THE LAWS OF PHYSICS & THE PHYSICS OF LAWS

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I. AN UNDERLYING ORDER

From ancient conjurers to modern scientists, those claiming to understand the nature of matter, energy, and the like often refer to their conclusions as “laws.” Why would they do that? The Law of Gravity, for example, could just as easily be called the gravity principle or Newton’s axiom. Even so, scientists instinctively use the argot of lawyers and judges. I think they do so because law represents order, and order law.

Physicist Stephen Hawking reminds us that “ever since the dawn of civilization, people have not been content to see events as unconnected and inexplicable. They have craved an understanding of the underlying order in the world.”1 It is for this reason we lawyers can say that “the Sparks of all [the] Sciences in the world are raked up in the ashes of the Law.”2

For similar reasons, I wonder whether raking through the ashes of science (as well as some of its white hot coals) might reveal symmetries that reinforce our understanding of law. The parallels between science and law reveal the interwoven nature of the created order. Although neither, standing alone, claims to have produced a unified explanation of everything, viewed together they provide allegorical parallels between what we think we know about nature (science) and what we think we know about man (law).

The early common law jurists thought this way. Even before the admixture of Reformation and Enlightenment influences, the common law tradition we inherited assumed the laws of science naturally led to an understanding of the laws of men.3 In Judge Henry Bracton’s thirteenth-century treatise, the first true attempt to synthesize English

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* The views advanced in this Essay represent commentary “concerning the law, the legal system, [and] the administration of justice” as authorized by Virginia Canon of Judicial Conduct 4(B) (permitting judges to “speak, write, lecture, teach” and otherwise participate in extrajudicial efforts to improve the legal system). These views, therefore, should not be mistaken for the official views of the Virginia Court of Appeals or my opinion as an appellate judge in the context of any specific case. I also appreciate the assistance of my law clerk, Shawn D. Lillemo, Esq., in the research for and editing of this essay.


3 See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *38–39.
common law, he defined jurisprudence as simply “the science of the just and unjust.”

Explaining the point further, Sir William Blackstone argued in his famous Commentaries that the elemental laws of physics provide the starting point in our effort to understand the laws of men:

Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action, and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus we say, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey.

Thus, when the Supreme Being formed the universe, and created matter out of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would cease to be. When he put that matter into motion, he established certain laws of motion, to which all movable bodies must conform.

Finding the same sense of order underlying the laws of men, Blackstone recognized free will as one of the intrinsic design features of the “noblest of all sublunary beings.”

This, then, is the general signification of law; a rule of action dictated by some superior being, and, in those creatures that have neither the power to think, nor to will, such laws must be invariably obeyed . . . . But laws, in their more confined sense, and in which it is our present business to consider them, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct; that is, the precepts by which man, the noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his behaviour.

Justice James Wilson—a signer of the Declaration of Independence, one of the principal framers of the Constitution, and an inaugural member of the Supreme Court of the United States—agreed: “Order, proportion, and fitness pervade the universe. Around us, we see; within us, we feel; above us, we admire a rule, from which a deviation cannot, or should not, or will not be made.”

“The great and incomprehensible Author, and Preserver, and Ruler of all things—he himself works not

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5 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *38 (emphasis added).
6 Id. at *39.
7 Id.
without an eternal decree,” Wilson concluded. "Such—and so universal is law.”

This jurisprudential view was a common theme among the great jurists of the past. They believed the laws of physics and the laws of men, taken together, represent a universal order, a kind of architectural design crafted with purpose and care. The two disciplines differed only in their coercive efficacy: Pebbles and stars are bound to obey the laws of physics; yet men are free to disobey the laws of men. Except for the normative nature of the laws of men, the two systems of law share many elegant parallels. Although this thesis was advocated with confidence in the eighteenth century, it still holds up pretty well today.

II. NEWTONIAN PHYSICS

A. The First & Second Laws of Motion—Inertial Forces & Stare Decisis

Working from conclusions first reached by Galileo, Isaac Newton developed the Laws of Motion in his 1687 Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, a work considered by Hawking as “surely the most influential book ever written in physics.”

