exists, the fit of the model is examined based on multiple other fit indices: Root Mean Square Estimation Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), McDonald’s (1989) Noncentrality Index (NFI), and the Gamma Hat index (Steiger, 1989). The RMSEA is an overall goodness-of-fit measure that takes into account model complexity. Browne and Cudek (1993) suggested that values of .05 or less represent good fit to the model, whereas values up to .08 represent acceptable model fit.

While there are a number of fit indices available for evaluating model fit and differences in fit between models, Cheung and Rensvold (2002) suggested that CFI, NCI, and Gamma Hat are appropriate fit indices for gauging the difference between models when examining multiple groups. CFI and NFI values range from 0.0 to 1.0, with values closer to 1.0 representing better fit and values greater than .90 representing acceptable fit to the data. In discussing the interpretation of model fit when examining the equivalence of measures between two groups, Cheung and Rensvold suggested that the CFI between the two models should not exceed 0.01, the difference in NCI should not exceed 0.02, and the difference in Gamma Hat should not exceed 0.001.

**Results**

Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the study variables are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, Reliability Estimates, and Difference Tests for the German and United States Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>German Sample</th>
<th>U.S. Sample</th>
<th>t(^a)</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Visualizing Greatness</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Empowering the “We”</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Communicating for Meaning</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Managing One’s Self</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Care and Recognition</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Levene’s test for unequal variances indicated that the two groups had unequal variances on each of the 5 dimensions. Therefore, Student’s t statistic based on the assumption of unequal variances was used.

*p < .05.
Test of Equivalence

Two models were evaluated in order to determine measurement equivalence across the German and United States cultures. Fit indices for each of the two models are displayed in Table 4. The first model examined whether the LBI demonstrated an equivalent 5-factor structure across the two cultures (Model 1). As with the sample based only on German data, the chi-square was significantly different from zero. However, the RMSEA, CFI, and NFI indices indicate that the model provides an adequate to good structure for the data (RMSEA = .08, CFI = .98, NFI = .97). The second model examined whether the LBI items demonstrated equivalent factor loadings across the two cultures (Model 2). On one hand, the change in chi square between the two models is significant ($\Delta \chi^2 (29) = 122.29, p < .01$), and the $\Delta$Gamma Hat value exceeds the recommended values ($\Delta$Gamma Hat = .012) (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). On the other hand, the NCI and CFI values for the two models are identical. Cheung and Rensvold (2002) noted that when examining invariance between two groups, “A value of $\Delta$CFI smaller than or equal to -0.01 indicates that the null hypothesis of invariance should not be rejected” (p. 251). As the CFI and NFI values were the same for the two models, the null hypothesis was not rejected.

Table 4: Results for the Leader Behavior Inventory Measurement Invariance Tests for a German ($N = 355$) and American ($N = 112$) Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>$\chi^2$ Diff.</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>CFI Diff.</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>NFI Diff.</th>
<th>Gamma Hat</th>
<th>Gamma Hat Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1: Same factor structure</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>1947.25</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2: Same factor loadings</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>2046.73</td>
<td>99.48</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aRepresents the difference between Model 1 and Model 2.

As the LBI demonstrated configural invariance and may also demonstrate metric invariance in the German and U.S. cultures, additional analyses were conducted in order to examine similarities and differences on the dimensions of the LBI across the two cultures. Correlations and internal consistency estimates for each of the dimensions of the Leader Behavior Inventory based on the German data and the American data are presented in Table 3. For both cultures, reliability estimates on each of the five dimensions are acceptable. As displayed in Table 3, the American managers were rated as demonstrating better behaviors in each of the five dimensions.

Discussion

The results show that five factors of the LBI apply to German leaders as well as to U.S. leaders. That is, we can say that German followers can differentiate between their leaders using these five factors. Said another way, the five factors—Visualizing Greatness, Empowering the “We,” Communicating for Meaning, Managing One’s Self, and Care and Recognition—are useful categories for describing leadership behaviors and for differentiating between leaders in both the United States and in Germany. It can also be said that the five factors can be expected to yield similar results reliably over time, all things being equal.

Having said that, it should be noted that the various fit indices were not unanimous in their suggestion of equivalence. However, given that the a priori model was based on a 5-factor
structure in the United States data, the authors decided to treat the measure as equivalent for research purposes. Nevertheless, additional research is recommended in order to further examine the factor structure of the German culture on the LBI. Assuming, however, that the LBI is a useful, reliable instrument to assess leadership in the United States and in Germany, the authors looked at the differences in performance on the factors among German and U.S. leaders. A test of the difference between the two samples on each of the five factors indicates there is a significant difference on the five factors between the United States and German samples. Specifically, subordinates in the United States gave their managers higher scores on all five dimensions than did subordinates in Germany. There does not seem to be a cultural explanation for this difference based on Hofstede’s four values. Table 1 suggests that the two cultures are quite similar on three of the four Hofstede values. The one value in which there may be a difference between the two cultures is the Uncertainty Avoidance value. High uncertainty avoidance occurs within organizations that create a stressful work environment by punishing deviation and errors, and where rules and procedures must be adhered to. Low uncertainty avoidance occurs in organizations that encourage innovation and experimentation. Some items that make up the LBI may reflect Uncertainty Avoidance. For example, within the Empowering the “We” LBI factor, there are these items: “Experiments, innovates, and takes risks to find new or better ways;” and “Is willing to challenge the system.” Within the Managing One’s Self LBI factor, there is the “Believes anything can be done,” “Has a ‘can do’ attitude,” and “Strengthens people by giving power away, developing their competence, and assigning critical tasks to them.” Finally, the Care and Recognition factor includes these items: “My leader publicizes peoples’ successes,” “My leader celebrates the team’s accomplishments,” “My leader strengthens people by developing their competence and assigning critical tasks to them,” and “My leader genuinely cares about others.”

It may be that these and other items were sufficient to create the mean differences found in this study and that these items were actually, in this case, a measure of Uncertainty Avoidance. As mentioned earlier, Adsit et al. (1997) found uncertainty avoidant behaviors to be lower among German managers than among U.S. managers, while Hofstede concluded that uncertainty avoidant behaviors were higher among German managers.

To say the least, the results are certainly not what might be expected based on previous work as described earlier. Further, one would not expect these few items, which may or may not be related to one of the four cultural values posited by Hofstede, to be sufficient to cause the differences found in this study.

The differences may be, in part, due to the nature of the samples themselves. The German leaders were mostly from business organizations. The U.S. leaders were made up of mostly senior managers from an academic setting. Clearly, much work needs to be done to, first, verify that there are differences between United States and German leaders as suggested by this research, and second to see if different industries or organizational types develop or breed different leadership styles.

Limitations and Directions for Further Research

Although these findings are interesting, there are several limitations associated with the outcomes observed in this study. First, this study was based on a sample of a small group within each of two very large nations. Although it is possible that the sample used here is representative of a larger cultural difference, the samples are too small to draw final conclusions. Future
research is necessary, which will examine measurement equivalence based on a larger sample from each nation and also cultural differences between the two groups.

Second, the German sample was based on students enrolled in college classes. Like samples used in many studies, this sample was convenient. However, though the students were working individuals employed full time by their organizations, it is unclear whether the scores on the inventory in the German culture are representative of an older, more experienced population. Furthermore, the differences observed between the two cultures on the care and recognition dimension were based on just one dimension. In order to draw firm conclusions about potential differences between the two cultures in the area of care and recognition, an extensive study is necessary. Specifically, research would need to be conducted examining managerial care and recognition based on multiple inventories.

Third, the U.S. subjects as a whole may appear to be quite diverse being subordinates of deans at a university and subordinates of manufacturing supervisors and managers. However, the data indicate that the LBI holds together despite this diversity. Also, the German sample is drawn from various industries though there are no academic institutions among the employers of the German respondents. While this is an issue to keep in mind, it does not appear to have caused any major problems with the outcomes of the LBI instrument.

Despite these limitations, this study makes several contributions to the leadership literature. First and foremost, the results of this study suggest that the LBI is potentially a feasible measure of leader behavior in both Germany and the United States and thus can be used as a tool for comparing components of each of the two cultures. In this study, when the measure was used to compare leader behaviors in Germany and the United States, an interesting question was raised regarding differences between the two cultures in subordinate care and recognition. If this difference exists in the larger population, what is it about these two cultures that makes them different regarding these specific behaviors? In the United States during the past few decades, there has been an increased focus on rewarding and praising behavior—specifically rewarding the performance of children. Perhaps this is behind the differences, in that managers are being educated and/or trained to also give more recognition to subordinates in the workplace. Clearly, there are research questions to be dealt with regarding the nature and cause of differences between the two cultures on this factor. It could just be an anomaly in the data that should be investigated through replications of the study.

Finally, this type of research—investigating the nature of similarities and differences in leadership behaviors across cultures—must be extended dramatically. Work has already begun to study leader behaviors using the LBI in India and in China. As well, it would be interesting to look at differences in leader behaviors across industries as well as across organizational size within cultures.

The LBI should be further developed as a measure of transformational leadership. Extensive validation and reliability studies must be carried out.

About the Authors

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Email: ulrich.schuele@wiwi.fh-mainz.de

References


Appendix

The Leadership Behavior Inventory
Dr. Thomas W. Kent, 2001

Write Leader's name here: _________________________

To complete the questionnaire, think of your Leader (whose name appears above) and his/her behavior in his/her role as leader. Then, using each of the items below, describe that behavior by circling the choice that, in your experience, most nearly describes how often your Leader successfully displays that particular behavior.

For example, suppose the item is "Uses examples that others can relate to." If you think the Leader does this often, you would circle a "5" or a "6" as in the example below. You would circle a "5" if you feel that the situation is closer to "sometimes" than to "very often." You would circle a "6" if you think that the situation is closer to "very often."

### Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I would describe my Leader as one who:</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Very Often</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uses examples that others can relate to.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I would describe my Leader as one who:</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Very Often</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Has visions and dreams of what can be.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Has a desire to make something happen.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3. Has a clear image of the future.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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<td>4. Expresses enthusiasm for his/her future.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Experiments, innovates, and takes risks to find new or better ways.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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<td>6. Is willing to challenge the system.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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Viz. _______

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<tr>
<th>I would describe my Leader as one who:</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Very Often</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Lets people (empowers them to) do what they believe is right.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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<td>8. Gets people involved in decisions that affect.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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<td>9. Creates in others a sense of ownership in the organization.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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<td>10. Uses the word &quot;we&quot; constantly instead of &quot;I&quot;.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Enlists the support and assistance of others who have a stake in the vision.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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<td>12. Involves others who must live with the results.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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<td>13. Appeals to others' values, interests, hopes, and dreams.</td>
<td>1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8</td>
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14. Strengthens people by giving power away, developing their competence, and assigning critical tasks to them

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EmpWe ________

15. Explains why she/he is doing what.

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16. Knows his/her audience when speaking to them

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17. Talks about the principles or values behind decisions that are made.

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18. Communicates in ways that inspire and motivate others.

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19. Takes the time needed to explain fully what he/she is thinking.

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20. Sets the example by behaving in ways that are consistent with his/her stated values.

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CommMean ________


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22. Keeps his/her own level of energy up high.

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23. Believes anything can be done; has a "can do" attitude.

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24. Is a model of persistence and perseverance.

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25. Maintains focus and constancy of purpose.

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26. Publicizes peoples' successes to all employees.

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27. Celebrates team accomplishments regularly.

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28. Genuinely cares about others.

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29. Celebrates victories.

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Cultural Awareness in Intercultural Mentoring: A Model for Enhancing Mentoring Relationships

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Increasing ethnic diversity in both the domestic workforce and in multinational organizations creates opportunities for the formation of intercultural mentoring relationships. This paper explores the influence of cultural dimensions on intercultural mentoring, drawing on the findings of the GLOBE Project (House, Hanges, Javida, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004) and presents a conceptual model of cultural awareness and how such awareness can influence mentoring effectiveness. A review of the literature yields an integrative definition of cultural awareness that incorporates general cultural awareness, cultural self-awareness, and situation specific awareness in order to adopt a third-culture perspective in intercultural interactions that result in culturally appropriate behavior that enhances the relationship between mentor and mentee. The cultural awareness model promises to be significant for intercultural mentors by providing practitioners a paradigm through which to evaluate their mentoring relationships in order to enrich understanding between mentor and mentee with a view of improving mentoring outcomes.

Culture influences virtually every aspect of life, from one’s general perspective or outlook on the world to the understanding of what constitutes socially acceptable behavior. Culture can be defined broadly as “shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives that are transmitted across generations” (House, Hanges, Javida, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004, p. 15). “It is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 1997, p. 5).

The increase of ethnic diversity in the U.S. workforce, along with the expansion of organizations into the global arena, has opened the door to unprecedented communication and interaction across cultures, bringing along with it the challenges of cultural understanding (House et al., 2004; Marquardt & Horvath, 2001; Tullett, 1997; Tung, 1997). Leaders today are faced with an array of such challenges that require cultural awareness, knowledge, and skills (Brislin & Yoshida, 1994). “When working on global teams or in other countries, the ability to...
think outside your own culture and see an issue through the eyes of another is critical to success” (“World without Walls,” 2003, p. 59). Apart from serving as a challenge to the ever-present danger of ethnocentrism, this ability to see beyond one’s own culture promotes empathy for others while encouraging a degree of critical thinking about one’s own cultural position.

The terms *cross-cultural* and *intercultural* are often used interchangeably. However, in order to delineate more precisely the scope of this study, *cross-cultural* is defined as the “comparison of cultural differences or situations in which such differences exist” (Stewart & Bennett, 1991, p. xii). The term *intercultural* is used to describe the “actual interaction between people of different cultures” (p. xii). This paper employs the term *intercultural mentoring* to portray the interactive relationship when mentor and mentee come from different cultures. The purpose of this article is to explore the influence of cultural awareness upon intercultural mentoring relationships and to present a conceptual model that reflects the relationship between the two.

**Intercultural Mentoring**

Though leaders may accept the need to practice mentoring in the context of their leadership functions in order to develop followers and to improve organizational outcomes, mentoring relationships in intercultural settings pose unique challenges. As previously defined, *intercultural mentoring relationship* describes the relationship when mentor and mentee are from different cultures. Both mentor and mentee bring to the relationship values and assumptions that are culturally based. By understanding the influence of culture on attitudes, expectations, and behaviors, leaders may increase their cultural awareness and improve intercultural mentoring practices.

**Culturally Appropriate Behavior**

Ting-Toomey (1999), citing Spitzberg and Cupach (1984), defined appropriateness as “the degree to which behaviors are regarded as proper and match the expectations generated by the culture” (p. 48). A survey of the relevant literature leads to the conclusion that what is deemed as culturally appropriate behavior arises from cultural sensitivity, cultural empathy, and cultural competence. Taken together, these constructs establish a framework for understanding what is considered culturally appropriate behavior in an intercultural context.

Bennett (1986) presented a developmental model of intercultural sensitivity, using as the key organizing principle the concept of *difference*, “that cultures differ fundamentally in the way they create and maintain world views” (p. 181). He argued that individuals who accept the principle of cultural difference can grow in intercultural sensitivity and in effectiveness of intercultural communication. His model illustrates a continuum of six stages of personal growth from *ethnocentrism*: (a) the denial of cultural difference, (b) the defense against difference, and (c) the minimization of difference; to *ethnorelativism*: (d) the acceptance of difference, (e) the adaptation to difference, and (f) the integration of cultural difference into one’s life.

Bhawuk and Brislin (1992) offered a definition of intercultural sensitivity as “a sensitivity to the importance of cultural differences and to the points of view of people in other cultures” (p. 414). They described intercultural sensitivity as being characterized by interest in other cultures, sensitivity to notice cultural differences, and the willingness to modify behavior as an indication of respect for the people of other cultures.
Cultural empathy “involves a temporary shift in frame of reference such that one construes events ‘as if’ one were the other person” (Bennett, 1986, p. 185). Referring to the adaptation stage of Bennett’s developmental model of intercultural sensitivity, Brislin and Yoshida (1994) noted that cultural empathy exists when “people not only accept cultural differences but are able to empathize with individuals from other cultures and change their behaviors when interacting with them” (p. 64). Mullavey-O’Byrne (1997) described cultural empathy as the “individual’s ability to understand others within the framework of their cultural backgrounds and the facility to communicate that understanding to them in a meaningful way” (p. 210). Just as sensitivity and empathy are closely related in psychology (cf. the Rogerian construct of empathic understanding; Siegel, 1999), the two constructs are difficult to differentiate in the realm of intercultural interactions.

Cultural competence or effectiveness can be seen as the behavioral outcome of cultural awareness. Collier (1989) stated that “cultural competence is conduct which is appropriate and effective for the particular cultural identity being adopted at the time in the particular situation” (p. 296). It is “mutually competent behavior for both cultural identities being advanced” (p. 297), that is, for both the cultural identity of the sojourner and that of the host. This perspective of appropriate conduct in relation to both cultures represented in intercultural interactions hints of a third-culture perspective that is treated below. Ruben (1976) reflected this emphasis on the individual relating to both cultures by defining intercultural communication competence as “the ability to function in a manner that is perceived to be relatively consistent with the needs, capacities, goals, and expectations of the individuals in one’s environment while satisfying one’s own needs, capacities, goals, and expectations” (p. 336).

Meaningful Mentoring Relationships

Culturally appropriate behavior facilitates meaningful mentoring relationships. Meaningful in this context is synonymous with effective and, according to Ting-Toomey (1999), reflects “the degree to which communicators achieve shared meanings and desirable outcomes in a given situation” (p. 48). There is obviously a good deal more that can be said regarding what is appropriate or meaningful from different cultural perspectives. Mentoring relationships provide an appealing context for exploring the perceived and relative importance of cultural awareness in the development of intercultural relationships. The influence of cultural dimensions on mentoring relationships is critical to establishing meaningful mentoring relationships.

Because individuals bring their cultural values into personal relationships, the culturally aware mentor will understand that cultural dimensions may significantly influence his or her intercultural interactions with mentees (Irvin, 2007). While in-group collectivism leads people to emphasize personal relationships over tasks (House et al., 2004), individualist cultural tendencies like those found in the US and Great Britain cause people generally to prefer focusing on task accomplishment, such as starting and ending meetings on time. We know more than one American expatriate who thinks tardiness is evidence of weak character and a lack of professionalism. Intercultural mentors from individualist societies could increase their effectiveness with mentees who are from more collectivist societies by acting upon the implications of collectivism that focuses on relationship building, even at the expense of schedules and timely task accomplishment.

In-group collectivism affects trust between individuals. Individualists tend to be universalistic in their willingness to trust people and give them the benefit of the doubt.
Collectivists on the other hand tend to be particularistic, extending trust only to those from within their in-group. When someone attempts to interact with people from an out-group—be it from outside the family, social group, or region—trust must be earned slowly by consistency of character and by proof of benevolence. For this reason, “in a collectivist society a relationship of trust should be established with another person before any business can be done” (Hofstede, 1997, p. 67). This trust leads to the adoption of others into the in-group. The application to mentoring is clear. In collectivist cultures, the mentor who is intent on “getting through the materials” at the cost of informal relationship building with the mentee will find it more difficult to develop the trust that is foundational to the mentoring relationship as a whole.

Because of the importance of the in-group in collectivist societies, harmony is a key value. Personal confrontation is normally considered rude, and one tries to avoid saying no to others as that would imply a confrontation. Communication can be very indirect. A mentee from a collectivist country will normally not dare to contradict his or her mentor, but may express agreement that does not imply—from the mentee’s perspective—any real commitment. People from individualist countries, on the other hand, believe that speaking the truth openly, even if it causes conflict, is both virtuous and healthy (Hofstede, 1997). When the mentor and mentee are from distinct cultural backgrounds, the possibility of miscommunication is great. Misunderstandings, even of an ethical nature, can arise that undermine the viability of the mentoring relationship.

The effective, culturally aware mentor who takes into account the cultural tendencies of the mentee and attempts to provide responses that are both faithful to the mentor’s natural tendencies as well as sensitive to the mentee’s cultural expectations, may increase mentoring effectiveness (Rosinski, 2003). In addition to these moderating responses is the possibility of an intercultural learning agenda in which both mentor and mentee first learn more about each other’s cultural expectations before finalizing their mentoring agreement. While this awareness of the other is commonly expected (if not always delivered) in foreign situations, such as the preparation of expatriates, diplomats, or missionaries for overseas postings, its relevance for domestic situations may be even more significant and affect a broad range of issues related to diversity and the work environment.

While the construct of cultural dimensions informs cultural awareness, those involved in an intercultural mentoring relationship should guard against stereotyping. The dimensions reflect central tendencies and are not meant to describe personality traits of individuals (Hofstede, 1997; House et al., 2004). However, as Hofstede (1984) noted, “attempts at the transfer of leadership skills which do not take the values of subordinates into account have little chance of success” (p. 260).

