The recent arrests of two dozen terrorist plotters in Great Britain are rightly heralded as a significant victory in the global war on terror.  British, Pakistani, and American intelligence and law enforcement agencies cooperated to thwart a sophisticated, coordinated attack that could have rivaled 9/11, at least in terms of loss of life.  Our intelligence professionals and their overseas allies deserve our praise and gratitude.

            But as details of the foiled plot become clearer, they tell a more complete story than 24 mug shots and longer lines at the airport.  This latest plot, closely examined, reveals a great deal about the progress of the war on terror and our homeland security.

            First, notice the disrupted attack was conceived, planned and was to be executed outside the United States.  The purpose of terrorism is largely psychological. As the name implies, terrorism seeks to strike fear in the hearts of its victims and cause them to feel insecure in the mundane activities of life.  Thus, the intended victims of terrorism are the witnesses and survivors, not the dead.  For this reason, terrorists’ targets tend to be either symbolic (the World Trade Center or the Pentagon) or very ordinary (a busy subway system).  The message to those witnessing the attack, whether in person or via the ubiquitous media, is that no one—not the rich, not the strong, not the ordinary—is safe.

            Certainly the nearly simultaneous downing of six transatlantic flights and the resulting loss of life would cause terror and feelings of insecurity.  But undoubtedly our terrorist enemies would prefer more “valuable” targets—particularly, targets on U.S. soil that would maximize the psychological impact.  As bad as the transatlantic bombings might have been, they would not be as “terrifying” as a successful attack on Americans in America.  In short, Al-Qaeda, with whom these would-be bombers appear to be linked, would strike a domestic target if it could.  The foiled plot demonstrates that those responsible for our homeland security in America have been effectively denying the enemy his preferred targets.

            Second, this plot tells us something about the constraints the terrorists believe they now face regarding airline security.  No pocketknives and box-cutters here.  No attempts to commandeer planes for use as weapons.  In this case the plan was to use crude bombs simply to bring down planes over the ocean.  These would not be sophisticated devices employing high explosives.  The peroxide bombs envisioned by the terrorists were clever, but by no means foolproof nor especially powerful.  In fact it remains unclear whether the bombs developed by these terrorists could even have effectively brought down the planes they targeted.

            Third, consider the timeframe of the failed plot.  As we approach the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, recall the warnings of so many experts, government officials and even President Bush himself: the next terrorist attack is inevitable.  It is not a matter of “if,” but “when.”  Those warnings remain valid today.  The terrorists need only find one weakness in our defenses to “succeed,” while our intelligence and homeland security professionals must be right all the time.  The tragic bombings in Madrid and London not withstanding however, our terrorist foes would certainly have struck the U.S. again by now if they felt they could.  Even if, God forbid, we experience a new attack tomorrow, it is still a testimony to those combating the terrorist threat that the lull has persisted so long.

            Finally and most importantly, a chief characteristic of the transatlantic plot is that it failed.  These terrorists lacked the operational security (OPSEC) enjoyed, for example, by Mohammed Atta and his fellow perpetrators.  And the breakdown in OPSEC was not a result of dumb luck or the terrorists’ own mistakes but rather of aggressive, sustained and effective intelligence gathering by American, British and Pakistani forces.  The foiling of the transatlantic plot will one day provide a fruitful teaching case for intelligence textbooks.

            As we enter another election season in which the war on terror is a central issue, we can and should have healthy debates on the legality of international wiretapping, the scope of the Patriot Act, the legitimacy of overseas prisons, and other issues touching national security.  But it would be shortsighted to disregard the comparative security we enjoy.  Under the circumstances, the glass is much more than half full.