Newton’s First Law holds: “Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly . . . except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed.” Under his Second Law, “A change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed . . . whether the force is impressed all at once or successively by degrees.”

It follows that, absent such a force, an object at rest will remain at rest. And if it is in motion, it will remain in motion. This idea Newton called the vis inertiae, the inherent nature of an object not to change its state of motion or rest. A “body exerts this force only during a change of its state, caused by another force impressed upon it.” Inertia is directly proportional to an object’s mass: The greater the mass, the more its inertia; the smaller the mass, the less its inertia. Challenging the contrary orthodoxy first taught by Aristotle, Newton’s First and Second

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9 Id.
10 Id.
11 HAWKING, supra note 1, at 196.
13 Id.
15 PRINCIPIA, supra note 12, at 404.
Laws laid the foundation for modern physics and helped explain the physical nature of our expanding universe. Rather than everything inevitably coming to rest, inertia maintains the status quo and resists changes to it.

The Anglo–American tradition of law follows the ancient law of stare decisis. Once a legal premise has been set in motion by a high court, protected by the force and stature of precedent, its momentum propels it effortlessly into future generations. Only a later court of equal or greater dignity with the initiating court can significantly alter the trajectory of the precedent into future generations. A resisting court’s ability to do so is directly proportional to the mass of the moving precedent. Its mass is measured by the strength of judicial consensus on the truth of the precedent and the longevity of its journey over time.

Against this mass is the vigor of those seeking to bring it to an end.

When precedents carry great intellectual mass (like Blackstone’s interpretation of common law in his Commentaries or John Marshall’s assertion of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison) few, if any, counteracting forces can interpose their resistant will in opposition. Unmet by resistance, precedents simply move from age to age along their original trajectories. On the other hand, precedents of featherweight mass usually come to an inglorious end, often lost among the emotive moods of the day, without any appreciable possibility of moving forward into future generations.

More often than not, however, the resistant forces we typically observe are sufficient only to change the relative vector of a disputable precedent, resigning it to a less ambitious course than originally charted by those who set it in motion. Yet in all cases, the governing premise remains the same: The law of judicial inertia, stare decisis, presupposes judicial precedents continue their intended course. Those seeking to change the course of a precedent or even to possibly end its journey altogether can succeed only by amassing sufficiently weighty reasons for doing so. In a common law legal system, precedents do not—and should not—come to rest on their own accord.

In this context, the mass is in the enduring legal principle embedded in the precedent—not simply the judicial opinion expounding (“[A]ll the elemental substances have a natural tendency to move towards their own special places, or to rest in them when there . . . .”).

17 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *64.
19 Of course, even the slightest of influences can have enormous unforeseen consequences. In what has come to be known as the “butterfly effect,” the minutest legal precedent could conceivably create a legal tornado on the other side of the world. See EDWARD N. LORENZ, THE ESSENCE OF CHAOS app. 1, at 181–82 (1993).
Upon it. As Professor Bryson explains, common law jurists “thought that
the cases were not themselves the common law of England, but are only
evidence of the common law.” The common law, Lord Mansfield once
remarked, “would be a strange science if it rested solely upon cases . . . .
Precedent indeed may serve to fix principles, which for certainty’s sake
are not suffered to be shaken, whatever might be the weight of the
principle, independent of precedent.” A point largely lost in modern
conversations about stare decisis, Lord Mansfield’s view represented the
original understanding of the concept: “[P]recedent, though it be
evidence of law, is not law in itself; much less the whole of the law.”