Specific Mentoring Outcomes

When initiating the foray into intercultural mentoring, mentors can begin by exploring those dimensions that reflect the greatest difference between their culture and the culture of the mentee. For example, one of the greatest cultural differences between the United States and Colombia is in the in-group collectivism dimension, in which the U.S. has one of the lowest scores and Colombia is near the top of societies that most endorse in-group collectivist practices (House et al., 2004). A mentor from the United States should understand that if the mentee indeed reflects the general cultural values of Colombia, then the mentor must gain the trust of the mentee through spending significant time in building the personal relationship. The mentee may
communicate acceptance of the mentor’s suggestions and opinions in deference to the mentor’s role and in order to maintain a harmonious relationship. However, this overt acceptance does not necessarily mean there is absolute agreement and commitment on the part of the mentee. Some of the communication, particularly of delicate issues, may hinge on indirect, or indirect statements that carry subtle meanings. The mentor should be careful to correct or reprove the mentee in a culturally sensitive way that will not cause him or her to lose face or question the security of the relationship. An awareness of the distinction between manifest (declared and obvious) and latent acceptance and the constant significance of verbal and non-verbal cues can be major factors that affect both the form and the structure of the mentoring relationship.

High power distance may produce an aversion to disagree with a superior, leading to avoidance of conflict (Hofstede, 1984). In order to avoid what he or she perceives to be a stifling hierarchical relationship, a low power distance mentor may want to limit his or her mentoring efforts to informal relationships that are based on factors other than organizational structures (Siegel, 1999). Even in informal mentoring relationships, however, cultural values come into play. The low power-distance mentor who enjoys lively interchanges and disagreements may become frustrated when faced with the higher power-distance mentee’s non-confrontational silence, misinterpreting the silence as an indication of a dysfunctional relationship (Salzman, 2000, p. 122). By taking into account the power distance dimension, both mentor and mentee can grow in an understanding of one another in order to sustain and improve the relationship.

Superiors in collectivist cultures will normally not discuss the performance of a subordinate directly with him or her. Mentors in these contexts should seek more subtle, indirect forms of communication that will allow the mentee to avoid loss of face and a loss of security in the relationship. When the mentee does not meet the mentor’s expectations, the termination of the mentoring relationship is perhaps too drastic (Hofstede, 1997). Loyalty and trust take precedence over task-oriented expectations. This greatly influences the final phase of mentoring when the relationship transitions. Individualist-oriented mentors may want to transition out of relationships with collectivist mentees only to find that the mentees may become offended and may feel rejected and abandoned by such a thought.

Cultural Awareness Leading to a Third-Culture Perspective

The term cultural awareness is not easily defined and is often employed analogously in the literature with constructs such as cultural sensitivity, cross-cultural competence, and cross-cultural effectiveness (Ridley, Mendoza, Kanitz, Angermeier & Zenk, 1994). Much of the difficulty surrounding the use of this term probably inheres in the word awareness, which is almost by definition open to varying and even conflicting interpretations. A review of some of these terms and how researchers define, operationalize, and apply them to intercultural interactions can help bring the concept of cultural awareness into better focus. See Table 1 for a summary of the following review.
Table 1: Some Operationalizations of Cultural Awareness

<table>
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<th>Term</th>
<th>Key Principle</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural Sensitivity</td>
<td>“Difference”</td>
<td>6 stages from ethnocentrism to ethnorelativism</td>
<td>Bennett (1986)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“Sensitivity”</td>
<td>(a) interest in other cultures; (b) notice of cultural differences; (c) modify behavior as mark of respect for other cultures</td>
<td>Bhawuk &amp; Brislin (1992)</td>
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<td>Perceptual Schema</td>
<td>(a) accurate cultural schema (b) ideographic data</td>
<td>Ridley et al. (1994)</td>
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<td>Cultural Empathy</td>
<td>Frame of reference</td>
<td>Temporary shift in frame of reference</td>
<td>Bennett (1986)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cultural differences</td>
<td>Change behavior when interacting with others</td>
<td>Brislin &amp; Yoshida (1994)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Communicating understanding</td>
<td>Sensitivity and empathy</td>
<td>Mullavey-O’Byrne (1997)</td>
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<td>Mindfulness</td>
<td>Readiness to shift one’s frame of readiness</td>
<td>(a) Mindlessness (reactive stage)</td>
<td>Ting-Toomey (1999)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(b) Mindfulness (proactive stage)</td>
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<td>Cultural Competence</td>
<td>Appropriate conduct</td>
<td>Mutually competent behavior</td>
<td>Collier (1989)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“Intercultural communication competence”</td>
<td>Intercultural Behavioral Assessment Indices</td>
<td>Ruben (1976)</td>
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**General Cultural Awareness**

The constructs of cultural sensitivity, empathy, mindfulness, and competence with their respective nuances reveal the multifaceted character of cultural awareness. At least three different levels of analysis of cultural awareness can be discerned. First of all, one can speak of *general cultural awareness*, that is, “generally aware that identity is shaped by cultural influences” (Singelis & Pedersen, 1997, p. 190). Hoopes and Pusch (1981) followed this line of thought, describing what they termed *cross-cultural awareness* as referring “to the basic ways of learning that behavior and ways of thinking and perceiving are culturally conditioned rather than being universal aspects of human nature” (p. 7). Hoopes (1981) explained, “The first step out of ethnocentrism is to become aware that other culture groups exist as something other than the enemy—even if they are still classified as peculiar” (p. 19).
Cultural Self-Awareness

The second level of analysis can be called cultural self-awareness. This is the awareness and knowledge of “the degree to which [one’s] perceptions and [one’s] behaviors are culturally conditioned” (Hoopes, 1981, p. 16). Brislin and Yoshida (1994) described four awareness competencies. The first is self-awareness, being aware of the way one’s life has been shaped by one’s own culture. Second is the consciousness of one’s own values and biases and their effects on the way one engages in intercultural interactions. Third is the necessity of becoming comfortable with cultural differences. Fourth is sensitivity to circumstances. Stewart and Bennett (1991) argued for the importance of cultural self-awareness in order to contrast one’s cultural attributes with those of individuals from other cultures, contributing to self-understanding as a cultural being.

Situation-Specific Awareness

General cultural awareness and cultural self-awareness are foundational for the third level of cultural awareness that can be coined situation-specific awareness. At this level of analysis, “awareness is the ability to accurately judge a cultural situation from both one’s own and the other’s cultural viewpoint” (Pedersen, 2000, p. 4). Chen (1992) presented this approach as requiring participants to “understand their own cultural values and examine contrasts with the host culture in order to apply the insights to improve intercultural competence” (p. 12). Treated by some intercultural training literature as a separate step toward effective intercultural interaction (Brislin & Yoshida, 1994; Sue et al., 1982), culture-specific knowledge informs sojourners’ awareness and enables them to respond more competently in intercultural situations. Pedersen (2000) argued for the importance of both etic (culture-general) knowledge and emic (culture-specific) knowledge. The terms etic and emic come from the words phonetic and phonemic, but are applied to cultural behavior as a whole (Pike, 1982).

The etic approach looks at behavior from the outside for the purpose of comparing cultures. Categories of behavior are imposed on observation. The emic approach, on the other hand, attempts to discover how a system looks from the inside, so ordinarily only one culture is studied at a time and comparison is not a matter of immediate interest. The categories and rules of behavior are derived from the user’s point of view. (Jones, 1979, p. 57)

A good example of how this might apply is the intercultural context within which foreign missionaries typically have to work. Hiebert, Shaw, and Tiénou (1999) argued that emic and etic views should not be divorced from one another:

Missionaries must begin by learning to see the world as the people they serve do. They must also develop metacultural [etic] grids for describing and comparing cultures, while, at the same time, constantly returning to emic analysis to make certain they do not misunderstand the particular people they serve. They are participant-observers—as participants they identify with and seek to understand the people they serve, and as observers they study, compare, and evaluate different cultures. (p. 23)
The etic perspective, or metacultural grid, corresponds to an analytical framework outside of any specific culture (Hiebert et al., 1999), comparable to Ridley et al.’s (1994) construct of perceptual schema discussed above. Similarly, Hammer, Gudykunst, and Wiseman (1978) citing Gudykunst, Wiseman, and Hammer (1977) made the case for a third-culture perspective as essential for effective intercultural interactions. They described this construct as

A psychological perspective the sojourner uses in interpreting and evaluating intercultural encounters. This third-culture perspective is neither from the sojourner’s own culture nor from the host culture. Rather it is a frame of reference for understanding intercultural interactions in general. The third-culture perspective acts as a psychological link between the sojourner’s own cultural perspective (i.e., assumptions, values, learned behaviors, etc.) and the perspective of another culture. (Hammer et al., p. 384)

Another way of interpreting this third-culture perspective is as a new composite which, while developed from the individual perspectives of each cultural actor, nevertheless transcends these localized or specific perspectives, presenting an alternate, or third-view culture. Hammer et al. (1978) went on to note seven characteristics of a third-culture perspective:

First of all is open-mindedness toward new ideas and experiences. Second is the ability to empathize with people from other cultures. Third, accuracy in perceiving differences and similarities between the sojourner’s own culture and the host culture. Fourth, is an attitude of being nonjudgmental. The fifth characteristic is that of being an astute, non-critical observer of one’s own and of other people’s behavior. Sixth is the ability to establish meaningful relationships with people in the host culture. Finally, one who demonstrates a third-culture perspective is less ethnocentric. (p. 384)

On the basis of the preceding discussion, cultural awareness can be defined as the ability to adopt a third-culture perspective in intercultural interactions in order to enact culturally appropriate behavior and to establish meaningful relationships with individuals from cultures different from one’s own. See Figure 1 for a conceptual model of integrated cultural awareness.
Implications for Leader Practitioners

Mentoring, as a leadership role, is subject to the same constraints that can hinder the effectiveness of expatriate leaders in cross-cultural settings (Brodbeck, Frese, Akerblom, Audia, Bakacsi, & Bendova, 2000). Leaders who seek to develop emerging leaders in intercultural contexts are faced with an array of cultural practices and expectations that can confound their strategies of leadership training and can thwart their well-intentioned mentoring strategies. This paper provides a conceptual framework to assist practitioners in not only deciphering the nuances of cultural differences, but in also applying principles of cultural awareness to intercultural mentoring relationships in order to improve mentoring outcomes. The relationship between cultural awareness and intercultural mentoring arises from the interactions of individuals seeking to develop a meaningful relationship that is mutually rewarding. The conceptual model in Figure 2 illustrates this relationship. As cultural awareness in the mentoring relationship increases, the relationship is enhanced as the mentor and mentee engage in culturally appropriate behavior that affects the mentoring outcomes.

For example, the mentor-mentee relationship can be described as a power relationship (Johnson-Bailey & Cervero, 2002). Conceptions of power distance may have significant influence over how the mentoring relationship is defined by each of the participants. For example, subordinates in low power distance countries may prefer loose supervision and participative decision-making while in high power distance cultures, subordinates may expect close supervision and more directive leadership (Hofstede, 1984). Mentees from high power distance countries may desire that their mentors to be more directive, possibly leaving a mentor...
from a low power distance background confused why the mentee is not self-motivated. The consequences of this for the development of the relationship can be significant and range from a sense on the part of mentee that the mentor is not properly mentoring him or her, to the feeling of the mentor that the mentee is less than adequate or lacks initiative. A fuller understanding of the significance of cultural awareness to the mentoring relationship may assist in measuring the depth and validity of these as well as other misperceptions.

Although leaders are often instructed in such topics as management principles and motivational techniques, the model of cultural awareness forces the leader to adopt the posture of a student of cultures, both of his or her own culture as well as of the culture of the mentee. Organizations with existing mentoring strategies of leadership development in intercultural contexts can enhance those strategies by introducing potential mentors and mentees to this cultural awareness model, contributing to the enhancement of intercultural mentoring relationships.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 2.** Conceptual model of the relationship between cultural awareness and intercultural mentoring relationships.
Application of the Conceptual Model

Analyzing the effects of culture on intercultural mentoring relationships, Murphy and Ensher (1997) noted five phases of the mentoring process that are influenced by cultural values: (a) attraction that leads to the establishment of a mentor-mentee relationship; (b) contracting, the definition of roles, and the evaluation of costs and benefits for each one; (c) growth in trust and sharing of information through increased contact; (d) maturation, the stabilization of the relationship marked by value congruence, and reciprocal support; and (e) transition, the decision to either end the relationship or move it to a different level such as informal friendship (pp. 217-228).

In applying the model of the relationship between cultural awareness and intercultural mentoring relationships, attraction may be increased as mentees identify in potential mentors the awareness of cultural values that directly influence the mentoring relationship. Negotiating the definition of roles in the relationship normally carries cultural expectations of power distance. Growth and maturation will depend in large part on effective communication, decision-making, and conflict management. The transition of the relationship could be shorter or longer, depending on the cultural values in play. High individualist cultures value separation and independence while high collectivist cultures value relationships of indefinite duration, comparable to that of the Latin American figure of the padrino (similar to a godfather) or more generalized patron in other societies. At every stage of the intercultural mentoring relationship, the mentee’s development will benefit by the mentor’s ability to exercise integrated cultural awareness in order to assume a third-culture perspective that leads to appropriate behavior and meaningful relationships.

Conclusion

This paper has presented a conceptual model of cultural awareness that integrates aspects of general cultural awareness, self-awareness, and situation-specific awareness in order to adopt a third-culture perspective that results in culturally appropriate behavior and in meaningful relationships. The focus of the paper has been upon the application of a cultural awareness model to intercultural mentoring relationships, arguing that such relationships require that mentors exercise cultural awareness in order to achieve desirable outcomes that benefit mentees. In light of the cultural influence upon mentoring relationships and of the unique challenges posed by intercultural mentoring relationships, organizations should explore means to increase cultural awareness between mentors and mentees, which can benefit all their workers given that mentoring relationships may be formed both formally and informally. Leaders who desire to incorporate mentoring into their own leadership repertoire should take into account the cultural nuances that mentees bring to mentoring relationships and capitalize upon this awareness in order to improve interactions with mentees.

Specific arenas in which the intercultural mentoring model could be tested include multinational corporations, international agencies, and the missions activities of churches. In addition to overseas research, the relevance of this study to local situations is obvious. Future research into the application of the cultural awareness model should include case studies of intercultural mentoring dyads with a focus on mentoring practices that are culturally relevant. A part of this research should include the search for etic (universal) mentoring practices that could benefit mentoring relationships across many contexts. Cross-cultural studies could explore emic
(culture-specific) mentoring models in an effort to identify those practices in comparison to other cultures. Also, measuring the level of cultural awareness among intercultural mentors and observing its effects upon mentoring outcomes could test this conceptual model. By increasing the knowledge of intercultural mentoring relationships and how they develop and function, culturally diverse organizations will have a greater opportunity to see mentoring outcomes improved and leadership skills better developed.

About the Authors

Dr. Bramwell Osula is an assistant professor of leadership at the School of Global Leadership & Entrepreneurship, Regent University. He earned his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Waterloo in 1984 and has lived and worked in Europe, Africa, and Canada for more than 30 years. A Woodrow Wilson Fellowship nominee in 1994, his research interests span the fields of globalization, leadership development, urban studies, and organizational behavior. Editor of The Journal of Practical Consulting, he consults with both for-profit and charitable organizations locally and internationally.

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References


Aggression, Risk Taking, and Leadership Effectiveness: Leadership Lessons From the Explanatory Styles of Civil War Generals

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The present study applies explanatory style theory and the content analysis of verbatim explanation (CAVE) technique toward examining the leadership behaviors and effectiveness of key Civil War generals. The results of our study suggest that relatively optimistic explanatory styles may lead to aggressiveness and risk taking while relatively pessimistic explanatory styles may lead to passivity and risk aversion. Our findings also suggest that a pessimistic explanatory style could be related to leadership effectiveness in some situations as mediated by aggression and risk taking. In short, pessimism may result in greater leadership effectiveness by reducing excessive aggression and risk taking.

Modern leadership theory and knowledge has often been enlightened by the study of leadership in historical contexts. The study of leadership in historical military contexts has been especially popular, and researchers have applied a variety of contemporary theories of leadership and psychology in the examination of historical military leaders and military leadership situations (e.g., Duncan, LaFrance, & Ginter, 2003; Pois & Langer, 2004; Taylor & Rosenbach, 2000; Wood, 1995; Wong, Bliese, & McGurk, 2003). Furthermore, it seems that leadership scholars have paid particularly close attention to military leadership in the context the American Civil War (e.g., Buell, 1997; Duncan et al., 2003). This attention appears to be fairly well-warranted. The Civil War is one of the more thoroughly documented wars in modern history and provides a rich backdrop for the study of leadership behaviors and tendencies.

In the current paper, we follow this established approach of applying contemporary theories and techniques within the historical context of the Civil War in order to expand our knowledge and understanding of leadership behaviors and processes. More specifically, the purpose of the present study is to apply explanatory style theory and the content analysis of verbatim explanations (CAVE) technique to examine the leadership behaviors and leadership
effectiveness of four prominent Civil War generals. Although these techniques have previously been applied toward understanding military leadership behaviors at the executive level (i.e., heads of state such as George H. W. Bush and Winston Churchill) in the 20th century (Satterfield, 1998; Satterfield & Seligman, 1994), we are the first to apply these techniques toward understanding military leadership at a different level (battlefield commander) and in a different historical context (the Civil War). The results of our study primarily will be of interest to leadership theorists and practitioners who may be able to apply some of our findings to other leadership contexts. Finally, our findings may also hold some interest for military strategists seeking to understand and predict the actions of modern military leaders as well as for Civil War historians seeking to better understand the behaviors and motivations of Civil War generals.

Explanatory Style

The concept of explanatory style was developed as part of Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale’s (1978) reformulation of the learned helplessness theory. Learned helplessness occurs when, due to negative circumstances or experiences, people come to believe that they have no control over their outcomes. Such people believe that nothing they do matters and consequently become passive, indecisive, and depressed. The reformulated learned helplessness theory suggests that people have tendencies or habits for explaining positive and negative events (Abramson et al., 1978). An individual’s habitual or preferred explanatory style helps to determine whether the individual will become passive, risk-averse, and indecisive (i.e., “helpless”) when faced with difficult and challenging situations (Gillham, Shatte, Reivich, & Seligman, 2001). A person with a pessimistic explanatory style tends to hesitate, give up, or retreat when faced with problems or the possibility of failure. In contrast, individuals with an optimistic explanatory style tend to persist, endure, or increase their efforts when faced with setbacks and challenges (Seligman, 1991). There are three primary causal dimensions that comprise explanatory style: permanence (i.e., stable vs. unstable causes), pervasiveness (i.e., universal vs. specific causes), and personalization (i.e., internal vs. external causes) (Gillham et al., 2001). People with a pessimistic explanatory style tend to see negative events as resulting from permanent, pervasive, and personal causes (e.g., “It will never get any better, it undermines everything I do, and it is entirely my fault”). In contrast, people with an optimistic explanatory style tend to see negative events as temporary and related to specific impersonal external causes (Seligman, 1991).

Research suggests that a person’s explanatory style is relatively stable across both time and situation (e.g., Burns & Seligman, 1989; Nolen-Hoeksema, Girt, Seligman, 1986; Peterson, Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988). However, unlike personality traits, which are generally considered to be well established after adolescence (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1994), explanatory style is thought to be somewhat more malleable and amenable to reshaping with appropriate cognitive change interventions (Seligman, 1991). A person’s explanatory style is developed in childhood on the basis of three primary influences (Dweck & Licht, 1980; Seligman & Elder, 1985). First, children whose parents, especially their mothers, provide largely optimistic causal explanations for everyday events tend to develop optimistic explanatory styles. Second, children who are criticized for their failings in terms of permanent and pervasive explanations tend to develop pessimistic explanatory styles. Third, children who experience early childhood traumas and losses that are in fact pervasive and permanent, such as the death of a parent, tend to develop pessimistic explanatory styles. The explanatory styles developed in childhood tend to follow...
individuals into adulthood, shaping the way they interpret and explain the world around them, especially the negative events that they experience (Burns & Seligman, 1989).

Although a number of measures have been used in explanatory style research (see Reivich, 1995 for a complete review), the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) is the most widely used instrument for the measurement of explanatory style (Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982). The ASQ is a self-report instrument that scores an individual’s explanatory style along the three causal dimensions outlined above. The ASQ presents 12 hypothetical events, half of which are good and half of which are bad. The subject is first asked to write one major cause for each hypothetical event before rating the causes on each of the three causal dimensions. However, because some people will not (as in the case of famous people such as politicians, sports figures, or movie stars) or can not (as in the case of historical figures who are no longer living) complete a questionnaire, the Content Analysis of Verbatim Explanations (CAVE) technique was developed (Schulman, Castellon, & Seligman, 1989). The CAVE technique calls for the extraction of verbatim explanatory statements from a subject’s writings or recorded comments (e.g., a diary, newspaper quotations, an autobiography, a transcribed interview, etc.). Independent blind raters then rate the explanatory statements on each of the three explanatory style causal dimensions (permanence, pervasiveness, and personalization) to create an explanatory style score. CAVE explanatory style scores have good construct validity, correlating highly (r = .71) with ASQ scores for the same subject (Schulman et al., 1989).

