Not long ago American media reports were laden with dark warnings of the rise of a new power in the Middle East—Iran.  Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was cast as a shrewd statesman single-handedly outwitting the Bush administration against all odds.  Some even seemed to take a morbid pleasure in the Iranian ascendancy as yet another example of failed Bush foreign policy.

However, the requiem for the Bush administration and the triumphal procession of Iran may be premature.  In a stark reversal, Iran is now showing a willingness—even an eagerness—to come to the negotiating table.  Iran’s newfound amiability results from recent events that have highlighted the weakness of its position and some unexpected successes for the White House.

For several years Iran has been waging a quiet but intense intelligence war against America, especially in the Iraqi theater.  The U.S. intelligence community and its allies appear to have been up to the challenge.  Not only did American forces capture five Iranian intelligence operatives in Iraq in January, but Iran has since had to endure several high-level defections at a most inopportune time.  At least one of those defections was devastating to the Iranian military apparatus.  And of course Iranian nuclear scientist Ardeshir Hassanpour was assassinated, most likely by the Israeli Mossad.

Iran’s responses to these developments have been largely anemic.  Iranian forces detained 15 British sailors for two weeks in response to the capture of its agents in Iran, and retaliated for the death of Hassanpour by assassinating the head of the Israeli Defense Ministry Mission to Europe.  While these demonstrate Iran’s determination, they do not demonstrate much capability.  It is dehumanizing to speak in such terms, but in the context of an intelligence war, a few sailors and a government official are not nearly as valuable as five trained intelligence officers and a key architect of the Iranian nuclear program.

Fundamentally, Iran’s problem is geopolitical.  We in America may focus on casualty figures coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan as though they were islands, but a quick glance at the map reminds us that Iran shares extensive borders with Iraq to its west and Afghanistan to its east.  Tehran is well aware that those American and NATO forces could easily do an about face and open a massive two-front campaign against Iran.  An unlikely outcome, to be sure, but one that looms over every foreign policy decision Tehran takes.  It is no comfort to Ahmadinejad that America and the Afghanis are discussing the possibility of permanent U.S. bases on their soil.

Iran also must consider intra-Islam tensions.  Ironically, an indefinite American presence in Afghanistan may be a more desirable outcome for Iran than the alternative.  A Taliban resurgence would at least be problematic given its fiercely Sunni devotion in opposition to Iran’s passionate Shi’a Islam.  Likewise, should the Sunni insurgency prevail in Iraq, Iran would have a new problem on its western frontier.

The military, political, and religious pressures on Iran are beginning to tell.  For months Iran demanded that any cooperation on Iraq must be linked to Western recognition of its “legitimate” nuclear program.  Now, Iran appears to be backing away from that previously nonnegotiable linkage. Instead Tehran is signaling that it is ready to participate in reasonable talks without outlandish preconditions, and the Bush administration seems willing to take them up on it.