From an allegorical perspective, stare decisis is like the trajectory of
a rocket. The greatest force must be applied at the earliest stage, lifting
the rocket off the launch pad and pushing it beyond the Earth’s
gravitational pull. After lift-off, the rocket follows its flight path powered
only by its momentum. Absent the application of a resistant force (such
as a thruster burn, an asteroid, or a solar flare), the rocket will
indefinitely continue on its intended trajectory. In the same way,
consider the physical flow of a river. Snow and rain flow down the
mountains to the sea. The water carves gorges through rock, moves
around boulders in the rapids, gets forced through man-made dams, and
ultimately fans out into deltas and bays. Resistant forces may change
the course of the river, but they rarely stop it altogether. Whether
allegorized as a rocket trajectory or a winding river, stare decisis abides
by Newton’s principle of inertia. The basic formula of stare decisis
describes the inertial history of common law reasoning and quantifies
the resisting force necessary to alter or end the originally intended
trajectory of a legal principle.

B. Newton’s Third Law: Opposing Forces & the Adversary System

Described as the fundamental principle of symmetry, Newton’s
Third Law of Motion provides that all forces come in opposing pairs. For
each action (better thought of as a force) we should expect to see an
equal and opposite reaction. “If anyone presses a stone with a finger,”
Newton observed, “the finger is also pressed by the stone.”

Newton’s Third Law means that all forces in the universe can be
best described as interactions between two different objects. Each force

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20. 1 RATIO DECIDENDI: GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 287 (W.
Hamilton Bryson & Serge Dauchy eds., 2006).
21.  Id.
22.  Id.
23.  Id.
24.  Id.
has two end points—two objects of force. Each is equal in magnitude but exactly opposite in direction. The end points mirror each other. Force itself, as an intelligible scientific concept, does not exist outside of this point-counterpoint model. Thus, to physicists and schoolchildren alike, force is simply a tug of war. Each side pulls on the rope while the rope pulls on each side.

The architects of the common law system intuitively understood this principle. Unlike the inquisitorial system employed by continental courts applying civil law, the common law courts of England and America created an adversarial system of justice. It presupposes truth can best be found in the competing contest between opposing forces. For each matter in dispute, the assertion of \( X \) is expected to be accompanied by a counter assertion of not-\( X \).

A less violent adaptation of the trial-by-combat adjudication of the Middle Ages,\(^{25}\) modern litigation is a forensic contest between two opponents. Each seeks to pull the tug-of-war rope of persuasion toward his side. Presiding over the contest is a neutral decision maker, a judge or jury. In every case, the initial assumption is the same: Both sides apply persuasive force in opposite directions to unbalance the other. Depending on the governing burden of proof (which determines which side is initially disfavored by the rules of the game), either side of the tug-of-war rope pulls until one wins or the game is called off.

The apparent brutishness of the contest may sometimes distract us, but the adversarial method of litigation resonates with good sense, in part at least, because of its symmetrical relationship with Newton’s Third Law of Motion. There is an intrinsic sense of order in both.

III. QUANTUM MECHANICS

A. Justice & the Wave-Particle Paradox

Much of the trouble in modern physics stems from an ancient question: Is light an indivisible particle or a wave? Albert Einstein once wrote to a friend: “All these fifty years of conscious brooding have brought me no nearer to the answer to the question ‘What are light quanta?’ Nowadays every Tom, Dick, and Harry thinks he knows it, but he is mistaken.”\(^{26}\) Physicist Richard Feynman described the state of confusion over the “wave-particle duality” of light with an oft-repeated quote: “[L]ight was waves on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays; it was

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\(^{25}\) See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *346–48.

particles on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, and on Sundays, we think about it!”

In Einstein’s famous $E=mc^2$ equation, he proved the energy-to-mass ratio was a function of the speed of light. The history of nuclear fission, from the Manhattan Project to the modern worldwide use of atomic power plants, owes its existence to this simple equation. It thus should come as some surprise to learn that modern scientists still do not know what light actually is.

The debate over the nature of light began in the fifth century B.C. Attributed by some to the teachings of Pythagoras, “Greek atomists believed that seeing and hearing (and smelling) involved the traveling of atoms (at finite speed) from the perceived object to the perceiving organ and that the form of the atoms conveyed information.” Light traveled in straight lines and bounced off mirrors like a ball off a wall. Aristotle disagreed with the particle theory, claiming light was more like a wave. The wave theory seemed incomplete, however, to Newton, who noted light’s ability to cast shadows suggested a stream of particles.