Much of the previous explanatory style research has dealt with the effects of explanatory style on various outcomes such as depression (Peterson & Seligman, 1984), illness (Peterson, Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988), and performance. Areas of performance include academics (Peterson & Barrett, 1987), athletics (Seligman, Nolen-Hoeksema, Thornton, & Thornton, 1990), and insurance sales (Seligman & Schulman, 1986). Explanatory style has also been used to examine and explain important historical events. For instance, Zullow and Seligman (1990) used the CAVE technique to assess the explanatory style used by presidential candidates in their campaign speeches from 1900-1984 and found that the candidate with the more pessimistic explanatory style lost 18 of 22 presidential elections over that time period. Explanatory style research has also been extended to the examination of military leadership at the commander-in-chief level. For example, Zullow, Oettingen, Peterson, and Seligman (1988) reported that when Lyndon Johnson shifted to a more optimistic explanatory style in his Vietnam era press conferences, aggressive and risky military actions followed, while a shift to a more pessimistic explanatory style predicted passivity and risk aversion. Likewise, Satterfield and Seligman (1994) showed that relatively high levels of optimism in the explanatory styles of both George H. W. Bush and Saddam Hussein during the events surrounding the first gulf war predicted aggression and risk taking, while increased pessimism before a military event predicted caution and passivity. Similarly, Satterfield (1998) demonstrated a significant relationship between the relative explanatory styles for time periods preceding important military events and the levels of aggression and risk taking for Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, and Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II.
Explanatory Style and Leadership

Leadership has often been described as a process of influence toward the accomplishment of objectives (e.g., Bass, 1960; Katz & Kahn, 1966; Yukl, 1998). In order to better understand this complex process, leadership theorists have attempted to identify key leader characteristics and behaviors that may be associated with effective leadership. One such characteristic that has been advanced as a possible mechanism for overall leadership effective is an optimistic explanatory style. For example, Peterson, Walumbwa, Byron and Myrowitz (2007) reported a relationship between leaders’ positive psychological traits of hope and optimism and firm performance. Similarly, Wunderly, Reddy, and Dember (1998) found that a sample of male business leaders had a lower mean score on pessimism than a normative group of non-leaders. These authors also reported that optimism was positively correlated with a scale measuring effective leadership practices and that pessimism was negatively correlated with a scale measuring adaptation and innovation. Likewise, Popper, Amit, Gal, Mishkal-Sinai, and Lisak (2004) argued that a proactive orientation as expressed by optimism was one of three psychological capacities necessary for leadership. In a study of 402 soldiers who were nearing the end of three months of basic training, peers’ and commanders’ evaluations of the soldiers’ leadership capabilities were used to categorize subjects dichotomously as either leaders or non-leaders. The findings suggested that leaders have a higher internal locus of control, lower levels of anxiety, higher self-efficacy, greater capacity for developing interpersonal relationships and higher levels of optimism than their non-leader peers (Popper et al., 2004). Finally, in a similarly designed study, Chemers, Watson, and May (2000) found that optimism was positively associated with military science professors’ ratings of leadership potential for a sample of military cadets.

Research Hypotheses

In the present study, we expand the existing line of explanatory style in military leadership research to a different time context (the Civil War) and to a different level of military leadership (field commander). In short, based on explanatory style theory and the previous empirical findings outlined above, we suggest that the explanatory style of key Civil War commanders in the days leading up to important military events will predict important leadership behaviors. More specifically, we expect that relatively optimistic explanatory styles in leaders will result in greater aggressiveness and risk-taking behaviors by those leaders, while relatively pessimistic explanatory styles will result in leader passivity and risk aversion. In addition, we suggest that the explanatory style of a commander will be related to overall leadership effectiveness for that commander, with an optimistic explanatory style related to leadership effectiveness and a pessimistic explanatory style related to leadership ineffectiveness.

H1: Commanders with relatively optimistic explanatory styles will be more aggressive and take more risks than commanders with relatively pessimistic explanatory styles.

H2: Commanders with relatively optimistic explanatory styles will be more effective leaders as compared to commanders with relatively pessimistic explanatory styles.
Method

Overall Study Design

The overall design for the present study is shown in Figure 1. As indicated in Figure 1, a negative event (a major battlefield defeat) was identified for each general, resulting in causal explanations that could be assessed to determine the explanatory style (pessimistic vs. optimistic) for each commander at that time. Leadership behaviors in a subsequent military campaign were then rated in terms of aggression, risk taking, and overall leadership effectiveness. Battlefield losses were chosen as the focal explanatory event in the current study for several reasons. Although both negative and positive events are often used to determine explanatory style (e.g., the ASQ), negative events may actually be more effective in determining an individual’s levels of optimism and pessimism. Negative events tend to have a greater impact on people than positive events (Zautra & Reich, 1983), and people tend to respond more strongly to losses than to gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Indeed, prior research suggests that explanatory style for negative events is a better predictor of clinical depression than explanatory style for positive events (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). Explanatory style for negative events also tends to be more stable across both time and situation than explanatory style for positive events (Burns & Seligman, 1989). Moreover, using multiple events (both positive and negative) for each general would have been prohibitive due to the demands that such a design would have placed on the CAVE raters, leading to a greater risk of rater fatigue.

Figure 1. Overall study design

Subjects

Braxton Bragg, John Bell Hood, Albert Sidney Johnston, and Robert E. Lee were chosen as subjects in the present study. These generals were chosen for inclusion because they commanded at the same level of military leadership (i.e., army commanders), and they all experienced a significant battlefield failure followed by another military action within three months.
Military Actions

Two major military actions involving key campaign and battlefield commands, orders, and decision-making were selected for each of the four commanders. Table 1 provides a summary of the paired military actions selected for each commander. The military actions were chosen utilizing the following criteria. First, the initial action had to result in a strategic military defeat or failure. Second, the army commander was held responsible for the defeat and was required to provide a battle report explaining the circumstances surrounding the failure. Third, the initial defeat was followed by another major military action within three months. In most cases, the causal explanations of the initial failure were written during this intervening period and serve as good indicators of the subject’s levels of optimism or pessimism as they entered the subsequent campaign.

Table 1: Commanders and Paired Military Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Military Actions</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Braxton Bragg</td>
<td>Perryville, KY</td>
<td>October 8, 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stones River, TN</td>
<td>December 31, 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bell Hood</td>
<td>Spring Hill, TN</td>
<td>November 29, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Franklin, TN</td>
<td>November 30, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Sidney Johnston</td>
<td>Fort Donelson, TN</td>
<td>February 11-16, 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shiloh, TN</td>
<td>April 6-7, 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert E. Lee</td>
<td>Antietam, MD</td>
<td>September 16-18, 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fredericksburg, VA</td>
<td>December 11-15, 1862</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the military actions chosen for each commander. For additional and more detailed information regarding these campaigns, refer to Walter Geer’s classic work, Campaigns of the Civil War (Geer, 1926/2001).

Perryville and Stones River. Confederate General Braxton Bragg’s autumn of 1862 invasion of Kentucky had carried as far as the outskirts of Cincinnati and Louisville before he was forced to fall back and regroup in central Kentucky. On October 8, 1862, Union Major General Don Carlos Buell and his force of 55,000 attacked Bragg’s army at Perryville. The armies battled throughout the day as the Confederates were pushed back through the streets of the town. Bragg, outnumbered and undersupplied, withdrew during the night into East Tennessee, ultimately retreating to Murfreesboro, where he ordered his army into winter quarters. Less than three months later, on December 31, 1862, Union Major General William S. Rosecrans’ army of 44,000 attacked Bragg’s force of 37,000 in the battle of Stones River.

Spring Hill and Franklin. On the afternoon of November 29, 1864, Confederate General John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee crossed the Duck River and raced toward Spring Hill, TN in an effort to cut off Union Major General John Schofield and his army from their supply lines in Nashville. In the late afternoon, a small Union force at Spring Hill held off a piecemeal Confederate infantry assault. During the night, Schofield’s entire army quietly passed within a few yards of the encamped Confederates, moving from Columbia, TN through Spring Hill to
take up entrenched positions in Franklin, TN. Schofield’s maneuver is generally considered to be one of the most crucial non-combat events of the entire war. The following day, an incensed John Bell Hood ordered his army to attack the waiting Federals at the battle of Franklin.

_Fort Donelson and Shiloh._ Following the capture of Fort Henry on the Tennessee River on February 6, 1862, Union Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant laid siege on Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River. Finally, on February 16, following a failed attempt to break through Grant’s lines with an all-out attack, the entire 12,000 man garrison surrendered unconditionally, giving the Union armies control of both of the major waterways leading into Tennessee. Following the defeat at Fort Donelson, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston was forced to fall back to Corinth, MS. Grant mounted an offensive down the Tennessee River, stopping at Pittsburg Landing to await the arrival of Major General Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio. In the early morning hours of April 6, 1862, Johnston launched a surprise assault in the battle of Shiloh.

_Anteitam and Fredericksburg._ On September 17, 1862, Union Major General George B. McClellan attacked Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Sharpsburg, MD in what would become the single bloodiest day of the war. The fighting raged throughout the day as Lee and his army, outnumbered two-to-one, fought McClellan and the Union army to a virtual draw. Despite devastating losses, Lee and his troops continued to engage the Union army throughout much of the following day. That night, Lee withdrew his army across the Potomac and back into Virginia. President Lincoln claimed a great Union victory and took the opportunity to announce his famous emancipation proclamation. Less than three months later, Robert E. Lee and his army occupied the heights behind the town of Fredericksburg, VA. Union General Ambrose Burnside crossed the Rappahannock River and attacked Lee and his army in the battle of Fredericksburg.

_Verbatim Materials_

Explanatory statements were extracted for each general from “The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,” or more commonly “The Official Records.” The Official Records contain the detailed contemporary verbatim explanatory statements of civil war commanders in the form of battle reports, correspondence, orders, and other types of reports. It is considered the primary source for all Civil War historians and provides perfect source materials for the CAVE technique.

The explanatory statements used in the current study were taken exclusively from the official battle reports written by each general. Generals often wrote multiple reports explaining the outcome of a given battle, and the vast majority of the reports used to extract explanatory statements for the current study were addressed to Brigadier General Samuel Cooper, the Adjutant and Inspector General for the Confederate Army. Cooper, who reported directly to President Jefferson Davis, was the highest ranking general in the Confederate Army. A few reports were addressed directly to Jefferson Davis or to J. P. Benjamin, the Secretary of War for the Confederacy, but there is little doubt that all three men routinely read these reports and were the intended audience.

The approaches used by the four generals in writing the battle reports were very similar due to common backgrounds and training and to the close constraints under which the reports were written. All four generals graduated from the United States Military Academy at West
Point and served in the Army of the United States prior to the Civil War. All four subsequently were commissioned as generals in the Confederate Army and wrote their battle reports in the context of the requirements and expectations of that army. Finally, in the mid-nineteenth century, long before the advent of telecommunications, the written word was supreme. Detailed explanations were expected and given, making this time period and these reports particularly rich and compelling as source material for the CAVE technique. Details regarding the criteria and procedures for selecting the explanatory statements for each general are presented in the following section.

CAVE Analysis and Explanatory Style Score

Explanatory statements were extracted from the Official Records for each subject in accordance with the “Guidelines for Extracting and Rating Spontaneous Explanations,” which is included as an appendix to Schulman et al.’s (1989) article describing the CAVE technique. Several conditions must be present in order for a statement to be extracted (Schulman et al., 1989). For example, the subject must be presenting his or her own explanation of the event and not simply agreeing with or quoting another person’s explanation. Likewise, there must be a clear causal relationship between explanation and event, rather than a mere description of a sequence of events that offers no explanation. The explanation must clearly precede the event as a primary cause as opposed to a simple proof or justification of the event. Schulman et al. included several examples of both acceptable and unacceptable extractions along with supporting discussion and commentary.

The authors of the present study extracted the explanatory statements that were used in subsequent analyses while adhering carefully to the guidelines described above. One of the authors has considerable knowledge and expertise in the area of Civil War history while the other author is well-versed in explanatory style theory and the CAVE technique. Together the authors were able to identify battle reports written by each commander following his battlefield defeat and to select a total of 35 explanatory statements from among these verbatim explanations. A sample statement for each general is listed in Appendix A.

Extractions were individually coded and randomized. Next, a panel of seven independent raters, who were blind to any information regarding the identity of the generals or the details of the circumstances surrounding the explanatory statements, scored each statement on the explanatory style dimensions of permanence, pervasiveness, and personalization using a basic 7-point scale. The raters received a 2-hour training session based on the “Guidelines for Extracting and Rating Spontaneous Explanations” (Schulman et al., 1989) that included a basic overview of explanatory style theory along with detailed information about the CAVE rating technique. More specifically, the trainer explained each of the three dimensions (internal vs. external, stable vs. unstable, universal vs. specific) in detail and provided sample explanatory statements that were representative of differing points on the 7-point scale for each dimension. This effectively provided the raters with rating “anchors” that helped to establish a common frame of reference for their subsequent individual ratings. Refer to the “Guidelines for Extracting and Rating Spontaneous Explanations” (Schulman et al., 1989) for more detailed information on the sample statements used in the training.

Although there are numerous methods for assessing interrater reliability and agreement, we chose to use James, Demaree, and Wolf’s (1984) rWG(J), which represents the within-group interrater reliability for judges’ mean scores based on J items. Values for rWG(J) range from 0 to 1.
with values above .70 generally representing acceptable levels of interrater agreement to warrant aggregation of individual ratings to create a single score based on the average of multiple ratings. This method of assessing interrater reliability has been widely used in behavioral research and has generally been viewed as an acceptable and effective means of determining the appropriateness of data aggregation (e.g., LeBreton, James, & Lindell, 2005; LeBreton & Senter, 2008; Lindell & Brandt, 1999).

The interrater reliability for the seven raters in the present study was quite good ($r_{WG(J)} = .977$). The ratings were therefore aggregated by averaging the ratings of the seven raters on each of the three causal dimensions: internal vs. external, stable vs. unstable, universal vs. specific. An overall composite score for pessimism (PES) in explanatory style for each general was calculated by averaging the aggregated scores for each of the three causal dimensions. A hopelessness (HLN) score (Satterfield & Seligman, 1994) was also calculated in a similar manner for each general. The hopelessness score excludes the internal/external or personalization (i.e., blaming) causal dimension and represents the average of the two remaining dimensions of permanence (stable vs. unstable) and pervasiveness (universal vs. specific).

**Aggression, Risk taking, and Leadership Effectiveness Scores**

Adapting previously established methods (Satterfield, 1998; Satterfield & Seligman, 1994), two noted Civil War historians, who were blind to the explanatory style scores assigned by the other raters, rated the specific actions taken by each general in the second of the paired military actions on a 5-point scale in order to determine an aggression score and a risk-taking score for each general. More specifically, the raters were asked to respond to the question “To what extent was Lee aggressive in his actions and orders at Fredericksburg?” on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all aggressive) to 5 (extremely aggressive) and the question “To what extent did Lee take risks in his actions and orders at Fredericksburg?” on a scale ranging from 1 (no risk taking) to 5 (extreme risk taking). The questions were adapted and repeated for each general. Because of the historians’ familiarity and knowledge of the focal battles and the actions of the generals in question, they were especially well-qualified for assessing the level of aggression and risk taking demonstrated by each general. Although the aggression and risk-taking constructs are theoretically distinct from one another (e.g., Satterfield & Seligman, 1994), they were highly correlated ($r = .93$) in the current data and were therefore combined into a single aggression and risk-taking (AGG/RISK) variable for subsequent analysis.

The two historians also assessed the leadership effectiveness of each general using an adapted version of the General Leadership Impression (GLI) scale (Lord, Foti, & DeVader, 1984). The adapted scale consisted of three items that were rated on a 5-point scale with anchors ranging from “extreme amount” to “nothing.” Scale items included “How much did Lee contribute to the effectiveness of his army?” “How much leadership did Lee exhibit?” and “If you had to choose a new leader for an army, how willing would you be to vote for Lee as the leader?” The scores on this adapted scale were used to create a leadership effectiveness score for each general. The interrater reliability for the two raters was excellent ($r_{WG(J)} = .993$). The ratings were therefore aggregated by averaging the ratings of the two raters to create a single aggregate AGG/RISK and leadership effectiveness score for each general.
Results

Explanatory style, aggression/risk taking, and leadership effectiveness scores are shown in Table 2. Higher overall pessimism scores (PES) indicate a more pessimistic and less optimistic explanatory style for each general in his explanation of the battlefield failure. Of the four generals, Bragg was the most pessimistic, and Hood was the most optimistic. The hopelessness score (HLN) excludes the internal/external “blaming” dimension of explanatory style. Once again, Hood was the most optimistic while Bragg was the more pessimistic or “hopeless” of the four generals. Hood scored the highest of the generals in aggression and risk taking (AGG/RISK), while Lee scored the lowest in this category. Finally, Lee was rated highest in terms of leadership effectiveness (LE) while Hood was rated as the least effective leader among the generals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>HLN</th>
<th>AGG/RISK</th>
<th>LE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bragg</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnston</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hood</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. PES = Overall Pessimism, HLN = Hopelessness, AGG/RISK = Aggression and Risk taking, and LE = Leadership Effectiveness. PES and HLN scores are reported on a seven-point scale based on the aggregate (average) ratings of seven independent raters. AGG/RISK and LE scores are reported on a five-point scale based on the aggregate (average) ratings of two independent raters.

Pearson correlations among the variables are shown in Table 3. Pessimism (PES) and hopelessness (HLN) scores were both negatively correlated to aggression/risk taking (AGG/RISK) scores. In addition, aggression/risk taking (AGG/RISK) was negatively correlated to leadership effectiveness (LE). Finally, pessimism (PES) and hopelessness (HLN) were both positively correlated with leadership effectiveness (LE). As anticipated, our analysis lends some support to Hypothesis 1, which stated that commanders with relatively optimistic explanatory styles will be more aggressive and take more risks than commanders with relatively pessimistic explanatory styles. Contrary to expectations, however, our findings do not support Hypothesis 2, which suggested that commanders with relatively optimistic explanatory styles will be rated higher in overall leadership effectiveness as compared to commanders with relatively pessimistic explanatory styles.
Table 3: Pearson Correlations Among the Variables of Pessimism, Hopelessness, Aggression/Risk taking, and Leadership Effectiveness (N = 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pessimism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hopelessness</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Aggression/Risk taking</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.64</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Leadership Effectiveness</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>-.99*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05.

Discussion

We utilized explanatory style theory and the CAVE technique to examine the leadership behaviors and leadership effectiveness of four prominent Civil War generals. As expected, our analysis indicated that generals with more optimistic explanatory styles were more aggressive and took greater risks than those with a pessimistic explanatory style. Hood and Johnston were rated highest in optimism by the blind raters and also rated very high in risk taking and aggression by the Civil War experts. In contrast, Lee’s explanatory style was judged to be more pessimistic than his fellow generals, and he was subsequently rated much lower in aggression and risk taking by the experts.

Our analysis also revealed an unanticipated outcome. We found that a pessimistic explanatory style was positively correlated with leadership effectiveness. Hood was the most optimistic of the four generals but was rated lowest in overall leadership effectiveness. Similarly, Lee was relatively more pessimistic and yet was rated as the most effective leader among the four generals. This finding seems somewhat counterintuitive and conflicts with existing empirical research examining optimism and military leadership (e.g., Chemers et al., 2000; Popper et al., 2004). One possible explanation of this unexpected result involves the role of aggression and risk taking as mediators of the relationship between pessimism and leadership effectiveness. As shown in Table 3, the negative correlation between pessimism and both aggression and risk taking appears stronger than the positive relationship between pessimism and leadership effectiveness. Likewise, the negative relationships between aggression and risk taking and leadership effectiveness appear quite strong. These strong negative relationships between pessimism, aggression and risk taking, and leadership effectiveness suggests that aggression and risk taking may be fully mediating the positive relationship between pessimism and leadership effectiveness as demonstrated in Figure 2. In other words, pessimism may result in leadership effectiveness only by limiting excessive aggression and risk taking.
Figure 2. A model of explanatory style and leadership effectiveness.

The results of this study suggest some interesting implications for leadership theory, especially in the context of military leadership. Although optimism is generally recommended as a key mechanism for leadership effectiveness (e.g., Peterson et al., 2007), an excessively optimistic explanatory style may not be appropriate for leaders, especially if it leads to recklessly aggressive behaviors or risky actions. Indeed, as Seligman (1991) suggested, “Optimism is no panacea…it has its limits…it may sometimes keep us from seeing reality with necessary clarity” (p. 291). This concept may be especially important to military leaders or others in leadership roles whose actions could lead to potentially negative outcomes for their followers. Although modern organizations, including the military in many western countries, are much less autocratic and hierarchical than were the armies of the 19th century (e.g., Mutch, 2006), unbridled optimism in leadership resulting in unwarrantedly reckless and aggressive actions may still have detrimental consequences for followers, even in today’s dominant organizational environments characterized by autonomy and empowerment.

A number of contemporary theories of psychology and leadership may further help to interpret these findings. For example, the concept of defensive pessimism (e.g., Norem, 2001; Norem & Cantor, 1986a, 1986b) has been used to explain the use of pessimism as a cognitive strategy for avoiding potential hazards and increasing motivation. People using this strategy set low expectations for future outcomes, despite having performed well in similar past situations. They reflect extensively on all possible future outcomes, paying special attention to potential problems and pitfalls. This seems to allow them to channel their anxieties into energy and motivation while creating an overall feeling of control leading to actual performances far better than their negative predictions. Defensive pessimism may help to explain Robert E. Lee’s leadership behavior at Fredericksburg, where the commander’s deliberate caution and patience resulted in a decisive victory for his outnumbered force.

