Henry Kissinger, the godfather of American foreign policy, recently told the BBC that “military victory” is no longer possible in Iraq.  Always the careful statesman, however, Kissinger qualified that judgment.  “If you mean by ‘military victory’ an Iraqi government that can be established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets the civil war under control and sectarian violence under control in a time period that the political processes of the democracies will support, I don’t believe that is possible.

Kissinger’s statement is not hopeless, especially if his definition is, in fact, not what we mean by military victory.  The problem of course is that neither the Bush administration nor its Democratic opponents have been clear about what would constitute victory in Iraq.  Since the conclusion of major military operations in 2003, both American policymakers and the American public have held dangerously nebulous and implausible expectations for post-war Iraq.

Two possible victory scenarios come to mind.  The first is along the lines drawn by Kissinger: a stable, democratic Iraq with a consensus government capable of dealing with its own internal and external security threats.  Unfortunately, that scenario sets a standard unattainable by many of the world’s troubled states, not just Iraq.  Such a level of order and stability is simply not in Iraq’s near-term future.

The second scenario might be called the realist’s definition of victory.  From this perspective it helps to recall the circumstances that first drew America into Iraq and the war’s connection to the wider War on Terror.  The Bush administration believed that Iraq had or was seriously pursuing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  The administration was also concerned that former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein would aide and abet the al Qaeda terrorist network.  While some doubt the validity of those justifications for war, they frame defensible criteria for victory.  Regardless of the quality of Iraqi democracy and the degree of consensus among its peoples, establishing an Iraq that eschews WMDs and refrains from aiding international terrorists may reasonably be called “victory.”  Scaling back expectations in this manner may not advance the commendable ideals of democracy, consensus, and the rule of law, but the realist’s victory has the offsetting advantage of being achievable.

Kissinger is rightly pessimistic about “military victory” in Iraq, but he also knows total withdrawal, otherwise known as defeat, would be disastrous.  According to putative House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, “This isn’t a war to win; it’s a situation to be solved.”  Perhaps the difference between “war” and “situation” is semantic in this case, but the Iraqi insurgents and their terrorist backers believe they are at war and, unlike their Washington counterparts, have clearly defined victory.  Any American withdrawal that can be credited to the insurgency will be seen as a victory for the terrorists.

As embarrassing as withdrawal might be to the United States, embarrassment would not be the most significant consequence of failing to secure victory.  For the last 20 years jihadists have been trying to demonstrate to their angry but as yet unradicalized Muslim brothers that America is weak and will yield to Islamic might.  Unceremonious withdrawal from Iraq will not put end to a difficult “situation.”  It will provoke the expansion of Islamic jihad against other American interests on the assumption that America does not have the stomach to stand against Allah’s fighters.  The result would be more violence not less as the fight is continued against other targets.

As Gen. Douglas MacArthur observed over 50 years ago, “In war there is no substitute for victory.”  First, however, we must know what victory is.