Most classical physicists of the nineteenth century who worked with electromagnetism seemed content to describe light as a wave. Thomas Young, an English scientist, popularized the wave theory with a simple, yet profound, experiment. He shined a beam of light onto a projection screen through a barrier with two closely spaced slits. If light were made of particles, he reasoned, two closely spaced bright images would

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27. RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, QED: THE STRANGE THEORY OF LIGHT AND MATTER 23 n.3 (expanded ed. 2006) [hereinafter QED].
31. ARISTOTLE, ON THE SOUL, reprinted in 8 ARISTOTLE IN TWENTY-THREE VOLUMES bk. II, at 107 (G. P. Goold ed., W. S. Hett trans., 1975) (“[L]ight is the essence of colour to produce movement in the actually transparent; and the actuality of the transparent is light. The evidence for this is clear . . . .”).
32. ISAAC NEWTON, OPTICS (1704), reprinted in 34 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 377, 529 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) (“Are not the rays of light very small bodies emitted from shining substances?” (emphasis added)).
33. See, e.g., J. Clerk Maxwell, A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field, 155 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOCY LONDON 459, 499 (1865) (“[L]ight is an electromagnetic disturbance propagated through the field according to electromagnetic laws.”).
34. AMIR D. ALCZEL, ENTANGLEMENT: THE GREATEST MYSTERY IN PHYSICS 18 (2002).
appear on the projection screen. But what he saw was not what he expected. Instead, many parallel lines in a classic wave interference pattern appeared on the screen. The only plausible explanation for these refracted images, Young concluded, was that light consisted of streams of wave energy, not particles.35

Einstein, as he did with so many other topics, reconsidered the debate from an entirely different perspective. He pointed out the photoelectric effect (certain metals releasing electrons when light shines on them) occurred in specific quantities. As Einstein viewed it, light must consist of streams of energized particles—indivisible packets of energy later called photons.36 Nevertheless, none of Einstein’s explanation refuted the earlier findings that light also acted like a wave insofar as it exhibited a wavelength and was capable of reflecting, refracting, and polarizing—typical functions of a wave.

Today’s physicists offer little to resolve the conflicting theories of the nature of light. Using terms like “wave energy duality,” they appear to accept the inexplicable paradox—unknown in classical physics—that light is sometimes a wave, sometimes a particle, and perhaps both at the same time.38 As described in the legendary Feynman lectures, “We choose to examine a phenomenon which is impossible, absolutely impossible, to explain in any classical way, and which has in it the heart of quantum mechanics. In reality, it contains the only mystery.”39 It seems the only true certitude we have on this topic is that we can be certain of very little.

A similar definitional paradox is deeply embedded in our understanding of justice. In every case there are two ways to perform the calculations of justice. On some occasions we choose the particle theory of law. On others, we choose the wave theory of equity. Sometimes we marble them together, allowing both to contribute to the decision. Even when we do so, however, we still get the unnerving sense we are dealing with conceptually dissimilar concepts.

35 See id. at 18–19.
36 Klein, supra note 26, at 134.
37 Gilbert N. Lewis coined the term “photon” in 1926. See Gilbert N. Lewis, Letter to the Editor, The Conservation of Photons, 118 Nature 874, 874 (1926) (“I therefore take the liberty of proposing for this hypothetical new atom, which is not light but plays an essential part in every process of radiation, the name photon.”).
38 Light and electrons “behave somewhat like waves, and somewhat like particles.” QED, supra note 27, at 85. “In order to save ourselves from inventing new words such as ‘wavicles,’ we have chosen to call these objects ‘particles’ . . . .” Id.
The law-equity duality has a long history. Early common law jurists looked to discrete, concrete rules of law to find the justice of every case. The very nature of a neutral, outcome-indeterminate principle ensured justice because it applied the same reasoning process to every litigant (from plowboy to prince) and in every case (from small to great). In this way, common law jurists usually looked at justice deductively.\textsuperscript{40} Reasoning from general to specific, they consulted governing statutes of the legislature, binding precedent from prior courts, as well as accepted mores of custom and practice—all in a synthesizing effort to formulate a principled rule of decision for a particular case. In the language of physics, the initial conditions determined the result.