Similarly, the concept of narcissistic leadership may also help to elucidate our results. Narcissistic leaders are characterized by grandiosity, arrogance, self-absorption, entitlement, fragile self-esteem, and hostility (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). These leaders tend to be motivated more by a drive for power and admiration than by any genuine concern for their followers. John Bell Hood and his leadership actions, particularly those surrounding the Battle of
Franklin, have sometimes been described in narcissistic terms (e.g., Sword, 1992). Some have suggested that Hood’s self-righteous arrogance and blaming rage in reaction to the Spring Hill debacle, focused on what he saw as cowardice and ineptitude among his officers, was the critical factor that clouded his judgment in ordering the recklessly aggressive attack on the fortified federal positions at Franklin, which lead to more than 6,000 Confederate casualties including five Confederate generals (e.g., McDonough & Connelly, 1983; Sword, 1992).

Likewise, the increasingly popular concept of authentic leadership may lend itself toward helping to explain why excessive optimism may at times become a detriment to effective leadership. Authentic leadership involves, among other key components, a greater self-awareness, relational transparency, and a balanced processing of information (Walumbwa, Avolio, Gardner, Wernsing, & Peterson, 2008). Self-awareness includes a realistic understanding of one’s own strengths and weaknesses, which could be distorted by an unwarranted optimistic viewpoint. Relational transparency involves promoting trust in others by presenting an authentic self as opposed to an artificial or false self. Excessive optimism could lead to distortions in the self that one presents to others. Finally, balanced processing refers to the objective analysis of all relevant data before making a decision. Once again, an unusually optimistic outlook may hinder a truly objective examination of a given situation. Taken together, these factors suggest that extremely optimistic people may lose some of their credibility as authentic leaders, which may in turn affect their overall leadership effectiveness.

Although our findings suggest some important possibilities regarding the relationships between optimism/pessimism and leadership effectiveness, the results reported here are subject to several limitations and should be viewed with some degree of caution. First, only four generals were examined in the present study, resulting in a very small sample size. Given the small sample size, only one correlation in Table 3 rose to the level of significance. This clearly limits the generalizability of our findings. However, it would have been difficult to have included more subjects in the present study because it would have resulted in an excessively large number of explanatory statements to be rated, leading to a greater risk of rater fatigue and inaccuracies. Likewise, the number of Civil War army commanders who experienced a major battle loss followed by another major campaign within three months is quite small. Second, Hood’s explanatory statements of the events at Spring Hill were actually written after the Battle of Franklin, the second of the paired military actions. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the optimistic explanations provided by Hood after the fact represent his state of mind in leading his army into the Battle of Franklin. Third, Hood’s pair of battles occurred in 1864, while the other paired battles all occurred in 1862. It is possible that some systematic bias relating to the overall course of the war at the given time may have tainted the generals’ outlook. However, according to this supposition, one would expect Hood’s explanations to be more pessimistic, given the increasingly grim situation facing the Confederacy by 1864. To the contrary, Hood’s explanations were more optimistic than those of the generals explaining events in 1862. Fourth, the four generals were all relatively optimistic in their explanations (scores ranging from 2.62 to 3.56 on a 7-point scale with lower scores representing greater optimism), leading to concerns of a social desirability or halo effect corrupting the accuracy of the written battle reports. Such an effect, however, would have acted similarly on all four generals, and although the scores were skewed toward optimism, there was enough variation in the scores to effectively conduct our analysis. Finally, factors other than explanatory style could have affected the leadership approach taken by each general in the subsequent military action. Although one could argue that the four generals were operating within substantially similar contexts (e.g., the same superiors who would
presumably react fairly consistently to each commander’s report of a battlefield loss, outnumbered by the enemy, undersupplied, etc.) making the external influences acting upon them roughly equivalent, it is possible nevertheless that some other influence or influences played a greater role than explanatory style in shaping subsequent leadership actions. For example, the fact that all four commanders were Confederate generals suggests the possibility of a systematic bias based on culture and heritage. In their book “Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage,” McWhiney and Jamieson (1982) argued that some southern generals were excessively aggressive and took great risks largely because of their Scots-Irish heritage.

In closing, our analysis has provided an important first step toward understanding the relationships between pessimism/optimism, aggression/risk taking, and leadership effectiveness. Future research should be designed to continue to investigate the relationships suggested here in a variety of other contexts, both military and non-military, using larger sample sizes when possible. In particular, the role of aggression and risk taking as mediators of the relationship between pessimism/optimism and leadership effectiveness should be more directly examined. By learning from the past, we can continue to inform our understanding and knowledge of leadership effectiveness well into the future.

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References


Appendix

Sample Explanatory Statements

General John B. Hood:
“The enemy was at this time moving rapidly along the pike, with some of his troops formed on
the flank of his column to protect it. Major General Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at
once vigorously and get possession of this pike, and, although these orders were frequently and
earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated.
Had my instructions been carried out there is no doubt that we should have possessed ourselves
of this road.”

General Braxton Bragg:
“The campaign here was predicated on a belief and the most positive assurances that the people
of this country would rise in mass to assert their independence. No people ever had so favorable
an opportunity, but I am distressed to add there is little or no disposition to avail of it. Willing
perhaps to accept their independence, they are neither disposed nor willing to risk their lives or
their property in its achievement.”

General Robert E. Lee:
“One great embarrassment is the reduction of our ranks by straggling, which it seems impossible
to prevent with our present regimental officers.”

General Albert S. Johnston:
“…and nearly all the stores would have been saved but for the heavy and unusual rains, which
have washed away the bridges, swept away portions of the railroad, and rendered transportation
almost impossible.”
The Perfect Storm of Leaders’ Unethical Behavior: A Conceptual Framework

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Unethical behavior of leaders has consequences for leaders themselves, followers, and their respective organizations. After defining relevant terms including ethics, morality, and ethical and unethical leadership, a conceptual framework for the unethical behavior of leaders is proposed, which includes the three “perfect storm” dimensions of leaders, followers, and situational context. Additionally, the mediating variable termed “critical incident” suggests that unethical leadership behavior is precipitated by a catalyzing thought, condition, intention, or event. With specific examples illustrating the conceptual framework dimensions and salient characteristics of each, the paper then concludes with a discussion of the implications of unethical leadership behavior, with attention given to further research foci.

The unethical behavior of leaders can be compared to the formation of tornadoes, a “perfect storm” resulting from the combinative effect of rotating winds, temperature, and atmospheric pressure. Similarly, unethical behavior of leaders occurs when a conflux of factors interact between leaders (rotating winds), followers (colliding hot and cold temperatures), and the situational context (atmospheric conditions), catalyzed by a critical incident or trigger event that pulls everything into its center, similar to the vortex of a tornado. Just as tornadic activity is difficult to predict and may result in damaging loss of property, personal injury, and death, unethical leadership behavior damages all involved including leaders, followers, and organizations.

Examples of unethical behavior of seemingly successful leaders abound in business, government, and religion. Names like Kenneth Lay, Andrew Fastow, and Jeffrey Skilling of Enron; Dennis Koslowski of Tyco; Eliot Spitzer, former Governor of New York; John Edwards, former U.S. Senator from North Carolina; and Archbishop Bernard Law of the Boston Roman Catholic Diocese bring to mind those whose previous success ended in humiliation. As a result, several sobering questions arise including how leaders made such poor ethical decisions, what factors contributed to their ethical/moral meltdowns, and how leaders can avoid “the perfect storm” of leadership demise in the future. Therefore, this paper provides (a) a brief overview of definitional terms, (b) a conceptual framework for the unethical behavior of leaders, and (c) an...
expanded analysis of the literature related to the framework dimensions. The paper concludes with recommendations for further study.

**Ethics, Morality, and Ethical and Unethical Leadership Behavior**

The terms ethics, morality, ethical leadership, and unethical leadership have varying meanings in the leadership literature. To clarify these terms, definitions are provided to clearly distinguish them.

*Ethics & Morality*

Leadership scholars generally agree that the terms “ethics” and “morality,” and “ethical” and “moral” are synonymous (Boatright, 2007; Ciulla, 2005). The English terms “ethics” and “morality” are translations of the same word in Greek and Latin respectively; and as such, each word is translated into English slightly differently. The word “ethics” derives from the Greek word “ethikos,” and from the root word “ethos,” referring to character. The word “morality” derives from the Latin word, “moralitas,” based upon the root word, “mores,” referring to character, custom, or habit (Rhode, 2006, pp. 4-5). Therefore, these interchangeable terms refer to the character or disposition of beliefs, values, and behaviors that shape perceptions of what is right and wrong based upon one’s personal, social, cultural, and religious values and the standards by which behavior is deemed acceptable or unacceptable regarding responsibilities, rules, codes of conduct, and/or laws (c.f., Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996, p. 33; Johnson, 2005, p. 6).

*Ethical Leadership Behavior*

Leadership research identifies the essentiality of leaders not only modeling moral integrity and ethical standards in their personal lives but also in their professional lives (Barnard, 1968; Bowie, 2005; Ciulla, 2001; Price; 2008; Wren, 1998). Emphasized by Burns (1978), Bass and Steidlmeier (1999), and Trevino, Hartman, and Brown (2000), the leader’s character provides the foundation of leadership. Further, ethical leadership is essential for organizational legitimacy (Mendonca, 2001), earns the confidence and loyalty of followers (Aronson, 2001), establishes the role modeling process for constituents (Schein, 1992; Sims & Brinkmann, 2002); enhances organizational moral climate (Schminke, Ambrose, & Neubaum, 2005) and conduct (Trevino, Brown, & Hartman, 2003); and may exact personal sacrifice (Margolis & Molinsky, 2006). Based on this analysis, ethical leadership behavior is defined as the organizational process of leaders acting in a manner consistent with agreed upon standards of character, decency, and integrity, which upholds clear, measurable, and legal standards, fostering the common good over personal self-interest.

*Unethical Leadership Behavior*

Leadership research also examines the unethical behavior of leaders (Conger, 2005; Kellerman, 2004a, 2004b; McGill, 2003; Price, 2006; Sayles & Smith, 2006). Likening unethical behavior to a cancer, Sims (2003) identified the eroding quality of unethical behavior on all personal and professional levels (c.f., Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998). Johnson (2005)
commented, “We can and do condemn the actions of leaders who decide to lie, belittle followers, and enrich themselves at the expense of the less fortunate” (p. 6). Unethical leadership behavior is, therefore, defined as the organizational process of leaders acting in a manner inconsistent with agreed upon standards of character, decency, and integrity, which blurs or violates clear, measurable, and legal standards, fostering constituent distrust because of personal self-interest.

**Conceptual Perspectives and Proposed Framework of Unethical Behavior of Leaders**

Whereas the topic of ethical leadership has received a plethora of research attention (Brown & Trevino, 2006; Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, 2005; Cameron, 2003; Ciulla, 1998; Trevino, 1986), researchers more recently have begun to assess unethical leadership behavior in light of an avalanche of leadership scandals in all spheres of society. This paper presents a conceptual perspective, which extends previous approaches of unethical behavior from a multidimensional approach involving the interactive effects of leaders, followers, and situational context (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007; Popper, 2001; Vardi & Weitz, 2004). Therefore, this section highlights the conceptual basis for unethical leadership behavior as predicated on a process approach involving leaders, followers, and situational context, along with a mediating variable termed “critical incident.” The words situation and context will be used interchangeably.

**Conceptual Perspectives on the Process of Unethical Behavior of Leaders**

Leadership scholars and social psychologists have addressed the causality of unethical leadership from three primary perspectives: (a) leaders (Dotlich & Cairo, 2003; Kets de Vries, 2006; Luban, 2006; Van Velsor & Leslie, 1995; Whicker, 1996), (b) followers (Berg, 1998; Kellerman, 2008; Offerman, 2004), and (c) situational context (Asch, 1955, 1956; Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 1969, 2006, 2007). However more recently, scholars have presented conceptual frameworks that include a confluence of the three from a process perspective (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007; Popper, 2001). For example, Padilla et al. (2007) proposed a theoretical model entitled “the toxic triangle” to describe destructive leadership. The toxic triangle is comprised of the three domains of destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and conducive environments. Each of these three domains is further examined by exploring specific characteristics of each domain. In keeping with a process model, Popper (2001) similarly proposed that unethical and destructive leadership is comprised of the interplay between leaders, followers, and circumstances. As such, the inner psychodynamics of leaders and followers interacting within unique situational contexts create the incendiary dynamics of unethical leadership. What is lacking in both models relates to catalyzing events that prompt the interplay between the leader, follower, and situational context.

In other words, unethical behavior and its persistence must have a catalyzing starting place, a tipping point moment that prompts all subsequent unethical behavior, similar to the vortex of a tornado drawing everything into its fury. This catalyst will be considered a critical incident, a thought, condition, intention, or event, which prompts unethical behavior (Patton, 2002). Such intentions to behave unethically or incidents that catalyze further unethical behavior comprise the mediating variable, which is seldom discussed in the leadership literature (Vardi & Weitz, 2004). Therefore, this paper builds upon previous research (Padilla et al., 2007; Popper, 2001) by describing salient characteristics of leaders, followers, and situational context and additionally introduces the mediating variable of a critical incident.
Conceptual Model

Unethical leadership seldom happens in a vacuum but rather within a complex interaction of dynamics. With leaders, followers, and situational context catalyzed by a critical incident all interacting within the “perfect storm” of unethical behavior, the conceptual model is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Conceptual framework of unethical behavior of leaders.

Analysis of the Literature

In keeping with the tornado imagery to describe the unethical behavior of leaders, Figure 2 depicts the interactive factors creating this perfect storm: (a) leaders (rotating winds), (b) followers (colliding hot and cold temperatures), and (c) situational context (atmospheric conditions), catalyzed by a critical incident or trigger event that draws everything into its center (tornado vortex). In this section, each dimension contributing to the perfect storm of unethical leadership behavior is further elaborated, including the salient characteristics of each.
Figure 2. The perfect storm dimensions.

Leader Dimensions

Both intrapersonal and interpersonal dynamics produce the rotating winds of unethical leadership behavior (Van Velsor & Leslie, 1995). Leaders bring to their leadership roles all of who they are, which is based on their previous life experiences, worldview, and values. Additionally by its very nature, the leadership role positions leaders to interact with others through interpersonal discourse and activity, which impacts leaders’ sociological and psychological state. As Kets de Vries (2006) observed, “…human development is an inter and intrapersonal process” (p. 11).

Intrapersonal Leader Dimensions

Various researchers have noted the intrapersonal factors contributing to leadership failure (Bass & Steidlmeyer, 1999; Clements & Washbush, 1999; Coutu, 2004; Kets de Vries, 1993, Kroll, Toombs, & Wright, 2000). These intrapersonal factors include what transpires in “the inner theatre of the leader,” or the areas deeply embedded in the leader’s psyche (Kets de Vries, 1993, 2006). For the purposes of this paper, these multiple factors can be clustered around these
primary areas: (a) unresolved childhood needs, (b) personality determinants, (c) moral values and character weakness, and (d) internalized success stressors.

Unresolved childhood needs. In an interview, Kets de Vries partially attributed intrapersonal problems in leaders to unresolved issues in childhood, which produce unconscious blind spots when leaders are under pressure (Coutu, 2004, p. 67). Citing the work of Freud regarding the unconscious aspects of personality, Kets de Vries’ clinical approach to leadership behavior centers in the nature-nurture pendulum where behavior derives from core motivations comprised of thoughts, feelings, and desires conditioned from childhood over time. This primary motivational pattern develops from what Bowlby (1982) described as “attachment theory” (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978).

Attachment theory proposes that human behavior can be explained by the quality of early human attachments with primary caregivers, especially parents (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1965). These attachments can be perceived as secure and positive or insecure and negative. Thus, attachments with significant others throughout childhood can be transferred to other relationships in adulthood identified as (a) secure attachment derived from a basic trust in prior caregivers because of availability and sensitivity, (b) anxious-ambivalent insecure attachment fostered by uncertainty in prior caregivers’ availability in responding to legitimate needs, or (c) anxious-avoidant insecure attachment characterized by previous caregivers who were completely unavailable to provide nurture, love, and care that prompts emotional self-sufficiency and mistrust of others. In a series of three studies, Popper, Mayseless, and Castelnovo (2000) found significant correlations between transformational leadership style and secure attachment.

As adults, leaders take with them life scripts based on these attachment experiences, which regulate emotions, communication, and interaction in a healthy or unhealthy way (Kets de Vries, 1993). Popper (2001) connoted a lack of love pattern from childhood through adulthood as prompting an over-compensation pattern evidenced in leaders’ desire “…to be at the center, to be loved…which is often unconscious” (p. 13). These motivational need systems, predicated on unmet childhood needs, become powerful determinants of adult behavior.

Personality determinants. Unresolved childhood needs impact psychological determinants such as narcissism (Popper, 2002; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006), hubris (Kroll et al., 2000; Sternberg, 2002), and self-deception (Martin, 1986). Leaders’ sense of self runs the spectrum of healthy self-esteem to pathological egotism. Narcissism, or egoistic self-interest as the primary motive for behavior, can be constructive or reactive (Kets de Vries, 2006). Leaders may develop a reactive narcissism, fostered in childhood when they did not receive the caring support needed for healthy psycho-social development. This reactive narcissism, attributed to damage in the formative “mirroring” process between infant and mother where the child is deprived in some way, leads to grandiosity and yearning for positive affirmation and individuation in later adult stages (Kohut, 1971; Pines, 1981; Popper, 2001). For example, when John Edwards, a 2008 U.S. Democratic presidential contender and former South Carolina Senator, was interviewed about his adulterous affair, he admitted that narcissism played a role in his unethical behavior (ABC News/Nightline, 2008).

Hubris, exaggerated pride or self-confidence, contributes to a sense of grandiosity. Sternberg (2002) cited a lack of tacit knowledge, or common sense, disposes leaders to imbalance through a sense of personal omnipotence, an extreme sense of power and invulnerability, and an illusion of insulation from others. As Kroll et al. (2000) asserted,
“Narcissism and hubris feed on further successes” (p. 120). Likewise, Rhode (2006) identified that high confidence, arrogance, and optimism experienced by leaders leads to moral myopia. When leaders engage in unethical behavior they often experience a cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), where information is suppressed or reconstrued, resulting in the rationalization of unethical behavior (Price, 2006). Unbridled narcissism and hubris leads to self-deception.

Self-deception, the paradoxical capacity to deceive oneself regarding the truth in the process of protecting self-image, is another psychological determinant. Introduced in his seminal work, Fingarette (2000) related self-deception to personal identity constructs where the self-deceiver denies acknowledging the truth and “commits himself to avoid spelling-out his commitment” (p. 47). Martin (1986) distinguished self-deception from deceiving others by asserting that self-deception involves “concealing a truth or one’s view of the truth” and takes many forms (p. 6). Various patterns of self-deception involve evasive mechanisms including willful ignorance, systematic ignoring, emotional detachment, self-pretense, rationalization. Self-deception can be conceived as a fracture between two selves, whereby the deceiver and the deceived live within one person (Haight, 1980), which leads to unethical leadership behavior.

Moral values and character weakness. Leaders’ ethical standards may falter because of the loosening of moral values regarding personal conduct and organizational procedures. The character and ethical values of leaders form a cornerstone of decision making and conduct. Bass and Steidlmeier (1998) argued that authentic transformational leadership must “be grounded on moral foundations” and predicated “on values of honesty, loyalty and fairness, and the end values of justice, equality, and human rights” (pp. 181-185). The character and integrity of leaders transcends projected persona and others’ perceptions of them and must nurture trust and credibility among followers by invoking “word-action match” (Simons, 1999, p. 90). Character and integrity are seen as cornerstones of ethical leadership (Cameron, 2003; Heath, 2002; Quinn, 2003).

A lack of moral values and character weakness evidence themselves in lying, cheating, and greed (Bok, 1999; Cruver, 2002; Doris, 2002). Few would agree that lying to protect personal image at the expense of public trust and breaking the law are acceptable leadership practices. Leadership lies, scams, and cover-ups are alarmingly prevalent. In 1998, former U.S. President Bill Clinton admitted to misleading his family, colleagues, and the public in his denial of allegations related to his involvement with a White House intern in the Paula Jones deposition (Wright, 1999). These leadership lies and subsequent cover-up clearly violated the public trust.

Success stressors and personal imbalance. Success brings with it positive as well as challenging outcomes. For example, vocational success may foster additional stress to protect personal image/persona (Kets de Vries, 2006), achieve further goals (Berglas, 1986), meet perceived internal and external expectations (Chaleff, 2008), and breed exception making and a false sense of entitlement (Johnson, 2005; Perkins, 2002; Price, 2006, 2008). Berglas (1986) suggested that self-esteem is the outcome of “what has been accomplished” divided by “what is possible or expected” (p. 98). However, when escalating internal and external expectations are not being met, stress ensues, with self-esteem likely to plummet. Additionally, success stress is created by heightened public recognition, reduced personal time, strained personal relationships, an “alone at the top feeling,” and the over-functioning in a false persona in order to fulfill leadership roles and expectations (O’Neill, 2004).
Ludwig and Longenecker (1993) cited an inability to cope with success as contributing to “the Bathsheba Syndrome,” derived from the Old Testament and Torah accounts of King David’s adulterous affair with Bathsheba and his subsequent cover-up. The Bathsheba Syndrome is characterized by complacency, loss of focus, privileged access to information and people, unrestrained control of organizational resources, and the ability to manipulate outcomes, which in turn may elicit unethical behavior. Leaders often lack preparedness in dealing with personal and organizational success, which may lead to personal isolation, lack of relational intimacy, and emptiness (c.f., Kelly, 1988; La Bier, 1986).