Shortly after the birth of what we now call the common law, a competing vision of justice appeared. In medieval England, a King was the sovereign Liege Lord of the kingdom, divinely appointed protector of all dependent subjects, and thus the very fount of justice.\textsuperscript{41} Whatever the common law may or may not be, the King believed his personal conscience—that is, his subjective sense of justice—superseded the uniform rules of common law.\textsuperscript{42} This regal spirit of justice became known as equity.\textsuperscript{43}

In the early 1200s, litigants began petitioning the King to intervene in disputes where the litigants thought the common law might violate the royal sense of justice.\textsuperscript{44} After growing weary of exercising his conscience in an ever growing docket of unhappy litigants, the King delegated the task to his Chancellor, a close advisor and member of the King’s Council.\textsuperscript{45}

Until the appointment of Sir Thomas More in 1529, all earlier Chancellors were prelates, educated to be ecclesiastical scholars and appointed to be the King’s personal confessors.\textsuperscript{46} The Chancellors usually looked at justice inductively and made decisions on a case-by-case basis informed only by general maxims of equity,\textsuperscript{47} which they discovered from

\textsuperscript{40} See Roscoe Pound, \textit{The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought}, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 201, 201 (1917).
\textsuperscript{41} See \textit{ibid.} § 2.1(3), at 63.
\textsuperscript{42} See \textit{ibid.} § 2.2, at 67–68.
\textsuperscript{43} See \textit{ibid.} § 2.1, at 69.
\textsuperscript{44} See \textit{ibid.} § 2.2, at 66–67.
\textsuperscript{45} See \textit{ibid.} § 2.3(1), at 74.
theologians like St. Thomas Aquinas, as well as from ancient philosophical constructs developed by Aristotle. 48

From the Chancellor’s perspective, he “did not issue generally applicable ‘legal’ rulings. Quite the contrary. It was the very universality of the common law precedents and their unbending quality that he might find, from time to time, unjust when applied to a specific set of circumstances.” 49 As Aquinas starkly put it, “In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good.” 50

Needless to say, the development of an equity court did not please many common law adherents. The famous commentator John Selden voiced the popular protest against using equity as a substitute for law:

Equity is a Roguish thing: for Law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the measure, we call a Foot, a Chancellor’s Foot; what an uncertain Measure would this be? One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a Third an indifferent Foot: ’Tis the same thing in the Chancellor’s Conscience. 51

Sir Edward Coke, a Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, shared Selden’s discontent. He used the law court’s power of habeas corpus to release litigants from the Chancery Court’s contempt orders forbidding them from enforcing a common law judgment that the Chancellor condemned as inequitable. 52 Thus equity began to blur justice over a range of permissible results in cases where the common law drew distinct, but inequitable, bright lines.

On the eve of the American Revolution, Sir Robert Chambers (Blackstone’s successor as the Oxford Vinerian Chair of English Law) framed the law-equity dispute not as an accident of judicial politics but as a deep jurisprudential paradox. “It has appeared to some a question difficult of decision,” Chambers explained, “what is the use of a court of

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49 Id.


equity if our laws are right, and what is the use of laws if they are wrong.”53 Chambers answered the question by challenging its assumptions: “This question supposes in human institutions a degree of excellence which they never have attained. No human law was ever perfect, it has always equity for its object, but it sometimes misses of its end.”54 “Yet law is not unnecessary,” he continued, “[t]he subject has, in the law, a rule of action always safe, and commonly right; and where it happens to be wrong a remedy is provided.”55

At its founding, America inherited this law-equity duality.56 Although most American courts have merged the administration of justice (eventually abolishing the distinction between the judge of law and the chancellor in equity), the substantive distinction remains between the two competing visions of justice. As Professor Pomeroy explained, “While the external distinctions of form between suits in equity and actions at law have been abrogated, the essential distinctions which inhere in the very nature of equitable and legal primary or remedial rights still exist as clearly defined as before the system was adopted . . . ”57

Thus, even to this day, some of our most sacred rights, such as the right to a trial by jury in civil cases, specifically depend on which side of the law-equity boundary a given case falls.58 The substantive distinction between law and equity remains important in determining available

54  Id.
55  Id.
57  1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 354, at 795–96 (5th ed. 1941).
58  U.S. CONST. amend VII; Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (holding that the jury trial right of the Seventh Amendment applies to legal cases “in contradistinction to equity” (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830)))). A “jury trial was given in actions at common law and not in suits in equity, and a jury trial may still be granted or not, according to whether the case is classified as one in equity or at law.” DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1, at 28 (1973) [hereinafter DOBBS 1973].
remedies, formulating the scope of injunctive relief, and dispensing exceptions to worthy litigants from the strictures of the law.

Equity formulations often take on the role of exceptions. A rule of law, like the statute of limitations, usually states a categorical principle: A claimant cannot file a complaint more than a certain number of years after his cause of action arises. Equity sets this generally applicable rule aside if the complainant shows he was somehow tricked into waiting too late—a specific mercy-laden caveat called equitable estoppel.

Dozens of examples of this law-equity duality can be given. My only point is that it exists today and has existed for a very long time. The heart of the judicial system is justice. Yet, like modern physicists attempting to describe the properties of light, we too must equivocate on the actual properties of justice. Is it governed by principles of law, maxims of equity, or both?

Our answer is unsettling but honest: Sometimes it is law, sometimes equity, sometimes both, but never neither. To adapt the Feynman pejorative: Justice is equity on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays; it is law on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays; and on Sundays, we think about it.

Along these same lines, consider the even more disquieting paradigm contest taking place in the deepest cavern of modern physics. Few scientists have engaged at this level, and those who have engaged returned with stories bordering on the unintelligible. On one side of the cavern are the accepted principles of general relativity, Einstein’s elegant explanation of the geometric properties of space-time. General relativity explains the essential gravitational structure of the universe at large. On the other side of the cavern is quantum mechanics, which

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59 “Quite apart from the fact of merger, there may be good reasons to deny equity remedies in ‘law’ type claims—not because they are claims at law, but because they do not warrant the exercise of the special power.” Dobbs 1973, supra note 58, § 2.6, at 67.

60 See Kent Sinclair, Guide to Virginia Law/Equity Reform and Other Landmark Changes § 1.07, at 45 (2006).

61 “Equitable estoppel” is a device whereby a party is “absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed.” 3 Pomeroy, supra note 57, § 804, at 189.

62 See Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334, 344 (1896) (“Under such circumstances the courts have held with great unanimity that the purchaser is estopped to insist upon the statutory period . . . .”).

63 See QED, supra note 27, at 23 (describing the “wave-particle duality” confusion as to why photon-multipliers maintained strength instead of softening as predicted by the wave theory).

explains the permissible range of properties of mass and energy at the level of subatomic matter.

To date, many physicists have tried, although none have succeeded, to reconcile these paradigms. The math, the theory, and the experimental data frustrate all attempts to construct a unified “theory of everything” that would explain equally well the very large and very small—leaving not a few theorists content with the paradoxical hypothesis that gravity is at once a curvature in the fabric of space-time and a wavelike graviton particle.65

In a similar way, jurists and lawyers are continually flanked by two competing strong towers of justice: the generally applicable law with its virtue of objective uniformity, and the specifically applicable equity with its virtues of particularity and tailored mercy. Neither paradigm, by itself, fully describes what we mean by justice. Perhaps we will never come up with a rhetoric that convincingly forces these competing virtues into a single formulation. Perhaps it is vain to think we could.

B. Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle & the Jurisprudence of Doubt

In the mid-1920s, a young German physicist named Werner Heisenberg wanted to precisely describe tiny subatomic particles.66 The conventional wisdom taught that such particles should have a physical position and measurable momentum at any given moment in time. Rejecting this view, Heisenberg postulated a system where position and momentum were interdependent, not unlike Einstein’s space-time theory.67 Heisenberg believed “an observer cannot infer a single unique event that would have led to the measured outcome.”68 “There would always be, as Heisenberg put it, an ‘inexactness’ (Ungenaugigkeit) in the conclusions.”69

Later physicists realized Heisenberg’s insight led to a simple, but startling, conclusion: Inherent in every measurement is a band of inescapable uncertainty.70 Heisenberg’s thesis implied the very act of measuring somehow changes the thing measured. These concepts rocked the scientific community because of the implication that absolute certitude, when it comes to subatomic quantifications, is impossible. The

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65 It is “proposed to identify the massless spin-two particle in the string’s spectrum with the graviton, the quantum of gravitation.” BECKER ET AL., supra note 64, at xi.
67 Id. at 131.
68 Id. at 146.
69 Id. at 147.
70 See HAWKING, supra note 1, at 58.
discovery effectively dethroned the scientist from his role as an objective and neutral observer and made him part of the thing being observed.

The epistemology of science continues, even today, to convulse over the implications of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Even so, Heisenberg’s computations and experimental data have held up to rigorous scrutiny. The uncertainty principle, Hawking claims, “has been an outstandingly successful theory and underlies nearly all of modern science and technology.”

Thus, science has moved from the illusion that things can be measured precisely to a realization that the best knowledge we can hope to obtain lies in “probability cloud[s].”

Long before the theory of quantum mechanics, the common law tradition intuited a similar uncertainty principle. Dealing in mere probabilities, a concept previously foreign to physics, has always been a traditional feature of the law.

The institutional humility derived from inevitable uncertainty explains why the adversarial system does not begin with strict neutrality and then configure the trial as an even-handed experiment to ascertain truly objective realities. To be sure, just the opposite is true. Every trial begins with a wholly unproven assumption, a heuristic bias in the classical sense of the term. We do not merely hypothesize its truth—we outright presume it. Every trial, to put it plainly, begins with a thumb on the scales of justice.

In a criminal case, for example, the accused is presumed to be innocent before a single fact is offered to support such a presumption. In a civil case, with few exceptions, the civil defendant is presumed to be not liable. The presumption could be that he did not act negligently, that he did not breach the contract, or that he did not act with malice.

Why would the law inject such bias into the adversarial system? Why would it not be far more sensible to begin a trial with utter objectivity, presuming neither side to be blameless and allowing the evidence, like the needle of a compass, to point to the objective truth? The reason is that lawyers and jurists alike have known for centuries that irrebuttable truth is almost always, if not invariably, garbled by the exercise of discovering it. The very act of advocating tends to exaggerate the strengths of an assertion and to minimize its weaknesses. Some witnesses, whether subconsciously or deliberately, seem to be hardwired to rationalize their retelling of past events in a manner favorable to their perceived self-interests. We use cross-examination to trim down overstatements and to fill in understatements. We consult a library of evidentiary rules to filter out unreliable information.

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71 Id.
72 1 FEYNMAN ET AL., supra note 39, § 6-5.
Despite our best efforts, however, most cases end up presenting competing views of hyperbolized truth. Judges and juries grope for the median view, the probabilistic truth, which they estimate to be somewhere between the poles of embellishment. Guiding this search, burdens of proof establish default settings in the decision-making process, which temporarily predispose the case to the most risk-averse outcome. They recognize the margin of error inherent in the adversarial system and steer the decision away from the pretense of pure objectivity.

The uncertainty principle also distributes myriad lesser evidentiary burdens between the parties on a topic-by-topic basis. Professor Wigmore said the "most important consideration in the creation of presumptions is probability." The probability biases range from mere permissible inferences to legally conclusive presumptions. Wigmore devoted at least fifty-five sections of his original treatise to various evidentiary burdens and presumptions allocated by the common law to certain basic facts.