Furthermore, success may cause leaders to excuse themselves from established protocols (Cameron, 2003), while making exceptions for their unethical behavior (Price, 2006). This sense of entitlement and rationalization, whereby leaders gratuitously expect certain rewards for their hard work (Boatright, 2007, Nozick, 1974; Rhode, 2006), end up in denial, which fosters rule breaking. The Watergate scandal that rocked the Nixon presidency is a classic example of exception making. During a news conference on November 17, 1973, President Richard Nixon, who first minimized the scandal as part of politics, rationalized his unethical behavior by stating, “People have got to know whether or not their President is a crook. Well, I’m not a crook. I’ve earned everything I’ve got” (Kilpatrick, 1973).

**Interpersonal Dimensions**

Interpersonal antecedents of unethical behavior of leaders are well-supported (Margolis & Molinsky, 2006; Van Velsor & Leslie, 1995; Vardi & Weitz, 2004). Four factors related to interpersonal dimensions are presented: (a) charisma, (b) abuse of personalized power, (c) lack of effective interpersonal skills, and (d) lack of a viable accountability and support system.

Charisma. A frequently identified characteristic of effective leadership is charisma. Charisma is both a trait and behavior that influences the attitudes and behaviors of followers (Howell, 1988; Howell & Avolio, 1992; House, 1977; Meindl, 1990; Shamir & Howell, 1999). Charismatic leaders articulate a compelling vision, use expressive forms of communication with followers, take personal risks, and communicate high expectations (Yukl, 2005). By being greatly influenced by charismatic leaders, followers are apt to agree with, feel affection for, and obey them. With charismatic leaders fostering a sense of strong identification with followers, they may likewise curry followers’ inordinate allegiance to them in the face of unethical or moral leadership indiscretion (Conger & Kanungo, 1988, 1998). Shamir, House, and Arthur (1993) found a direct link between charismatic leaders and follower motivation based on followers’ self-concepts. With the self-concept comprised of social identity and values, followers can be motivated to enhance their self-esteem and self-worth through identification with leaders (Brown, Hogg & Reid, 2001; Lord & Brown, 2004; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003), which may contribute to leaders’ unethical behavior.

Howell and Avolio (1992) examined ethical considerations related to followers. They asserted, “Unethical charismatic leaders select or produce obedient, dependent, and compliant followers. They undermine followers’ motivation and ability to challenge existing views, to engage in self-development, and to develop independent perspectives” (p. 49). Consequently when leaders deviate from ethical norms, compliant followers tend not to critique leaders’ decisions, since leaders are considered to be the standard bearers for moral conduct. Although all leaders need positive and socialized charisma to interact with followers, the downside of
charisma concerns possible negative consequences including the abuse of personalized power, the nurture of blind loyalties, and the inhibition of any criticism (Lord & Brown, 2004).

A classic example of a charismatic leader who engaged in unethical behavior was Michael Milken, nicknamed the “junk bond king,” who worked at Drexel Burnham for over 20 years. Known for arrogance, obsession with follower’s unquestioned loyalty, and personal gain, Milken instigated a perfect storm of illegal insider trading, stock manipulation, and tax evasion eventuating in his 1990 guilty plea (Bruck, 1989).

Abuse of personalized power. Observing the corruptive nature of power, Lord Acton astutely observed, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Lord Acton, 1972, p. 364). Power is a great motivator (McClelland & Burnham, 1976). However, power can foil for self-interest and aggrandizement, deception, and unethical behavior (Keltner, Langner, & Allison, 2006; Zimbardo, 2007), resulting in the rationalization of unethical behavior (Kets de Vries, 2006) and the reestablishment of personal psychological equilibrium to avoid the debilitating effects of misused or abusive power (Kets de Vries, 1993). Winter (2006) asserted that psycho-social mechanisms such as love and affiliation, reason and intellect, a sense of responsibility, and religious or secular moral codes can be hijacked and subverted by the exercise of personalized power. Whereas ethical leaders focus on serving the greater good (Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996; Trevino et al., 2003), unethical leaders engage in what Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) attributed to pseudotransformational leadership, or the deceptive masquerade of power, with leaders engaging “a public image of a saint but privately are deceptive devils” (p. 186).

Leaders with an ethical awareness demonstrate “the capacity to perceive and be sensitive to relevant moral issues that deserve consideration in making choices that have a significant impact on others” (Petrick & Quinn, 1997, p. 89). Conversely, leaders without an ethical awareness use personal power to advance self-interest and personal goals at the expense of followers (Padilla et al., 2007; Whicker, 1996), or what Magee, Gruenfeld, Keltner, and Galinsky (2005) called objectification, the process of viewing others as objects in accomplishing personal goals. Unbridled personalized power may have devastatingly evil consequences, as the world witnessed during the Holocaust, the 1978 Jim Jones/People’s Temple mass suicide, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon, and the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison by participating guards (c.f., Zimbardo, 2006, 2007).

Lack of effective interpersonal skills. Lack of effective interpersonal social skills may likewise contribute to the unethical leadership behavior. As interpersonal skills contribute to social identity processes, leaders exercise great influence upon followers by how they communicate, express vision, motivate people to support a shared vision, and empower others (Lord & Brown, 2004; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). As such, the ability to relate effectively to others with tact, etiquette, self-monitoring, social acumen, and conflict resolution increases leaders’ credibility and group cohesiveness (Yukl, 2005). However as Dotlich and Cairo (2003) identified, a lack of relational competence and a sense of aloofness are major leadership derailers fostering personal isolation and insulation from others, conflict avoidance, miscommunication, and organizational lethargy, all potential antecedents to unethical leadership behavior.

One indicator of interpersonal acumen is emotional intelligence, the ability to understand and manage the emotional dimension of oneself and others particularly in interpersonal relationships (Goleman, 2005). Generally, people high in emotional intelligence likewise evidence strong interpersonal skills. When asked in an interview how to identify healthy and
successful leaders, Kets de Vries (Coutu, 2004) cited emotional intelligence as the number one characteristic. Emotional intelligence contributes to leaders’ self-awareness, self-regulation, and empathy, as well as the ability to listen, express appreciation, and remain adaptable.

With chronic interpersonal stressors and work demands, leaders may experience personal imbalance and become disconnected from followers through stress, burnout, and work overload; leading to depersonalization, noted to be a negative, cynical, and detached response to others (Maslach, 2000). Without effective interpersonal skills, leaders may lack self-monitoring capacity and the ability to engage in constructive conflict resolution, further isolating them and creating relational fissures disabling healthy team formation, delegation, and management. For example, Van Velsor and Leslie’s (1995) research on leadership derailment supported the notion that the inability to foster positive team dynamics contributes to leadership failure.

Lack of effective accountability and viable support systems. Lack of appropriate accountability structures and procedures contributes to unethical and moral leadership failures (Cruver, 2002; Magee et al., 2005). The autonomy that leadership affords may provide an escape from healthy and tenable accountability, defined as being open and forthright regarding communication, decisions, and processes (Chaffee, 1997; Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002). Accountable leaders willingly make themselves answerable to others. Conners, Smith, and Hickman (1994) observed: “If you selectively assume accountability for some of your circumstances and conveniently reject it for others, you cannot stay on the steps to accountability” (p. 120). Leaders who are held accountable are more likely than those who are not to take into consideration social consequences of their behavior and consider others’ interests above their own (Keltner et al., 2006; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Magee et al., 2005).

As Dotlich and Cairo (2003) advised, “Find the truth-tellers in your organization and ask them to level with you” (p. 9). Kroll et al. (2000) recommended that leaders appoint persons who represent their alter ego and are given permission to be ruthlessly honest without threat of retribution. From calling for more careful oversight from boards of directors (Sayles & Smith, 2006) to establishing a more effective system of checks and balances (Kellerman, 2004a), accountability is a crucial component for minimizing the unethical behavior of leaders (Chaleff, 2008). For example, lack of effective personal and financial accountability contributed to the 1989 conviction of televangelist Jim Bakker of defrauding PTL ministry supporters of $158 million (Shepard, 1989).

In addition, the lack of an effective support system also contributes to the demise of otherwise successful leaders, as by its very nature leadership has been shown to contribute to isolation (Kets de Vries, 1993, 2006). Social support bolsters emotional reserves, perspective, and provides an outlet for those in organizational settings to be themselves (Winnubst, 1993). Appropriate vulnerability within meaningful relationships amidst stressful leadership demands provides congruency in maintaining a healthy life balance and self-image. According to Burke (2006), having personal confidantes is invaluable in the leadership role. Without social support, leaders become distanced from reality, isolated, and vulnerable to ethical leadership failure. In summary, unethical behavior of leaders, like the circulating storm winds within a tornado, results from intrapersonal and interpersonal dynamics interacting with various follower and situational dimensions.
Follower Dimensions

In addition to the leader dimension, the second contributing factor of hot and cold colliding temperatures in creating the “perfect storm” of unethical leadership behavior involves follower dimensions. The important role of followers in influencing leadership behavior has been clearly identified (Gini, 1998; Kellerman, 2008; Rost, 1993). Additionally, followers’ needs, attitudes, and behaviors are likely to influence the unethical behaviors of leaders (Chaleff, 2003; Popper, 2001). As Whicker (1996) argued, “To blame the decline of many institutions and organizations in the United States on bad leadership is to oversimplify the complex relationship between leaders and followers” (p. 51). Followers play a highly instrumental role in the unethical behavior of leaders by passive or active complicity (Vardi & Weitz, 2004).

Scholars have identified the active and passive role of followers in supporting unethical leadership behavior (Kellerman, 2004a; Lipman-Blumen, 2005; Padilla et al., 2007). Generally, followers may fall into one of three categories: (a) benign, passive, and conforming bystanders, (b) colluding associates and acolytes who implement the leaders’ agenda, act in their names, and protect them from disrepute, and (c) malevolent and conspiring followers who are self-interested, ambitious, and evil. To illustrate, during the Nazi regime, benign bystanders went along with Hitler’s horrific agenda but were not fervent Nazis. Colluding associates and acolytes were those true believers in the Nazi cause and personally committed to Hitler and his agenda. Malevolent followers were members of the SS, standing for Schutzstaffel meaning Protective Squadron, who under Heinrich Himmler internalized the mission of killing Jews during World War II (Gellately, 2001). Followers actively and passively support the unethical behavior of leaders.

What specific factors related to followers contribute to the active (hot temperatures) and/or passive (cold temperatures) support of the perfect storm of unethical leadership behavior? Four of the most salient areas related to followers are explored: (a) self-concept, (b) self-efficacy and locus of control (LOC), (c) values and beliefs, and (d) social identity including status and power.

Follower Self-concept

The follower self-concept is a robust domain for understanding leader-follower dynamics. Drawing from implicit leadership theory and cognitive psychology, the self-concept relates to the ways followers view themselves, their self-worth, and the activation of esteem processes influencing how they relate to leaders and how leaders foster these esteem processes (Hall & Lord, 1995; Lord, Brown, & Harvey, 2001; Lord, Brown, Harvey, & Hall, 2001; Meindl, 1995). Thought to derive from individuals’ knowledge of themselves including personality, image of one’s physical appearance, persona, and self-schemas, Lord and Brown (2004) defined the self-concept as “the overarching knowledge structure that organizes memory and behavior…and includes trait-like schemas that organize social and self-perceptions in specific situations” (p. 14). They argued that leaders’ behaviors are proximal determinants of followers’ self-concept activation.

Contributing to the development of the followers’ self-concept, the leader-member exchange (LME) process fosters a psychological interaction enabling followers to experience protection and security, achievement and effectiveness, inclusion and belongingness, and commitment and loyalty (Messick, 2005). Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) described the outcome of this psychological exchange as the formation of in-groups and out-groups, dyadic relationships...
of contrasting degrees of trust, interaction, and closeness. In-groups comprise the inner circle, the entourage, and acolytes and can be seen as conformers or colluders. As such, Lord, Brown, and Freiberg (1999) cited that research has supported several precursors to LMX, namely leaders “liking” followers, follower demographics, and perceived attitudinal similarity (c.f., Engle & Lord, 1997). As a result, followers’ self-concepts may be strengthened leading to further motivation, self-regulation, and information processes. Since people are motivated to preserve and increase their sense of self-esteem, followers will be highly motivated to preserve this identity, especially in their relationship to leaders (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993).

As the self-concept is reinforced by the roles people play in relationship to others and through personal comparison (Brewer & Gardner, 1996), leaders heighten followers’ self-esteem by personal appraisals, performance evaluation, and positive reinforcements and rewards. In-group formation, followers may reinforce leaders’ objectives, goals, values, and processes. If leaders are engaging in the slippery slope of unethical behavior, followers may unwittingly contribute to the process by remaining silent, fearful to confront superiors or collaborate with unethical behavior to protect their self-identifies (c.f., Padilla et al., 1997; Kellerman, 2004a). As Berg (1998) maintained, “The hierarchical character of the leader-follower collaboration heightens the follower’s need for courage” (p. 49).

Follower Self-efficacy and LOC

Followers possess varying degrees of beliefs about their self-efficacy, defined as the freedom and power to act for specific purposes (Bandura, 1986). Bandura (1997) identified various components which determine behavior including cognitive self-regulation and personal agency. However, in certain situations, followers may engage or disengage personal agency and self-sanctions related to ethical and moral behavior, in a similar fashion as leaders. This process of ethical/moral disengagement includes a reduction of self-monitoring and judgment, leading to detrimental conduct (Bandura, 1991; Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996).

In addition to self-efficacy, followers’ LOC also contributes to how followers participate in or resist unethical behaviors of leaders. Rotter’s (1966) research identified those with a strong internal LOC (i.e., the belief that one’s actions determine the outcome of one’s life), and those with an external LOC (i.e., the belief that events determine one’s destiny minimizing any personal influence upon these events). Hence, followers with an internal LOC may take more initiative to resist or confront the unethical behavior of leaders than those with an external local, who may be more easily manipulated (Padilla et al., 2007). Although no empirical evidence supports this assertion, it would seem that those who muster the courage to adhere to their ethical values and confront superiors would possess a high internal LOC. For example, Sherron Watkins, then the vice president of Corporate Development at Enron, exercised an obvious internal LOC when she met with CEO Kenneth Lay to expose the corrupt accounting practices that implicated the company (Morse & Bower, 2002).

Follower Values and Beliefs

Value alignment between leaders and followers impacts organizational processes (Bass & Stedlmeier, 1999; Shamir et al., 1993). Values provide stability and standards both for individuals and social systems (Rohan, 2000; Schein, 1992). Lord and Brown (2001, 2004) contended that leader behaviors reinforce values in followers and that these values are associated
with followers’ self-concepts. Given that universal values such as self-direction, achievement, power, and security (Schwartz, 1999) are activated in organizational contexts, value compatibilities and conflicts emerge between leaders and followers, which impose positive or negative constraints on their dyadic relationship and organizational processes.

Value similarity between leaders and followers forges increased follower motivation, commitment, and satisfaction (Jung & Avolio, 2000). With having less positional power, followers may sublimate their espoused and realized values in the face of leaders’ unethical practices, resulting in followers’ internalized dissonance, especially in the face of affiliation needs. Similar values between leaders and followers in favor of unethical behavior produce colluding behavior. For example, Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler, both chiefs of the Gestapo, Hitler’s secret police, colluded with Hitler to ultimately exterminate approximately six million European Jews during World War II. Value alignment most probably contributed to this collusive follower behavior.

Follower Social Identity

Follower self-concepts are not only impacted by self-views but also by relational identities within social contexts (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Lord & Brown, 2004; Lord et al., 1999). The social identity perspective considers the social influences on collective self-perception (Hogg, 2001). Given that group members compete for distinctiveness and positive social perceptions in order to define themselves as having higher status (Hogg & Reid, 2001), the connection with the follower self-concept becomes clear. The striving for a positive group social identity is motivated by the need to belong, which further affirms self-esteem. Aligning with LMX theory, social categorization (Hogg, 1996), describes in-groups and out-groups that people differentiate through cognitive prototypes, which include attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that distinguish group members from others (Hogg & Reid, 2001).

In that followers engage in groups for self-enhancement and uncertainty reduction, the link between followers’ social identity and the potential to conform or collude with unethical leadership behavior becomes even more salient. With Hogg and Reid (2001) arguing that prototypical in-group membership “depersonalize perception, cognition, affect, and behavior in terms of the contextually relevant in-group prototype” (p. 164), it would seem to follow that those functioning in-group prototypes may be more likely than those who are not included in in-groups to support the unethical behavior of leaders. The abuse of power, then, becomes a tangible prospect (Reid & Ng, 2003). To illustrate, in the wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers, New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani pushed for a third term, a clear violation of state law. However, the City Council refused to consider his request, standing up against authority as informed followers to curb any hint of unethical decision making.

In contrast, an example of follower compliance to unethical leadership hails from the story of King David’s adulterous relationship with Bathsheba and his duplicitous ruse to kill her husband to cover up his misdeeds. The unquestioning allegiance of Joab, his military captain, demonstrates Joab’s colluding behavior reinforcing David’s abuse of power. In times of uncertainty or external threat such as David’s being at war, group members may consent to involvement with unethical behavior, serving to tighten what Hogg and Reid (2001) call an “empathetic bond” (p. 175) to preserve the status of followers and leaders. In summary, follower dynamics contribute to unethical behavior, just as hot and cold temperatures contributes to the perfect storm created by tornadoes.
Situational Context Dimensions

Unique situational factors also contribute to the “perfect storm” of unethical leadership behavior (Bersoff, 1999; Rhode, 2006; Vardi & Weitz, 2004), similar to atmospheric conditions in tornado creation. These factors subsume under (a) environmental uncertainty, (b) drive for competitive viability or dominance, (c) lack of effective organizational processes and oversight, and (d) previous organizational success.

Environmental Uncertainty

With environmental turbulence, change, and uncertainty, ethical leadership may be compromised (Zimbardo, 2006, 2007) because of organizational transition, conflict, financial duress or growth, and weak or absent leadership. Crises, in particular, contribute to a heightened sense of organizational uncertainty. Klein and House asserted (1995) that crises are breeding grounds for charismatic leadership; and as such, heighten the influence of persuasive leaders upon followers who are seeking security, stability, and a return to the status quo. Further, Shamir et al. (1993) noted that charismatic leadership would emerge in contexts where few contextual cues and constraints exist to guide organizational behavior. During times of uncertainty, leaders increase authority to restore stability, tighten controls, and are granted more latitude in decision-making. As Padilla et al. (2007) noted, once decision-making has become centralized, it is very difficult to reverse. Moreover, internal and external threats often produce what Lewin (1948) termed “melting,” or the phenomenon of people with differing perspectives coming into alignment with one another, which makes power consolidation and attachment to a strong leader more likely. Thus, crises situations actually catalyze the likelihood of unethical behavior.

For example, armed conflict creates extremely unstable environments, causing people to do what under normal circumstances would be unthinkable. In 2004, the abuse of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison exposed the influence of context upon behavior. Not having a previous criminal background, Sergeant Ivan “Chip” Frederick, the highest ranking military police official, pleaded guilty to torturing prisoners, what Zimbardo (2007) has labeled “the Lucifer Effect”. In unstable situations, the likelihood of unethical leadership behavior is enhanced.

Drive for Competitive Viability and Dominance

Competition impacts organizational viability, profit, and overall influence. However under extreme pressures to compete and achieve sometimes unrealistic objectives, unethical behaviors are more likely (Quinn, 2003). As Yukl (2005) observed, “Unethical behavior is more likely in organizations with high pressure for increased productivity…” (p. 410). In examining the post-mortems of corporate scandals, similar factors played a role in unethical leadership practices. They include the desire to beat out the competition, dominate a particular industry, and proffer in excess. The all-too-familiar corporate scandals of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia Cable, and others bear testimony to competitive drive run amok, leading to economic profit through cheating, cutting corners, and breaking the rules. Whereas the need to achieve is a high motivator (McClelland, 1985), inordinate competition produces drivenness and a dysfunctional organizational culture and climate (Schminke et al., 2005). Such was the case in 1977 with the baby food producer Beech-Nut, when under increasing financial pressures, reduced costs by selling apple juice made from a bogus mixture of sugar and water. Indicted and convicted on 215
counts of violating FDA regulations and fined $2 million, Beech-Nut claimed that other companies were doing the same thing (Sims, 2003, pp. 128-129).