The idea of presuming truth in the absence of proof, however, did not originate with the common law. As James Franklin, a professor of mathematics, notes in The Science of Conjecture, the Babylonian Talmud contained "a good deal of reasoning from presumption (ḥazaḵaḵ)" as did Roman law at the time of Justinian and many other ancient legal codes.

Despite the occasional jurist expressing angst over the concept, most of us are comfortable with a jurisprudence of doubt. We do not—because we believe we cannot—demand or expect pure evidentiary objectivity. We accept as a given a certain "margin of misstatement" inherent in the very nature of our language, in the fog of memory, or in the rationalizations of disputants. Different levels of the burden of proof (reasonable suspicion, probable cause, preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing proof, beyond a reasonable doubt) merely calibrate the tolerable limits of uncertainty for specific decision-making topics.

73 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343, at 500 (6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
74 Id. § 342, at 496.
75 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2485–2540 (1905). Among the "hundreds of recognized presumptions" are the presumptions of regularity, that letters were delivered, that a person missing for seven years is deceased, and that offspring are the legitimate children of the husband. MCCORMICK, supra note 73, § 343, at 501–06.
78 Benjamin Cardozo, Law and Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV. 471, 474 (1939).
In short, common law jurists have long accepted the premise that our understanding of juristic truth—the *sui generis* kind of truth produced in courtrooms—is invariably affected by the truth-telling process of the adversary system. “The bottom line, at any rate, seems to be that facts are not the simple, hard things they were supposed to be.”

While we can measure some things with precision, others we can know only vaguely. It is for this very reason we engineer myriad presumptions into the litigation process to act as temporary proxies for the truth.

These truth presets, if we can call them that, ameliorate the capriciousness of Heisenberg’s observation that the act of measuring something necessarily changes it. They also remind us, as Chambers said of the legal scholars who came before him, “I suppose it will be found that often as their knowledge increases their confidence grows less.”

**CONCLUSION**

The laws of physics represent a search for order amid the tumult of matter and energy, from the most imperceptible subatomic speck to our grandest imagination of the ever-expanding universe. Most modern physicists (even those expressing their faith in, to use their description of it, “chaos theory”) search for the underlying order, rightly discounting as unhelpful the hypothesis that all things are merely a random physical and metaphysical game of chance. As Einstein famously said, “God does not play dice” with the universe.

So, too, in the laws of men, we look for order amid the tumult of human conflict. Our laws, like our physics, rest upon presuppositions reinforcing that sense of order. We presuppose traditional laws should have a measurable stare decisis force similar to the law of inertia. We rely on an adversarial system that pairs opposing litigable points of view similar to the pairing of all natural forces in Newtonian physics. We accept the apparent *ad hoc* duality in our definition of justice—generalized law and particularized equity—in the same way physicists accept particle-wave duality in their understanding of light. We accept

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79 LINDLEY, supra note 66, at 4.
80 1 CHAMBERS, supra note 53, at 195.
81 Sensitive dependence on initial conditions results in amplified divergence in outcomes, but surprisingly, often in observable fractal patterns exhibiting such phenomena as Lorenz attractors. See generally JULIEN CLINTON SPROTT, ELEGANT CHAOS: ALGEBRAICALLY SIMPLE CHAOTIC FLOWS 11, 61 (2010). Because chaos still deals with deterministic systems, some consider the label “chaos” to be a bit of a misnomer. See STEPHEN H. KELLE, IN THE WAKE OF CHAOS: UNPREDICTABLE ORDER IN DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS, at ix (1993) (“Chaos theory is not as interesting as it sounds. How could it be?”).
82 HAWKING, supra note 1, at 58.
our inability to reconstruct absolute truth through the judicial process, just as Heisenberg acknowledged his inability to overcome the principle of uncertainty in quantum mechanics.

Why should such things attract our interest? I turn to Oliver Wendell Holmes for the answer:

The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it universal interest. It is through them that you not only become a great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law.83

83 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 478 (1897).