Lack of Effective Organizational Processes and Oversight

The lack of effective organizational processes and accountability oversight further contributes to unethical leadership behavior (Vardi & Weitz, 2004). According to Rhode (2006), the size, structure, and corresponding complexity of organizations impact informed judgments. The larger the organization, the more likely bureaucratic structures will challenge the communication system and influence organizational culture. Partial information coupled with poor feedback channels for expressions of concern and lack of appropriate checks and balances are liabilities for large and lax organizations. Organizational culture involves distributing power and status, developing groups, allocating rewards and punishment, and exercising decision making processes (Schein, 1992), or what Sims (2003) called “embedded patterns of ‘how we do things around here’” (p. 107). Whereas culture involves social and behavioral patterns including member identity, sense-making, and value formation, without ethical leadership these processes can become manipulative havens for unethical practices.

Effective accountability structures and processes help offset the negative effects of power and encourage moral leadership (Keltner et al., 2006; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), through governing and advisory boards for example (Lipman-Blumen, 2005). Accountability deters self-enhancing behavior, which provides checks and balances to offset inordinate leadership power. Sedikides et al. (2002) conducted four experiments on the effect of accountability on self-enhancing behaviors and found that accountability deflates self-enhancement. The 1991 bond trading scandal involving Salomon, Inc. exposed a lack of honest organizational processes, corporate culture, and accountability. After its CEO John Gutfreund was implicated in placing illegal bids on several auctions of government securities, the company was eventually salvaged by Warren Buffet whose honest organizational practices turned the company around (Sims & Brinkmann, 2002).

Previous Organizational Success

Organizational downfall ironically has been attributed to previous organizational success (Bowie, 2005; Ciulla, 2001; La Bier, 1986; Martin, 1986; Miller, 1990). Miller (1994) observed that after long periods of fiscal success organizations are prone to (a) inertia regarding structure and strategic processes (c.f., Miller & Chen, 1994), (b) immoderation regarding development goals, (c) inattention to information gathering and organizational learning, and (d) insularity in adapting to environmental change. With America’s obsession with success manifesting in comparative ranking, monetary rewards, social status, and prestige, organizations and their leaders may become blinded to their own motives and power and lax in organizational oversight. Berglas (1986) concluded, “Without the prerequisite capacity to accept and enjoy success, many people become almost ‘drunk’ on the benefits it provides and ignore the way in which the positive consequences of success can also give rise to The Success Syndrome” (pp. 54-55). Through a series of positive feedback loops, success can create excessive confidence, unbalanced judgment, and blindness resulting in organizations and their leaders intertwined in a crash and burn downfall (Chaleff, 2008). In summary, contextual factors contribute to leaders’ unethical behavior, like atmospheric conditions contribute to tornado creation.
Critical Incident (Mediating Variable)

Unethical leadership rarely happens in a vacuum. Rather like the vortex of a tornado that sucks everything into its center, various factors converge over time to produce a catalyst, provoking unethical leadership behavior. Identifying phases of human behavior and adaptation, Perkins (2002) offered a similar perspective on systems thinking and change, which he called “self-organizing criticality” (p. 67). In change cycles, various conditions including physical forces or human motives and drives can build up over time to where the system almost topples into new activity patterns. What prompts the new activity is a “trigger event,” or a threshold point either internally or externally motivated, that is like an avalanche suddenly giving way. Martin (1986) identified the slippery slope approach to self-deception and morality whereby one misstep might lead in a potentially dangerous direction causing a downhill slide into disaster. Vardi and Weitz (2004) identified this mediating variable as “the intention to misbehave” and located it between antecedents of the intention and the expressions of actions which follow. King David’s unethical behavior with Bathsheba began with the critical incident of gazing upon her while he was on a hiatus from his troops at war. In summary, the perfect storm of unethical behavior of leaders is comprised of a complex interaction of leader, follower, and contextual dimensions, precipitated by the vortex of a critical incident.

Implications and Future Research

The unethical behavior of leaders has far-reaching consequences for all stakeholders at all organizational levels including leader and follower demise, follower distrust/disenfranchisement, and organizational decline. However many unanswered questions surround how the dimensions of leaders, followers, and situational context interact to create “perfect storm” conditions for moral disengagement and what exactly precipitates the sequence of events. Based upon these three dimensions, two questions relate to if ethical leadership can be predicted over time and how critical incidents, or the tornado vortex of pulling everything into cataclysmic crisis, can be identified and rectified before it’s too late for negative outcomes.

Although theoretical approaches to ethical/unethical leadership behavior have been proposed, little empirical research has grounded them (Brown et al., 2005). Therefore, it is recommended that empirical research grounded in theoretical approaches be undertaken, inclusive of social cognitive, attachment, personality, and organizational systems theories, along with demographic considerations including gender, age, previous unethical history, religious orientation, and organizational tenure. In addition, fresh insights into the moral development of leaders and followers would expand previously held perspectives (Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1994).

Further questions arise as to whether ethical/unethical leadership is in itself a theory. If so, how does it relate to other conceptual frameworks such as transformational, authentic, and spiritual leadership? Another question concerns leadership style and follower empowerment processes and the need for effective training and interventions at all organizational levels in order to model ethical leadership and respond to unethical behavior with appropriate procedures and protocols. For example, are shared versus vertical leadership structures more effective in creating a buffer to dissuade executive corruption (Pearce, Manz, & Sims, 2008)?

Furthermore, various organizational considerations related to effective accountability structures, checks and balances, and reward systems for honesty and integrity must be evaluated for effectiveness. Regarding training and mentoring, what existing organizational paradigms
reinforce ethical leadership behavior (Brown et al., 2005) and coping strategies to assist colleagues and protégés regarding the rigors of leading to keep from falling off the edge (Heifetz, 1994)? And how can formal and informal training venues (i.e., MBA and leadership development programs) incorporate ethics education as a more central curricular component?

Likewise, the field of cross-cultural ethics is promising for relevant research, with a view toward the differences and similarities of value systems (Jackson, 2001) upon which cultures base leadership prototypes, ethical leadership behavior, and the roles/responsibilities of followers (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & de Luque, 2006). In other words, how is unethical leadership behavior viewed across cultures (Resick, Hanges, Dickson, & Mitchelson, 2006), and what comprises leadership prototypes based on cross-cultural values (Gerstner & Day (1994)?

Being susceptible to the “perfect storm” of unethical leadership behavior is possible for every leader. As Ciulla (2001) reminds us, all leaders are imperfect and “carved out from the warped wood of humanity” (p. 313). By avoiding finger-pointing, we would do well to closely guard ourselves against our own humanity by putting effective accountability structures in place, yielding to the checks and balances instituted for the well-being of all stakeholders, and taking responsibility for our actions.

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The Emergence of Shared Leadership from Organizational Dimensions of Local Government

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Shared leadership is a mutually shared process by those who share vision, information, feedback, leadership responsibility, and public policy problems with members in public organizations. This article examines the effects of organizational structure, culture, and context on shared leadership from a public sector perspective. Completed mail surveys were received from 261 public employees of a local government in Florida. A multiple regression analysis was conducted to test five theoretically formulated hypotheses. The results showed that public employees’ perceptions on shared leadership are partially explainable by organizational structure, culture, and context factors. Organizational crisis, information technology, innovative culture, and hierarchy of position are significantly associated with shared leadership. This article concludes that every public employee displays and shares leadership under specific organizational dimensions.

The public administration literature has attempted to conceptualize shared leadership that occurs in a decentralized organization with adaptable culture and highly advanced technology within highly turbulent environments (Bryson & Crosby, 1992; Crosby, 1999; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Luke, 1998). Shared leadership allows organizational members to share power, vision, information, feedback, and public policy problems (Bryson & Crosby). Shared leadership does not constitute a position in a hierarchy but a process that occurs throughout organizations (Bradford & Cohen, 1998, Ensley, Pearson, & Pearce, 2004). It emphasizes lateral peer influence rather than the hierarchical influence of a leader at the top (Conger & Pearce, 2003). Thus, shared leadership in public administration highlights mutually shared processes embedded within public organizational contexts (Denhardt & Denhardt).

Based on the public administration literature, this study defines shared leadership as a mutually shared process by those who share vision, information, feedback, leadership responsibility, and public policy problems with members in their organizations. Sharing vision is clearly materialized through sharing information and sharing feedback with others (Luke, 1998). Sharing information and feedback make it possible for others to find the policy problems of the organization that should be solved. In the development of public policy, shared leadership pays attention to the multiple dimensions of the process by which public policy is challenged and
changed and helps others frame and reframe public policy problems (Crosby, 1999). The
definition of shared leadership is incorporated in the Shared Leadership Index (see Appendix)
which is the dependent variable of this study.

Despite numerous practical and prescriptive discussions of shared leadership in light of
organizational structure, culture, and context, little empirical research has been conducted to test
the effects of organizational dimensions on shared leadership (Ensley et al., 2004; Pearce & Sims,
2002; Seers et al., 2003; Yukl, 2002). Few instruments explicitly designed to measure the concept
of shared leadership in public administration or business administration currently exist. Therefore,
the study of the dynamics, nature, dimensions, and organizational context for shared leadership is
quite primitive (Pearce & Conger, 2003).

There has been a growing emphasis to test the effects of organizational context on
leadership within public administration (Fernandez, 2005; Javidan & Waldman 2003; Moynihan
stimulate empirical leadership research. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to investigate
the effects of organizational structure, organizational culture, and organizational context variables
on shared leadership from a public sector perspective.

The next section reviews the literature on the perspective of shared leadership and its
organizational context variables. Five hypotheses were formulated to test the effects of
organizational structure, culture, and context variables on shared leadership. In order to support
the perspective of shared leadership, this researcher collected data from a mail survey of public
employees in lower-level to higher-level positions in local government regardless of their
hierarchical positions. A multiple regression analysis examines the theoretically derived
hypotheses. Following the empirical test and analyses, this article discusses the major findings.
Finally, the theoretically and practically significant implications of shared leadership for the field
of public administration are presented.

**Horizontal Perspective of Shared Leadership**

Organizational hierarchy constitutes the social structure for a superior-subordinate role
relationship (Diamond, 1992; Gramsci, 2000; Thayer, 1981) that shapes hierarchically-oriented
perceptions about leadership. Presidents, governors, mayors, and public managers are properly
conceived of as leaders in public organizations because they are top executives and
administrators who control, command, and direct public employees. Until presently, the study of
leadership in public administration has typically focused on the leadership behavior of chief
executives, public administrators, and public managers (Crosby, 1999).

However, the practice of the hierarchical approach of leadership is somewhat unworkable
in a rapidly changing society (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Kouzes & Posner, 1996; Raelin,
2003). As organizations struggle to adapt to increasingly dynamic, complex, and uncertain
environments, significant transformations are taking place in daily work (Luthans, 1998). The
primary facets of these transformations include globalization, information technology, and
devolution. During the last decades, researchers have become increasingly less accepting of the
notion that leadership within organizations stems only from individuals in a hierarchical process
(Ensley et al., 2004).

In the hierarchical perspective, leadership comes from the top of the organization,
whereas in the horizontal perspective of leadership, leadership is shared with every member in
the organization. Although Follett (1918) explicitly raised the need of “leadership-sharing” and
“power with” almost 90 years ago, it was not until the beginning of the 1990s that public administration scholars began paying serious attention to the concept of shared leadership. In the public administration literature, shared leadership is conceptualized and developed through the writings of Bryson and Crosby (1992), Denhardt (1993), Kakabadse and Kakabadse (1998), Luke (1998), Crosby (1999), Denhardt and Denhardt (2003), and Van Wart (2005). In business administration, the writing of Pearce and Conger (2003) offers a theoretical foundation to guide the study of shared leadership, using conceptual and empirical lenses.

Shared leadership discussed by Pearce and Conger (2003), Denhardt and Denhardt (2003), and Van Wart (2005) is very much focused on a mutual shared process within organizations. This study also focuses on shared leadership that is the mutually shared process among multiple levels in an organization for promoting leadership-distributing or bottom-up leadership (Denhardt & Denhardt; Van Wart, 2005). The horizontal perspective proposed in shared leadership emphasizes that every public employee can share and display leadership regardless of hierarchical position (Bryson & Crosby, 1992; Dicke, 2004; Kouzes & Posner, 1996; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2001; Raelin, 2003, 2005; Vinzant & Crothers, 1998).

The horizontal perspective of shared leadership also emphasizes shared leadership as “a leader-full process rather than a leader-less one” (Luke 1998, p. 97). Raelin (2005) argued that “everyone shares the experience of serving as a leader, not sequentially, but concurrently and collectively” (p. 18). Denhardt and Denhardt (2003) convincingly noted that “while shared leadership takes time, because more people and groups are involved, ironically, it is often far more successful for exactly the same reason—because more people and more groups are involved!” (p. 148). Bradford and Cohen (1998) further argued that shared leadership “makes every one a leader and enlarges the psychological ownership of everyone” (p. 15). Additionally, “leadership is everyone’s business” (Kouzes & Posner, 1996, p. 108). The next section reviews the relationships among organizational structure, culture, and context factors and shared leadership, and develops the conceptual model of this study.

Organizational Dimensions and a Conceptual Model

Organizational Structure Factor

Organization structure influences a wide range of interlinked leadership processes (Bass, 1990; deLeon, 1993; Yukl, 2002). Weber’s (1958) pure type of bureaucracy constitutes the core structural dimensions of organizations that include hierarchy, centralization, formalization, specialization, and complexity (Daft, 1992; Hall, 1992; Rainey, 2003). The dimensions of organizational structure are often inconsistent across studies. In the public organization hierarchy, specialization, formation, merit and seniority, size, and nonmarketable output are identified as core structural dimensions (Nachmias & Ronsenbloom, 1980). Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson (1997) introduced three traditional dimensions of organizational structure in the public sector as hierarchy of position or authority, centralization, and specialization. For an organizational structure factor, one traditional dimension of organization structure, hierarchy of position, is used.

Traditionally, a person’s hierarchy of position in the organization is viewed as a source of power. Management research has paid attention to the impacts of a high position on leadership (Hall, 1992). Hierarchical position is an important leadership contingency (Oshagbemi & Gill, 2004). However, little leadership research has been conducted to test the impacts of different
positions on leadership in public administration. This might be attributed to the traditional leadership approaches that rely on leadership from the top.

In the perspectives of the traditional leadership approaches, hierarchy and power depend on the top position whereas in those of shared leadership, hierarchy and power are shared with all positions. Despite the emphasis on shared power in leadership, public organizations are still hierarchically designed (Frederickson & Smith, 2003; Hill & Lynn, 2005). In hierarchical organizations, public employees at the top display more leadership than those at the bottom. Consequently, this study expects that hierarchy of position is positively associated with perceptions of shared leadership.

\[ H_1: \text{There is a positive relationship between public employees’ hierarchy of positions in their organizations and public employees’ perceived levels of shared leadership.} \]

Organizational Culture Factors

Generally, organization culture is recognized as a major dimension for the understanding and practice of leadership (Bass, 1990; Ogbonna & Harris, 2000; Schein, 1985; Terry, 2003; Wildavsky, 1984; Yukl, 2002). However, few studies have empirically examined the relationship between organizational culture and leadership (Ogbonna & Harris). Moreover, the characteristics and concepts of organizational culture are inconsistent across research (Luthans, 1998; Schein, 1985). For understanding and analyzing organization culture, Wallach (1983) conceptualized three culture dimensions: bureaucratic, innovative, and supportive. These dimensions provide a useful and measurable typology (Koberg & Chusmir, 1987). This study tests the effects of bureaucratic and innovative cultures on shared leadership. The reason of excluding supportive culture is that it might not be embedded enough in public organizations as bureaucracy to affect public employees’ perceptions of shared leadership under the conceptual model.

**Bureaucratic culture.** According to Wallach (1983), bureaucratic culture has clear lines of responsibility and authority. In bureaucratic culture, work is hierarchal, systemic, and compartmentalized. Cameron and Quinn (1999) considered bureaucratic culture as hierarchical culture. They observed that managers surrounded in hierarchical culture are good at controlling, administrating, coordinating, and maintaining efficiency. Some researchers have shown that bureaucratic culture has a negative relationship with job satisfaction, job involvement, and employee commitment and involvement (Chen, 2004; Koberg & Chusmir, 1987).

Shared leadership is at odds with bureaucratic culture because shared leadership encourages employee involvement and rejects the hierarchy, control, domination, and power that bureaucratic culture creates. Shared leadership stimulates members’ participation in decision-making and teamwork and creates ongoing communication (Ensley, Pearson, & Pearce, 2003; Pearce & Conger, 2003). In the perspective of shared leadership, members of the organization share mutual interests and create a shared culture.

\[ H_2: \text{There is a negative relationship between public employees’ perceived levels of bureaucratic culture in their organizations and their perceived levels of shared leadership.} \]
Innovative culture. An individual who is well-suited to innovative culture is results-oriented, risk-taking, creative, pressurized, stimulating, challenging, enterprising, and driving (Wallach, 1983). Doig and Hargorve’s (1987) concept of entrepreneurial leadership emphasizes the role of effective bureaucratic leaders as risk-takers and opportunists. The entrepreneurial leadership approach focuses on innovative and creative environments for the satisfaction of customers and the benefits of the organization (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). In innovative culture, creativity and risk-taking are primary values to survive in the competition of capital markets. Cameron and Quinn (1999) conceptualized such culture as market culture.

However, there are negative aspects on innovative culture in public administration. Innovative culture produces burnout and stress that are routine occupational hazards of the constant pressure (Wallach, 1983) and is significantly and negatively related to the propensity to leave (Koberg & Chusmir, 1987). The philosophies of innovative culture borrow the principles of market economics and apply them to government (Denhardt, 2004; Kettl, 2002; Terry, 2003). The entrepreneurial leadership approach and innovative culture is tied to the satisfaction of customers rather than collective democratic consensus in a democratic society (deLeon & Denhardt, 2000). Thus, innovative culture is not related to consensus in decision-making, teamwork, and communication (Shadur, Kienzle, Rodwell, 1999). On the other hand, shared leadership challenges citizens to engage in the effort by convening a diverse set of peoples, agencies, and interests (Luke, 1998). Shared leadership is far from an innovative culture that stresses customer satisfaction and risk-taking.

H₃: There is a negative relationship between public employees’ perceived levels of innovative culture in their organizations and their perceived levels of shared leadership.

Organizational Context Factors

In leadership studies, technology and organizational crisis are frequently identified as the dimensions of organizational context that affect leadership (Shamir & Howell, 1999). The disasters of the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina created organizational crises in federal, state, and local governments and had tremendous effects on public organizations and political leadership (Comfort, 2002; The White House, 2006). Therefore, this study uses information technology and organizational crisis as the dimensions of organizational context for understanding shared leadership.

Information technology. Information technology has moved to more technology-based telecommunications, the information superhighway, and global networks (Huddleston, 2000; Luthans, 1998). The Weberian model of bureaucracy is outmoded in information technology and e-government (Fountain, 2001). The leadership style of the bureaucratic paradigm focuses on control, command, and hierarchy whereas e-government’s leadership style emphasizes facilitation and coordination (Tat-Kei Ho, 2002).

Shared leadership emerges in information technology that stimulates interconnectedness, communication, information sharing, and rapid feedback via community networks, e-mail, and distance conferencing (Luke, 1998). The increasing technology used in the workplace suggests that in more technologically-advanced organizations, power and control may become less important (Bass, 1990; Fountain, 2001; Tat-Kei Ho, 2002). Thus, given information technology,
shared leadership distributes information, decision-making, and leadership to every member in the organization (Bryson & Crosby, 1992; Luke, 1998).

H₄: There is a positive relationship between public employees’ usage of information technology in their jobs and their perceived levels of shared leadership.

Organizational crisis. The presence of organizational crisis affects leadership (Boin & ’t Hart, 2003; Shamir & Howell, 1999). Some studies noted that under turbulent environments, the members of the organization expect their leaders to be more directive, powerful, and charismatic (Bass, 1990). On the other hand, some researchers suggested that under organizational crisis, organizations should encourage sharing information and lateral coordination, not top-down command and control (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Shared leadership requires shared power, responsibility, and creative solutions under turbulent environments (Bryson & Crosby, 1992). Arguing that under highly turbulent environments the traditional command and control form of leadership is outmoded, Denhardt and Denhardt (2003) suggested that shared leadership is necessary, especially in public organizations that are influenced from many external constituencies.

H₅: There is a positive relationship between public employees’ perceived levels of organizational crisis within and outside their organizations and their perceived levels of shared leadership.

Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical constructs and the hypothesized relationships among these constructs. The constructs constitute a conceptual model of this study. In the diagram, each theoretical and hypothetical construct is represented by a circle and an arrow depicting the hypothesized positive and negative effects of organizational dimensions on shared leadership.
Organizational Dimensions

- Control Variables
- Organizational structure factor: Hierarchy of position
- Organizational culture factors: Bureaucratic culture and innovative culture
- Organizational context factors: Information technology and organizational crisis
- Control variables: Gender, years of government service, and years of education

**Figure 1.** Conceptual model of shared leadership.
Research Methods and Data Analysis

Use of Single Case Selection

This study is case based empirical research. Case studies can consist of a single case or of multiples cases and can use quantitative methods to collect data for research convenience, research economy, and research interest (Johnson, 2002; Patton, 1990; Yin, 1989). The reasons why the researcher chose Broward County, Florida as a single case for collecting data is attributed to factors identified by Yin (1989), Patton (1990), and Johnson (2002), especially because of the dynamic and rapidly changing organizational context which affect the emergence of shared leadership.

The organizational structure, culture, and context of Broward County’s government create unique challenges in the government’s delivering services to citizens (Broward County Human Resource Division, 2005). The data obtained from the dynamic and diverse organizational dimensions of all sixty organizations (divisions) within the county government across 300 different locations in 20 different cities can be ideal to test the effects of organizational dimension variables on shared leadership. According to its organizational profile (Broward County Human Resource Division), the Broward County government has approximately 8 departments, 80 agencies, 60 divisions, 1,000 different job classes, and 7,000 employees working at 300 different locations, which serve 1.62 million residents. Thirty-one cities are located in the county. In 2000, the population of Broward County ranked 15th out of 3,141 counties in the United States. Broward County’s 60 divisions are sub-units of 8 departments that include aviation, community services, environmental protection, finance and administration services, human services, Port Everglades, public works, and urban planning and redevelopment.

Another reason to choose the county is for research convenience and research economy. Since this study is designed to include all public employees from the top to the bottom in the sample data, collecting data from various governments would generate sample data that are large and very expensive. The conceptual model of shared leadership in this study makes empirical testing extremely hard (Van Wart, 2005). Thus, it is difficult for the researcher to collect large sample data from all public employees in various governments because of the financial limitations on research and research inconvenience. For these reasons, this study selected only the Broward County government as the single case and collected sample data from its public employees at 60 divisions across 300 locations in 20 cities. While the researcher chose Broward County as a single case, the study combines the single case with quantitative methods called the “dominant less design” (Creswell, 1994). According to Creswell, the dominant-less design presents the study within a single dominant research method with one small component of the overall study drawn from an alternative research method and is advantageous to a researcher for better understanding the conceptual model being tested. Thus, selecting the Broward County government as the single case and collecting data from its employees can be useful to examine the conceptual model of shared leadership.

Data Collection

The data collection of the previous leadership studies were commonly conducted on a relatively small number of leaders at the very top of organizations (Shamir, Zakay, Breinin, & Popper, 1998; Yukl, 2002). Even recently, vast leadership studies in public administration have
also used data collected from high ranking public managers (e.g., Fairholm, 2004; Fernandez, 2005; Gabris, Golembiewski, & Ihrke, 2001; Hambleton & Sweeting, 2004; Hanbury, Sapat, & Washington, 2004; Hooijberg & Choi, 2001; Javidan & Waldman, 2003). The perception and consciousness of “leader” or “leadership” are deeply rooted in hierarchically oriented leadership. Viewing administrators and managers as leaders has become one of the dominant myths of leadership theory (Rost, 1991).

This study does not agree with the idea that data collection limited to high level positions is adequate for leadership research because the study specifically asserts that every public employee can become a public leader and display leadership. As noted in the literature (Bradford & Cohen, 1998; Bryson & Crosby, 1992; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Dicke, 2004; Kouzes & Posner, 1996; OECD, 2001; Raelin, 2003, 2005; Vinzant & Crothers, 1998), both public managers from the top and public employees from the bottom are likely to display leadership. On the other hand, according to Van Wart (2005), a major weakness of shared-leadership theory is that it works at multiple levels of analysis, which makes empirical testing extremely difficult.

Given the nature of research design, this study collected sample data from the top to the bottom at 60 organizations within the county’s government. Five levels of employees were discerned: entry, upper-entry, middle, upper-middle, and top. A mail survey was sent to a sample of public employees ranging from division directors to carpenters, painters, bookkeepers, plumbers, library aides, bus operators, park aides, groundskeepers, social worker aides, school crossing guards, and student lifeguards. Since this study focused on public employees’ shared leadership within their organizations, the mail survey emphasized the phrase “in your division” by having it at the end of each survey question or statement.

The study used stratified sampling, adding all 60 division directors in the county government into the sample. Over a four-week period (from July 11, 2005 to August 16, 2005), three waves of mail surveys were sent to 791 public employees of Broward County’s government. Of the 791 public employees, 126 employees responded to the first survey, for a first wave response rate of 15.9%. Of the 791 public employees, 98 employees responded to the second survey, for a response rate of 12.3%. Thirty-seven of the 312 employees in the third wave responded, for a response rate of 14.1%. Consequently, 261 public employees of the 791 sample responded to the survey, for an overall response rate of 33%.

Since this study asserts that shared leadership behaviors occur among all public employees from the bottom to the top echelons in public organizations regardless of hierarchical position, the participation in data analysis of public employees below the upper-middle level is critical to this study. Among the 261 survey respondents, 46 employees in the entry level responded (17.6%). The upper-entry, middle, upper-middle, and top levels comprise 23.8, 34.1, 13.4, and 9.2%, respectively (see Table 1). Thus, employees below the upper-middle level comprise 75.5%.

---

1 Since the ratio of the number of the directors (60) to the population (6,865) is .008, if this study used simple random sampling that yields an equal probability of being selected, it could generate only about 1 percent of the directors in a sample size. Thus, this study used stratified sampling to obtain data capable of achieving statistical significance for the number of the directors.
Survey Measurement

All variables in this study, except for hierarchy of position, are measured by summated scales for increasing the reliability of measurements. The dependent variable of this study was the Shared Leadership Index (SLI, see Appendix). Measurement of shared leadership is not available in the literature (Pearce & Conger, 2003), so this study attempts to measure shared leadership and to develop the SLI. The SLI is comprised of five statements that describe the definition of shared leadership as previously noted. Each statement is measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha reliability for the SLI was 0.78.

Five independent variables were used to test the effects of organizational structure, culture, and context on the dependent variable in this study (see Appendix). Hierarchy of position is measured by a single measurement on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (entry level) to 5 (top level). The variable of hierarchy of position is an ordinal scale. The issue of the level of scaling required of metric variables in multiple regression analysis, which is conducted for this study, is controversial (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Statisticians argue that scales classified as nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio based on a Steven’s typology are too strict to apply to real-world data (Norusis, 2000; Velleman & Wilkinson, 1993).

According to Cohen and Cohen (1983), ordinal scales have intervals equal enough for meeting most assumptions in multiple regression analysis. In practice, ordinal scales can be treated successfully in the same statistical tests as interval scales (Albertson, 1995; Bentler & Chou, 1987; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991; Velleman & Wilkinson, 1993), so that ordinal scales can be employed in multiple regression analysis (Anderson, 1984; Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Cohen, West, Aiken, & Cohen, 2003; McCullagh & Neder, 1989; Walker & Ducan, 1967). Thus, the variable of hierarchy of position is measured by the ordinal scale that was employed in multiple regression analysis.

The measurements of organizational cultures (i.e. bureaucratic and innovative) and organizational crisis are measured and modified by multiple indicators derived from existing instruments. Bureaucratic and innovative cultures are measured by the Organizational Culture Index (OCI) developed by Wallach (1983). The OCI has been widely validated through management research (Chen, 2004; Koberg & Chusmir, 1987; Shadur et al., 1999). The OCI measures three separate cultural dimensions: bureaucratic, innovative, and supportive. The three cultural dimensions of the OCI are considered common in varying degrees to all organizations (Koberg & Chusmir, 1987; Wallach, 1983). This study uses bureaucratic and innovative cultures. Each of the bureaucratic and innovative cultures is comprised of eight adjective items. Each culture is measured on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (does not describe) to 3 (describes most of the time), given its eight adjectives. Cronbach’s alpha reliability for bureaucratic and innovative cultures was reported at 0.86 and 0.97 respectively in previous research (Chen, 2004). Cronbach’s alpha reliability for bureaucratic and innovative cultures in this study was 0.75 and 0.79 respectively.

This study develops the measurement of information technology. Three descriptive statements are measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Example items include statements such as “I frequently use technology on my job.” Cronbach’s alpha for information technology was 0.75. A measurement of organizational crisis was developed through Guth’s (1995) Organization Crisis Index. Guth provided 25 items to measure organizational crisis based on a 5-point scale.
Guth (1995) observed that public employees identify top-rated organizational crises among the 25 items as (a) intense scrutiny from news media, (b) political controversy, and (c) intense scrutiny from state/federal regulators. This study uses these three items for the measurement scale of organizational crisis. Respondents were asked to indicate how often the three items have occurred in their organizations based on a 5-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (frequently). Cronbach’s alpha reliability for organizational crisis was 0.66.

Nunnally (1978) provided a widely accepted rule of thumb that Cronbach’s alpha should be at least 0.70 for a scale to demonstrate internal consistency. However, it is not unusual to see scales with lower alphas in research (Peterson, 1994). Research suggests a value of 0.60 as “the criterion-in-use” (Ogbonna & Harris, 2000; Peterson, 1994). This suggestion and the construct validity of the organizational crisis scale in the previous research (Guth, 1995) led to the conclusion that the scale was above the criterion-in-use and thus acceptably reliable.

Three control variables were included in the survey: respondents’ gender, years of education, and years of government service. Claims about the nature of women’s leadership show similarities with the characteristics of shared leadership (Northhouse, 1997). The search for gender differences in leadership has surged in importance over the past few decades (Bass, 1990; Northhouse, 1997; Yukl, 2002). Using a dummy variable, the variable of gender is measured as 0 (female) and 1 (male). This study also controlled for respondents’ years of government service and their years of education because such personal factors affect leadership (Bass 1990; Van Wart, 2005).

Factor analysis (the varimax rotated component analysis) was conducted to identify the underlying dimensions and constructs of shared leadership (see Appendix). Included in the factor analysis were five items of shared leadership, which were measured on a 5-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The dependent variable, the SLI, was successful to capture a single composite measure at the level of factor loadings ≥ .50. Thus, the results of factor analysis ensure the scale validity of shared leadership.

Results

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, correlation, and reliability for each variable. All independent variables were positively and significantly correlated with shared leadership, except bureaucratic culture. The correlations show a striking finding between the results and the hypotheses. This study hypothesized that innovative culture is negatively associated with shared leadership. Yet, the results of the correlations indicated that innovative culture is significantly and positively correlated with shared leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α*</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared Leadership</td>
<td>19.61</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy of Position</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>-.47**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Culture</td>
<td>16.06</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Culture</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>12.19</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Crisis</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.12*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.
* Cronbach’s alpha reliability.
Multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine the conceptual model of this study. The overall prediction and generalization of regression results tested by the tolerance value and the variance inflation factor of all variables indicated that the estimation of the variables on shared leadership is not overly distorted by multicollinearity. Table 2 displays the model summary with a $R^2$ of .42 and an adjusted $R^2$ of .40. Hierarchy of position was statistically significantly associated with shared leadership ($\beta = .21, p < .001$). The findings support Hypothesis 1.

Among organizational culture variables, innovative culture was significantly and positively associated with shared leadership ($\beta = .29, p < .001$). The findings showed contradictory results in the relationship between innovative culture and shared leadership (Hypothesis 3). The effect of bureaucratic culture on shared leadership was not statistically significant.

Information technology was statistically and positively significant with shared leadership ($\beta = .23, p < .001$). Organizational crisis had also a statistically significant relationship with shared leadership ($\beta = .13, p < .05$). This finding supports Hypotheses 4 and 5. Among control variables, only years of education were significant with shared leadership ($\beta = .10, p < .1$). In sum, public employees perceived that shared leadership is likely to be affected by hierarchy of position, innovative culture, information technology, organizational crisis, and years of education under the specific organizational dimensions of the conceptual model in this study.

### Table 2: Results of Regression Analysis for Shared Leadership ($N = 261$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Dimensions</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Hierarchy of Position</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>3.40</td>
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<td>Culture</td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>1.08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innovative</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational Crisis</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Years of Education</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Years of Government</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. $R^2 = .43$. $F = 8.15$.

*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .001.

**Discussion of the Results**

This study finds that hierarchical position, organizational crisis, information technology, innovative culture, and years of education are significantly and positively associated with shared leadership. The findings of this study show that public employees at higher positions are more likely to express higher perceived levels of shared leadership than employees at lower positions. However, the findings indicate that shared leadership also occurs in the perceptions of public employees at lower positions.

These results are important to support the horizontal perspective on leadership theory in the public administration literature, in which scholars assert that leadership is potentially shared with every member of public organizations, and that every public employee can be a public leader (Bradford & Cohen, 1998; Bryson & Crosby, 1992; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Dicke, 2004; Kouzes & Posner, 1996; OECD, 2001; Vinzant & Crothers, 1998). The results of this study...
portray that public employees perceive a horizontal form of leadership within that hierarchical structure even while they might still hold to the hierarchical perspective that relies on the role and responsibility of leadership from the top. Through empirical analysis on horizontal governance, Hill and Lynn (2005) indicated that slowly, “new tools or administrative technologies are being added that facilitate public governance within a hierarchical system” (p. 189).

This study provides some interesting possibilities regarding the coexistence of hierarchical and horizontal perspectives on leadership within public organizations. Public employees might attempt to make “consciousness-raising efforts” for leadership-sharing in hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations, becoming accustomed to the new tools and concepts for horizontal governance, shared power, and leadership-sharing. Consequently, the hierarchical and horizontal perspectives on leadership might coexist in public employees’ consciousness. In other words, public employees at lower positions perceive both the hierarchical and horizontal perspectives within their organizations at the same time, but they are more likely to perceive the hierarchical perspectives because public organizations are still hierarchically organized (Frederickson & Smith, 2003; Hill & Lynn, 2005).

The findings of this study indicate that organizational crisis positively and significantly affects public employees’ perceptions of shared leadership. In the literature, there is the debate between the centralized and decentralized tendency of leadership to deal with organizational crisis. In traditional leadership approaches of orthodox public administration, leadership relies on the top of the hierarchy in times of organizational crisis (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003). However, shared leadership is a decentralized leadership approach to deal with unpredictable environments. The findings of this study support assertions that shared leadership occurs in organizational crises that create unpredictable, dramatic, dynamic, and uncertain changes within and outside public organizations (Bryson & Crosby, 1992; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003).

This study finds that information technology is significantly and positively associated with shared leadership. The results of this study tend to confirm assertions that organizational dependence on highly advanced technology contributes to shaping shared leadership (Bryson & Crosby, 1992). Using advanced technology, shared leadership stimulates information sharing and power sharing because advanced technology distributes information and leadership to every member in the organization (Luke, 1998).

The findings of this study show that the relationship between innovative culture and shared leadership is contrary to prediction. The results are the most striking findings for understanding and interpreting the relationships between innovative culture and shared leadership in public organizations, especially with the view from the literature that innovation and entrepreneurship have potentially negative impacts on public organizations and democratic values. Entrepreneurship as the source of innovation and reinvention is criticized in the public administration literature because entrepreneurship creates conflicts with political and ethical dimensions of public administration as well as the principles of democracy (deLeon & Denhardt, 2000; Denhardt, 2004; Frederickson, 1996; Mitchell & Scott, 1987; Terry, 2003).

The findings of this study tend to support previous research in the private sector. Pearce and Conger (2003) asserted that shared leadership is closely related to innovation in the private sector. Ensley et al. (2003) also argued that teams in the organization enjoy greater amounts of innovation with shared leadership in the private sector because team empowerment promotes innovation. However, in their research on an information technology company, Shadur et al. (1999) found that innovative culture in the organization is not a significant predictor of
participation in decision making, teamwork, and communication, all of which are also closely related to the characteristics of shared leadership.

These inconsistent leadership studies reflect that there are different relationships between innovative culture and shared leadership. The findings of this study suggest that innovation as a source of entrepreneurship cannot be solely viewed as a negative impact on public organizations and democratic values. The concept of innovation should be modified to link a positive impact to public organizations unless the impact creates conflicts with the principles of democracy in public administration. Future study is warranted to examine both positive and negative impacts of innovative culture on shared leadership and public organizations.

**Implications and Conclusion**

This study tests the effects of organizational factors on shared leadership. There is limited empirical research that has explicitly focused on the impact of the differences of hierarchical position on leadership according to personal and organizational factors (Van Engen, Van der Leeden, & Willemsen, 2001). Further, there has been little research to explicitly investigate the emergence of shared leadership from personal and organizational factors despite its increasing attention in the both public and private sectors (Pearce & Conger, 2003).

The findings of this study have several implications for the development of shared leadership in the public sector. First, the findings present public employees’ reflections that the horizontal perspective on leadership coexists with the hierarchical perspective on leadership in bureaucratic organizations. The reality of leadership is that leadership sharing appears in public employees’ consciousness within current bureaucratic organizations. The findings of this study support arguments that “leadership is increasingly being thought of not as a position in a hierarchy, but as a process that occurs throughout organization” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003, p. 140). With respect to the possibilities, this study, at least, implies that public employees in every position are able to perceive shared leadership despite the different perceived levels of shared leadership between the public employees at lower and higher positions. Therefore, future leadership research in the public sector should be considered to apply the horizontal perspective of shared leadership that is more shared and distributed hierarchically.

Second, the findings about the relationship between organizational crisis and shared leadership have implications. At the time of organizational crisis, centralization is impossible because many dynamic, situation-specific, and urgent problems arise at different places, and because in reality, crisis-response efforts depend on many people in many networks (Boin & t’ Hart, 2003). Friel (2002) further argued that in times of organizational crisis, “federal agencies and managers must break out of their bureaucratic cocoons and become social butterflies” (p. 32). Therefore, the study suggests that in times of organizational crisis, shared leadership—which enhances information sharing, feedback sharing, vision sharing, leadership sharing, and power sharing through collaboration and information technology among organizational members—might enable them to deal with the crisis.

Third, the findings about the relationship between years of education and shared leadership have also implications. This study supports previous research in which leadership behavior has a significantly positive relationship with years of education (Fagenson, 1990; Yammarino & Dubinsky, 1988). One study reveals that leadership behavior for lower levels may be blocked by a lack of appropriate training and development (Coad, 2000). The current study suggests that for lower public employees, shared leadership seems to be congruent with better
education and training that might help them accomplish a leadership role in public organizations. Thus, this study suggests that for the development of shared leadership for lower level public employees, providing more education and more training programs as well as information technology and innovative culture is essential.

Finally, although this study contained a broad sampling of the public employees’ perceptions from entry to top levels in 60 diverse organizations within the local government across 20 cities, the study was limited to a single local government and may not fully represent other public organizations. In other words, the findings and results of this study might reflect public employees’ idiosyncratic perceptions in the local government. Therefore, the findings should be viewed with some degree of caution in terms of their generalizability. Consequently, future research should obtain data from a broad range of local governments in order to improve the ability to generalize research findings and results.

In sum, the emergence of shared leadership is partially affected by organizational structure, culture, and context factors. Organizational crisis, information technology, innovative culture, and hierarchy of position are significantly associated with shared leadership. This study implies that public employees in lower positions might not rely on leadership from the top but instead recognize their potential capability for leadership responsibility to create a shared phenomenon within their organizations. The discussion of the results leads to the conclusion that every public employee displays and shares leadership under specific organizational dimensions.

About the Author

Dr. Sanghan Choi earned his Ph. D. in Public Administration from Florida Atlantic University and currently is a research associate of the Public Procurement Research Center at the university in Boca Raton, Florida. He taught at Florida Atlantic University and Nova Southeastern University. His research interests include public leadership, public and nonprofit management, organization theory, and globalization.

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Notes

This article is a revised version of the author’s doctoral dissertation entitled A conceptual model of the emergence of shared leadership: The effects of organizational structure, culture, and context variables on public employee perceptions of leadership (2006). The author would like to thank Drs. Patricia M. Patterson, Clofford P. McCue, and Floydette Cory-Scruggs who were the members of his dissertation committee.
References


Oshagbemi & Gill, 2004: I cannot find this reference. Would you remove it?


Appendix

Measures for Dependent and Independent Variables

1. Dependent Variable (Shared Leadership Index)

The following items are measured on a five point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The word others means the member of your division.

Table 3: Factor Analysis of Shared Leadership Index Item (N = 261; Principal Component Analysis, Varimax Method)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I share my division’s vision with others.</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. I share feedback with others.</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I share in identifying public policy problems with others.</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I share leadership responsibility with others.</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I share information with others.</td>
<td>.66</td>
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*Eigenvalues = 2.76; Percent of Common Variance = 55.32.

2. Independent Variables

Organizational Structure Dimension

Hierarchy of Position: Measured on a five point scale ranging from (1) entry level; (2) upper-entry level; (3) middle level; (4) upper-middle level; and (5) top level.

Organizational Culture Dimensions

Bureaucratic and innovative cultures are measured on a four-point scale ranging from 0 (does not describe my organization) to 3 (describes my organization most of the time), given 8 adjective items.

Bureaucratic culture: (1) Hierarchical; (2) Procedural; (3) Structured; (4) Ordered; (5) Regulated; (6) Established, solid; (7) Cautious; and (8) Power-oriented.

Innovative culture: (1) Risk-taking; (2) Result-oriented; (3) Creative; (4) Pressurized; (5) Stimulating; (6) Challenging; (7) Enterprising; and (8) Driving.

Organizational Context Dimensions

Information Technology: The measurement of information technology developed in this study is based on the following three statements in a five-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).

1. Technology makes my job more efficient.
2. I frequently use technology on my job.
3. I openly communicate or transact business on my job with others using e-mail or other computer-based systems.

Organizational Crisis: Measured on a five-point scale ranging from not at all (0) to frequently (4), given three items. Respondents are asked to indicate how the following three items have occurred in the organization during the previous two years: (1) Intense scrutiny from news media; (2) Being at the center of a political controversy; and (3) Intense scrutiny from state/federal regulators.

Control variables

Gender: 0 = Female; 1 = Male

Education: Respondents’ years of education

Government service: Respondents’ years of government
Practitioner’s Corner

Leadership Emergence Theory in the Corporate Context

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Numerous leadership theories describe the characteristics, values, attitudes, and behaviors that are indicative of leadership. However, Avolio and Gardner (2005) asserted that the actual process by which individuals develop leadership has not been adequately studied. Lord and Hall (2005) contended that this may be because the theories have neglected to address the deeper aspects of character that develop over a lifetime. Leadership emergence theory (Clinton, 1988a) is a theory of leadership development that is based on the experience of Christian ministry leaders over a lifetime. Recent research (Stadler, 2008) has shown that leadership emergence theory is applicable to the development of leaders who work in the corporate environment. The findings from this research provide insight that can be used by practitioners to broaden corporate leadership development approaches, enhance executive coaching programs, revitalize mentoring initiatives, and improve succession planning strategies.

Leadership development practitioners are increasingly incorporating empirically-tested leadership theories into the design of their programs. Unfortunately, most research on leadership is based on theories that describe the outcome of the process rather than the leadership development process itself. Numerous leadership theories describe the characteristics, values, attitudes, and behaviors that are indicative of leadership. However, the actual process by which individuals develop has not been adequately studied. Avolio and Gardner (2005) confirmed, “We have found that over the last 100 years, most leadership theories have been originated without a focus on the essential core processes that result in the development of leadership that would be characterized by those models” (p. 317).

Leadership Development

A number of leadership researchers have recognized the importance of identifying how leaders develop, including Bennis (1992, 2007), Bennis and Thomas (2002, 2006), Conger and Riggio (2007), McCall (2004), and Ready and Conger (2003). A few researchers, such as Dotlich, Noel, and Walker (2004) and McCall and Hollenbeck (2007), have identified the importance of certain key experiences in the process of leadership development. Despite these
efforts, Bennis (2007) has concluded, “Leaders develop by a process we do not fully understand” (p. 5). Similarly, Avolio (2007) has reported that “relatively little effort has been devoted to systematically explaining how such leaders and leadership develop” (p. 30). As a result, leadership development practitioners are left with little empirical guidance.

Lord and Hall (2005) contended that the lack of research on how leaders actually develop is due to the fact that most leadership development approaches have addressed “surface structure skills” as opposed to “the deeper, principled aspects of leadership that may be especially important for understanding the long-term development of effective leaders” (p. 592). Their conclusion pointed to the need for research that includes the development of those “deeper, principled aspects of leadership” over a lifetime. Recent research (Stadler, 2008) tested whether a theory of leadership development called leadership emergence theory (Clinton, 1988a), which was derived from studies of the lives of effective Christian ministers, could be applicable for leaders with a similar spiritual perspective who work in the corporate environment. A summary of the research follows, along with suggestions for how the findings can be applied by practitioners to more effectively design leadership programs and improve approaches to executive coaching, mentoring, and succession planning.

Leadership Emergence Theory

Leadership emergence theory (LET) is a descriptive theory of how Christian leaders develop over a lifetime. It was articulated by Dr. J. Robert Clinton (1988a) in a study which analyzed the lives of 420 historical and contemporary Christian leaders and missionaries. Clinton pointed out that his research had two goals. The first goal was to “determine a method for organizing and categorizing qualitative life-history data so that it could form an ongoing useful database for analysis” (p. 19). Clinton’s second goal was to “integrate the findings so as to form the basis for a theory of Christian leadership development” (p. 19).

Clinton used grounded theory methodology to collect and compare the life histories of midcareer Christian leaders from numerous countries, cultures, and eras. The resulting theory states that “the development of a leader can be significantly described by using three major variables labeled processing, time, and leader response” (Clinton, 1988a, p. vi). Over the last two decades, over 3,000 case studies have been conducted to refine leadership emergence theory (Clinton, 2005).

Leadership development is defined within leadership emergence theory as “a measure of a leader’s changing capacity to influence, in terms of various factors, over time” (Clinton, 1988b, p. 245). Clinton (1989) has identified three parallel processes within the leadership development process which are (a) internal psychological processes, (b) external sociological and contextual processes, and (c) divine processes. Combined, these processes are theorized to bring about the development in an individual’s capacity to influence. It is the acknowledgement of the divine processes that differentiates leadership emergence theory from other theories of leadership development.

In addition to the three processes outlined above, Clinton (1988b) has identified six phases of leadership development which extend across a lifelong timeline. The six phases are (a) sovereign foundations, (b) inner life growth, (c) ministry maturing, (d) life maturing, (e) convergence, and (f) afterglow or celebration. The names of the phases reflect the ministerial context, but the experiences identified within them may be similar to experiences encountered within the corporate context.
Phase I – sovereign foundations. In the first phase, God works providentially through the family, events, and environment of childhood and young adulthood to begin shaping a potential leader. When viewed retrospectively, the positive and negative experiences of this timeframe can be seen as providentially-designed learning opportunities. The major lesson for leaders to learn in this phase is to respond positively to both the positive and negative circumstances that God uses to develop character. It is often hard for relatively-young leaders to look back and view the negative experiences from their childhood and early adulthood as potentially positive, but their value will be more readily seen retrospectively. Clinton (1988b) noted, “It is often difficult to see the importance of all these items until later phases” (p. 44).

Phase II – inner life growth. In the second phase, the potential leader’s character is the focus of development. As the leader begins to undertake leadership tasks, inner life lessons occur. Situations occur that develop character and prepare the individual for the next steps of leadership. As Clinton (1988b) pointed out, a positive response “allows a leader to learn the fundamental lessons God wants to teach. If the person doesn’t learn, he will usually be tested again in the same areas. A proper response will result in an expanding ministry and greater responsibility” (p. 45).

Phase III – ministry maturing. In the third phase, the emerging leader begins to exercise individual strengths and gifts. The leader may seek training to increase his or her effectiveness. A second focus of this phase is relationships. Through interactions with others, the leader begins to learn lessons that provide insight into areas for personal development (Clinton, 1988b).

Phase IV – life maturing. In the fourth phase, the leader has gained clarity about how to use his or her unique gifts and strengths and is doing so in a way that is satisfying and fruitful. “He gains a sense of priorities concerning the best use of his gifts and understands that learning what not to do is as important as learning what to do” (Clinton, 1988b, p. 46).

Phase V – convergence. In the fifth phase, the leader is moved into a role that maximizes the leader’s gifts, and the leader is freed from responsibilities that are not well suited. This peak period of leadership effectiveness is not always reached. Clinton (1988b) noted, “Sometimes they [leaders] are hindered by their own lack of personal development. At other times, an organization may hinder a leader by keeping him in a limiting position” (p. 46).

Phase VI – afterglow or celebration. In the sixth phase, the leader enjoys “an era of recognition and indirect influence at broad levels” (Clinton, 1988b, p. 47) based on influence developed through a lifetime of contacts and relationships.

Within each phase, many descriptive processing items occur. Processing items are “the providential events, people, circumstances, special interventions, inner-life lessons, and/or anything else that God uses” (Clinton, 1988b, p. 253) in developing a leader. Process incidents are the actual occurrences of process items in an individual leader’s life. Since every life contains innumerable process incidents, critical incidents are those which are “important enough to be remembered and somehow had significantly been used in shaping the leader” (Clinton, 1989, p. 79). Process incidents are categorized into groups of process items with similar functions and properties. Over 50 process items have been identified and labeled by Clinton. Some process
items occur in multiple phases. Others tend to occur within certain phases. Clinton’s research on contemporary leaders reveals an average of 34 process items in a typical study of a leader’s life.

Knowledge of the typical experiences in each phase can provide a calming view of current struggles a leader is facing and can help him or her prepare to respond positively to future challenges that are likely to occur. Transitions between the phases can be difficult and are characterized by boundary events, which are defined as experiences such as “crises, promotions, a new ministry, learning a major new concept, unusual experiences, life-changing encounters with a person, a divine guidance experience, or a geographic move” (Clinton, 1988b, p. 49). A change in a leader’s “sphere of influence, either increase or decrease in numbers, or a change in the kind of sphere of influence usually signals a change in developmental phases” (p. 52). The value of delineating the six phases of leadership development comes from providing insight for leaders into how their current leadership challenges fit into a lifetime view of the leadership development phases, which can help leaders anticipate potential upcoming developmental situations. Leadership emergence theory is a necessarily extensive theory since it addresses a lifetime scope. See Clinton (1988a, 1988b, 1989, and 2005) for a more detailed explanation of the theory.

Unlike other theories of leadership development, leadership emergence theory is based on the concept that God’s providential development plan for the leader actively guides his or her development as opposed to chance. Leadership emergence theory evokes wisdom from God’s eternal perspective to inform the view of current leadership experiences and to encourage a positive response from the leader as part of the leader’s spiritual development. Practical benefit occurs when a leader shifts his or her awareness to realize that these developmental life experiences are being orchestrated by God for the purpose of his or her development as a leader.

**Testing the Theory in the Corporate Context**

Recent research (Stadler, 2008) explored whether the underlying tenets and assumptions of leadership emergence theory apply to Christian leaders who work in a secular corporate context rather than in a ministry context. It examined how Christian leaders in secular corporations view their development as leaders and therefore how leadership emergence theory might be used to develop leaders more effectively. The following four questions guided the research:

1. Have Christian leaders in corporate contexts been shaped by the types of processing items identified in leadership emergence theory?
2. Are they aware of the importance of their response to these shaping experiences?
3. Have they changed their views of past events as the passage of time has enabled clearer insight?
4. Could exposure to the concepts of leadership emergence theory open them to deeper development as a leader?

The multiple-case qualitative study (Stadler, 2008) involved sequential interviews with five leaders, identified through purposeful sampling, who held positions within three levels of the CEO in large corporations. The leaders shared a Christian worldview, ranged in age from 51-69, had between 27 and 45 years of work experience, and had worked in organizations ranging from $1-$42B in annual revenue. Demographically, all of the leaders were Caucasian and one was female. All of them had additional experience as leaders in other contexts, such as the nonprofit sector, higher education, the military, or as entrepreneurs, which enriched their
comparative view of the corporate context. The unstructured nature of the interviews allowed flexibility to delve into both the organizational context and the worldview of the leaders as it had bearing on their perception of how they developed as leaders. Cross-case synthesis (Yin, 2003) was employed to determine the applicability of the theory as gauged by a positive or negative evaluation of the responses in light of the research questions.

The findings showed that the corporate context does not appear to be a barrier to the application of the theory. The findings also confirmed the importance of a leader’s perception of God’s involvement in leadership development. The cross-case analysis of the interviews identified two different patterns of findings for the research questions: (a) a pattern of affirmative findings for all the research questions and (b) a pattern of an affirmative finding for the first question followed by lack of affirmative findings for the remaining three questions. The second pattern of findings confirms the tenet of leadership emergence theory that a leader’s lack of awareness of personal responsibility to respond positively to processing items (research question two) can inhibit a leader’s development, which could preclude the ability to discern the revised meaning of processing items upon reflection over time (research question three) and thereby lessen the perceived value of reviewing previous leadership experiences in order to deepen development (research question four). The study also illuminated the importance of the internal context of a leader’s mindset to recognize the providential aspects of leadership development. One of the underpinnings of leadership emergence theory is God’s active, caring involvement in every aspect of a believer’s life, including his or her development as a leader. Lack of attentiveness to this orchestrated guidance appeared to hamper awareness of the relationship between events and therefore reduced the developmental potential of the response of the leader to those events (Stadler, 2008).

Within the last few years, the spiritual dimension of organizational life has been explored more formally through research. Duchon and Plowman (2005) demonstrated that work unit performance is positively associated with work unit spirituality, and Reave (2005) has shown that there is consistency between effective leadership and spiritual practices. Dent, Higgins, and Wharff (2005) reviewed 85 scholarly articles and found that most of them hypothesized a correlation between productivity and spirituality. They have pointed out the need for “a comprehensive and integrated theory of leadership that acknowledges leaders as complex beings who mature and develop over time in relationship to spiritual, emotional, cognitive, social, and physical domains” (Dent et al., p. 648).

Application for Practitioners

The research outlined here (Stadler, 2008) confirmed that leadership emergence theory can apply in the corporate context to the degree that an individual leader holds a mindset, an internal context, which includes acknowledgement of God’s active involvement in the development of leaders. The value of leadership emergence theory may not be as apparent to a leader who does not currently have an internal context that is consistent with the presumption that the providence of God extends to the development of leaders. However, even if an individual leader subscribes to a different worldview, many leaders embrace the philosophy that “everything happens for a reason” so they may also benefit from the lifetime perspective of the theory. Applying the theory may have practical value for any leader who is interested in (a) reflecting on life’s cumulative patterns, (b) recognizing the phases of development, (c) understanding the benefit of challenging transition periods, and (d) choosing responses to
situations that will advance rather than derail his or her leadership journey. The findings of the research reviewed here can be applied by practitioners in multiple ways to improve the design of leadership programs as well as approaches to executive coaching, mentoring, and succession planning. Suggestions for application follow.

Leadership development programs. Leadership emergence theory highlights the importance of designing programs that (a) illuminate events typical of different phases of development, (b) that offer practical wisdom for navigating challenging leadership situations, (c) that provide insight into potential future challenges, and (d) that instill hope from the assurance that what is being experienced is normal and valuable. Customizing programs for leaders in different phases of development allows for more targeted activities rather than presuming that leaders at a similar organizational level or age need the same type of leadership development support.

Executive coaching. Leadership emergence theory can provide new insight into how to coach leaders in different phases most effectively. It can reveal ways to sensitize leaders to anticipate and prepare for future experiences. As Clinton (1989) stated, “Being forewarned of certain kinds of processing that will occur during certain periods of time can enable a smoother transition and learning of lessons” (p. 292). It can also clarify how to help leaders avoid derailment by providing them the opportunity to reflect on the impact of their choices.

Mentoring. Leadership emergence theory can position mentoring in a new light as a leadership development strategy. Providing information to both mentors and mentees on the concepts of leadership emergence theory can increase the intentionality of discussions between senior and junior leaders in order to enrich the content of the wisdom shared. It can create the opportunity for senior leaders to contribute in new ways to an organization’s leadership development strategy by providing a method for them to harvest their years of experience and a framework through which to instructionally articulate the value of particular experiences.

Succession planning. Leadership emergence theory can guide succession planning strategies to ensure that the next role identified for a leader will be in line with his or her next developmental phase and individual strengths. It can be used to steer high-potential leaders to roles that will maximize their development and avoid unfruitful assignments that could actually hinder or slow their development. It can provide a framework for leadership development discussions with senior leaders at the highest levels of the organization. The theory provides senior leaders, who often see themselves as no longer needing development, with a perspective from which to embrace continued development as a way to define and achieve a meaningful legacy.

Conclusion

Bennis (2004) has claimed, “Until we know more about how leadership truly develops, leadership education programs may be mostly acts of faith, evidence of our belief that authentic leadership is possible” (p. 36). As practitioners increasingly seek to apply research-based knowledge to the development of their leadership programs, leadership emergence theory holds promise for revolutionizing the way the mission of developing leaders is approached and
achieved. After two decades of successful application in the ministry environment, leadership emergence theory provides a framework that has now been demonstrated to apply in the corporate environment for leaders who believe that God cares about every aspect of their life, including their development as leaders. Even if a leader subscribes to a different world view, leadership emergence theory may help a leader take a lifetime view of past developmental events and be better prepared to maximize the learning from future events. The insight provided by leadership emergence theory can be used by practitioners to broaden corporate leadership development approaches, enhance executive coaching programs, revitalize mentoring initiatives, and improve succession planning strategies.

About the Author

Dr. Anita Stadler is a leadership development practitioner and internal executive coach for a Fortune 100 corporation. Since 2007, she has also served as the program manager for the corporation’s internal coach development program. With more than 25 years of experience in the corporate environment, her professional background includes leadership roles in business management, information technology, and talent development. She holds an MBA and earned a Ph.D. in Organizational Leadership from Regent University. Her research on leadership emergence theory in the corporate context earned her the 2009 Doctor of Philosophy in Organizational Leadership Outstanding Dissertation Award.

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References


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In the book, *Contemporary Leadership and Intercultural Competence: Exploring the Cross-cultural Dynamics Within Organizations*, edited by Michael Moodian (2009), many facets of leadership in a cross-cultural context are explored while it contributes to the growing interest in identifying cross-cultural leadership competencies.

Today, globalization metastasizes at unprecedented speed as the business leader is thrust into a virtual land of prosperity and peril. The once homogeneous cultures of the world are challenged by the introduction of preferences, tastes, and values from a new world of customers and employees. Michael Moodian (2009), in his book, *Contemporary Leadership and Intercultural Competence: Exploring the Cross-cultural Dynamics Within Organizations*, guides today’s leader through these converging cultural dynamics that are flamed by the unprecedented winds of global commerce.

The book is a compilation of 20 chapters authored by some of the top researchers and practitioners in cross-cultural leadership and diversity. It presents a balance between theory and application. The capable editor, Michael A. Moodian, is an assistant professor of social science and sociology at Chapman University. Topics range from the evolving role of diversity to measuring intercultural competencies in leaders. The book is well edited and careful not to be repetitive; rather, each contributing author reinforces the message from previous chapters.

Written as a text for upper-level undergraduate or graduate level classes in human resources, organizational development, or leadership, each chapter provides discussion questions that would help in classroom facilitation of this subject. The end notes of each chapter can be helpful as they provide additional references including web addresses for the researcher. In addition, the business practitioner would be informed by the numerous examples of workplace applications throughout the text.
The strength of the book rests in the identification of intercultural competency as an integral part of the modern leadership model. Trompenaars and Woolliams (in chapter 13) contended that “every organization is a cultural construct” and “culture is imbedded into the way we do business” (p. 161). Therefore, past leadership models fall short as they fail to give sufficient attention to culture. Trompenaars and Woolliams introduced an intercultural profile with a range of cultural competence components, thus broadening our perception of leadership.

In addition to Trompenaars and Woolliams, the book provides six additional chapters on measuring intercultural competencies including the review of instruments that currently exist. In chapter 18, Van Dyne, Ang, and Koh introduced the measurement and development of a cultural intelligence scale. They defined cultural intelligence as the “capability to function effectively in culturally diverse settings” (p. 233). Their detail on the scale development and validation studies provides the necessary rigor to this emerging field within leadership studies and presents new methods of measuring leadership effectiveness.

The book also provides practical applications that enhance the multicultural leader’s effectiveness. Chapters 8-12 examine how intercultural competence can be developed across organizations and become recognized as a critical component of leadership competencies. In Chapter 12, Beyond Borders, Gupta provided practical insights for leading multicultural and geographically dispersed teams. He gave pertinent examples and insights into the values and beliefs that frame our behaviors. Gupta addressed the most commonly encountered and challenging issues of time orientation, grooming, and formality in communications and style.

The text also introduces topics that usually are not included in diversity or cross-cultural discussions. Tobin addressed the legal implications of cross-cultural leadership and trade. What happens, for example, when a society based on common law engages in trade with civil law systems? Tobin pointed out that situational awareness of cultural cues is critical when navigating between competing legal paradigms. In chapter 7 Palthe highlighted trends in global human resource management and offered various approaches to improve talent development. Bennett introduced in chapter 5, the topic of religious and spiritual diversity in the workplace. He advanced the concept of faith-friendly institutions through strategies and structures that utilize the value of religious traditions. Again, it was refreshing to see these three topics being introduced in this text as it broadens the field of diversity and cross-cultural leadership.

The weakness of the book is found in the introductory chapters. Bhawuk, Landis, and Munusamy present in chapter 2, Understanding the Basics of Culture. Absent from their definition of culture were values and belief systems. The primary resisting force in changing an organizational culture is deeply held beliefs and values of those being impacted by the change. Their model focuses on history and ecology as the determinants of culture. They see culture determined by geography, time, and language. These are important elements that shape the culture and can provide greater cultural insights, however these are what Schein (2004) would refer to as cultural artifacts and do not go deep enough to gain a thorough understanding of the culture. Effective leaders also need to understand the underlying values and belief systems if they are to successfully facilitate change.

An even greater oversight by the book is the failure to establish a business case for diversity based on quantitative or qualitative research. Cultural diversity has been embraced by society in general as a cultural ideal while the academic community has only recently shown the virtues of diversity through rigorous research. In chapter 3, Developing and Implementing a Multicultural Vision, there are several recommended actions without any evidence that it improves productivity, reduces employee turnover, or increases profitability. Why should a
business leader follow such advice? The book has missed an opportunity to introduce the most recent research that infers diversity’s positive impact to the business. If this text is used in the classroom, it would be beneficial to students if the professor would supplement it with these additional studies.

Even with the book’s shortcomings mentioned above, this text is an asset to any researcher or student of leadership who wishes to advance his or her understanding of the relationship between cultural competency and leadership. Given our dynamic global economy, leaders must develop greater capabilities in getting work done through people within the multicultural context of today’s marketplace. This book provides new perspectives on measuring intercultural competencies, assessing leadership within a multicultural context, and numerous examples of how organizations can lead in an evolving multicultural world.

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